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LESLIE W. JACOBS*
The increasing case-load experienced by all Ohio Courts,' aroused
public scrutiny of the quality of justice available, more critical review of
the decisions of courts by legislatures2 and the Supreme Court of the
United States, pressures for more effective law enforcement, 3 moderniza-
tion of the Ohio judicial structure and, in that connection, expanded
authority of the Supreme Court of Ohio4 all suggest a need for an exam-
ination of the jurisprudence of that Court. As litigation multiplies, so do
the demands on the appellate levels.5 An appreciation of these demands,
the responses of the Court and its role as head of the third branch of
government may be attempted in this analysis of the 1969 term.
What follows is an effort in section I to identify some of those col-
lective attitudes, revealed in the decisions of the term, which invariably
affect the tenor of a court. The case highlights are examined in section II
in practical subject categories. And what is intended to be an informative,
t For the purpose of this article the 1969 term is considered to be the period from September
1, 1968 through August 31, 1969, which is a de facto term of the Court due to the customarily
prolonged summer recess. The Court normally commences hearing cases approximately Sep-
tember 15, and the last merit arguments are usually concluded prior to May 15; motions may be
heard into June, and most decisions are reported by the end of July.
An official term extends from January 1 through December 31 of a calendar year, and the
statistics computed by the clerk's office, as well as the revised system of assigning Supreme Court
case numbers, are maintained on this basis.
The official term is an historical anomaly, and the only current justification is that it cor-
responds to the elective terms of the justices, which commence on January 1 or 2 immediately
following an election. This is not considered a sufficient reason to overlook the reality of a
sustained period of decision-making which is periodically interrupted by considerably shorter
breaks than the summer recess.
It has been suggested by at least one member of the Court that all recesses should be of ap-
proximately the same duration and be evenly spaced over the entire year. There is no present
indication that this proposal will be adopted.
* B.S.B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., Harvard University. Member, Ohio Bar.
'Total cases filed in Ohio Courts of Common Pleas in 1958 was 93,702; in 1968, 117,728.
2 Witness the legislative response to State v. Potts, 16 Ohio St. 2d 111, 243 NYE.2d 91
(1968); State, ex rel. Park Inv. Co., v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 16 Ohio St.2d 85, 242 N.E.2d 887
(1968); and Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes, 16 Ohio St.2d 47, 242 N.E.2d 566 (1968),
and the continuing hearings before Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate.
3 E.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DIsomDERs (Kerner,
Chairman 1968). See A Symposium: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society-Perspectives
on the Report of the President's Crime Commission, 43 NOTRE DAME LAw. 811 (1968). See
also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 18, 18 App., 28, 42, 47 U.S.C.A.).
4 See W. Milligan and J. Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio Con-
stitution, 29 OHio ST. UJ. 811 (1968).
5 Total merit and motion cases filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1958 was 523; in 1968,
819.
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as well as interesting, statistical review is presented in section III. Any
one of these sections could be read independently, but even a tentative
"feel" for the Court, which is the ultimate goal, requires perusal of them
all.
Candor demands a confession as to what the article does not purport
to discuss. Perhaps the most important legal development in Ohio since
18526 is the proposal of new rules of civil, criminal and appellate proce-
dure. The proposed civil rules should be examined as a separate project,
and similar analysis of the criminal rules will be warranted in the future.
The administration of both the Supreme Court itself and the lower courts,
now subject to supervision by the Court which will be incorporated into
rules of superintendence for this purpose, is fascinating; unfortunately,
this would require a considerable digression. Related to administration is
the internal operation and structure of the Court, and that is mentioned
only collaterally.
I. INTRODUCTION
... [H]e fancied that it was right and requisite, as well for the sup-
port of his own honor as for the service of his country, that he should
make a knight-errant of himself, . .. righting every kind of wrong, and
exposing himself to peril and danger from which, in the issue, he was to
reap eternal renown and fame." Miguel de Cervantes. 7 The History of
Don Quixote de la Mancha.
Who can doubt that the role of a Supreme Court is to right the wrongs
in a judicial world? The difficulties are the recognition of the bound-
aries of that world, the identification of the wrongs and the choice of
method of attack. Does the principal responsibility for determining error
rest with a state court or the Supreme Court of the United States?
When the direction of the law is recognized, how far should a court go?
And along which route of review, and with what modicum of speed, does
the polestar" of propriety lead? These questions-the state and federal
functions of the Court, the scope of review and the philosophy on activ-
ism-define the quest which has distracted the Court from the contempla-
tion of the merits adjudicated, a definite undercurrent in the stream of an
otherwise typical term.
Concern with the respective roles of the state court of the highest
jurisdiction and the Supreme Court of the United States is not limited to
6 The year of the statutory enactment of Ohio's Field Code of Civil Procedure, 51 0. Laws
57, following the amendment of the judicial artide of the Ohio Constitution in 1851.
7 Pt. 1, ch. 1, translated by John Ormasby.
8 Borrowed from Justice Paul M. Herbert, an accomplished sailor, in Henry v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 16 Ohio St. 2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968).
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Ohio.' But it has been a puzzle which has particularly perplexed the
Supreme Court of Ohio in recent years since Mapp v. Ohio."0
The running debate was continued early in the term with the decision
of Hunter v. Erickson" reversing the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision of
the last term.'2 Chief Justice Taft's opinion dearly demonstrated an
awareness of the U.S. Supreme Court's previous decision in Reitman v.
9 Particularly relevant is the concurring opinion of Finley, C. J., of the Supreme Court of
Washington in State v. Davis, 73 Wash. 2d 281, 299, 301-02, 438 P.2d 185 (1969):
"The decision of the court in Miranda v. Arizona... is the law of the land. It is,
or should be, a truism of absolute quality that state court judges, and others, are duty-
bound to uphold and apply the law as construed by the court. Even so, in my judg-
ment some comment is appropriate relative to what I believe are some disturbing
jurisprudential and societal ramifications and consequences of Miranda. For although
I must and do support the decision judicially, I disagree with it, at least philosoph-
ically or in an essentially academic sense.
"As state law is affected more and more by a seemingly ever-expanding interpreta-
tion and application of the federal constitution, some may tend to forget the legal
niceties upon which intervention of the United States Supreme Court is predicated in
matters of state criminal law administration. The usual theoretical legal basis, as in
Miranda, for applying the principles of some of the federal constitutional amendments
to the states is the 'due process' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Miranda
rules are made applicable to the states because of a composite, majority judgment of
the members of the Supreme Court that such rules must be applied to accord 'due
process of law' for individuals accused of crimes.
"However, there is nothing thaumaturgic about the term 'due process of law.' Its
substance does not spring from timeless oracles. Rather, the words 'due process of
law' are (to paraphrase a general philosophical observation of Mr. Justice Holmes)
merely the 'skin of ideas.' In very large measure due process of law, in my considered
opinion, represents personal value-judgments made by different jurists at different
times under different circumstances. According reasonable and rational validity to
the foregoing postulates, there should be no inference of contumacy or heresy in crit-
ically analyzing and evaluating any and all judicial declarations which ostensibly or
purportedly provide additional substance to the shifting and varying content of those
fundamental social values characterized by the court as 'due process of law."'
The Supreme Court of the United States (or at least some of that Court's members) has not
been without reservations about the role of review. In a dissenting opinion of this term Justice
Harlan questioned how, in the light of new Court innovations, ". .. the integrity of the federal
judicial process is to be maintained in this era of increasingly rapid constitutional change."
Desist v. United States, - U.S. -, 89 S. Ct. 1030 (1969).
The lower federal courts have also voiced confusion and disagreement in following the Su-
preme Court and interpreting its theory of federal-state judicial relationships. In a Second Cir-
cuit decision of this term, with all nine judges sitting en banc, Chief Judge Lumbard said in dis-
sent, with two judges concurring: "I wish to be counted among those who do not think federal
judges were ever meant to review every state criminal proceedings or that there is any basis for
supposing that they can reach a more just result than the state court judges. We would be well
advised not to arrogate so much ultimate power to ourselves, as has been done by federal decisions
the past six years, in the name of safeguarding constitutional rights, and to be chary of exercising
such power except in the most compelling circumstances. We have gone far enough already;
we should not take the further step which will lead to the review, in one guise or another, of
every plea entered in a state court." United States ex rel. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016,
1036 (2d Cir. 1969). In the same case Judge Kaufman replied in a bitter majority concurrence:
"Judges must be careful lest their personal predilections lead them to ignore the constitutional
requirements set forth by the Supreme Court, by indulging in sophistic games of distinction-
making because they do not approve of the Court's Constitutional determinations." 409 F.2d at
1026.
10 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
12 State ex rel. Hunter v. Erickson, 12 Ohio St. 2d 116, 223 N.E.2d 129 (1967).
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Mulkey13 and made an honest attempt at valid distinction. But the opin-
ion of Justice White paid barely passing respect to the state courts and
decided the issue in broad terms, with little regard for legal niceties.
The rule became solely a test of practicality: When an ordinance of a city
expressly places all persons in an identical position as to the creation of
future racial regulations this will be invalid as discriminatory if the effect
is to make it more difficult than otherwise to pass open housing legisla-
tion. The importance of this case is that slight respect was shown by the
Supreme Court of the United States to the state court's legal reasoning,
while the quality of the opinion in reversing hardly merited great respect
in turn.
The Supreme Court of the United States remanded three cases this
term for consideration in the light of other decisions. It is always a
vexing problem for a court to understand its function upon remand, and
this is especially troublesome to a court which is accustomed to a position
of last resort. The Supreme Court of Ohio demonstrated on several occa-
sions this term its recognition of the difficulty within the state system.14
There is at least a hint of hesitation in the cases which it in turn had to
review upon direction of the Supreme Court of the United States. The
latter court has left the meaning of remand ambiguous-is it directing a
state court to anticipate its judgment, or is it requesting the benefit of the
state's wisdom and policy? This ambiguity is outstanding in the Serbian
Church case,"; remanded this spring but held for argument until next
term. The mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States refers to
its decision in the Presbyterian Church case,'1 but as is pointed out later
this may prove of little guidance.' 7
Following the decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois'8 the case of State
v. Pruett"9 was remanded to the Ohio Court.20 In that case and two
others21 this term the Court was squarely faced with the "Witherspoon
issue"-whether veniremen in Ohio trial courts were dismissed for cause
due to objections to capital punishment which would not necessarily pre-
clude their joining in a verdict of death where the evidence warranted
13387 U.S. 369 (1967).
14 Seetext accompanying note 111 infra, see also In re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E2d
808 (1969).
15 Serbian Orthodox Church Congregation of St. Demetrius of Akron, Ohio v. Vladislav
Kelemen, 393 U.S. 527 (per curiam) (1969).
16 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presby-
terian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
17 See, section J1 (I), infra.
1s391 U.S. 510 (1968).
19 Case number 41163, dismissed by the Court December 20, 1967.
20 Pruett v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 647 (1968).
21 State v. Wigglesworth, 18 Ohio St. 2d 171, 248 N.E.2d 607 (1969); State v. Crampton,
18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 248 N.E.2d 614 (1969). See also State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio St. 2d 145, 249
N.E.2d 897 (1969).
1969]
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it.22 In these cases it is hard to avoid the impression that the Court felt
forced to devote as much attention to the structure of its decision for pur-
poses of the inevitable review as it did to the merits of the contentions.23
The Supreme Court of the United States also remanded the much-
publicized case of In re Whittington 4 for consideration in the light of
In re Gault.25  The Supreme Court of Ohio had denied a motion to certify
that case last term, and upon remand it referred it back to the Court of
Appeals. But the fact was emphasized that Ohio's juvenile court system
was under scrutiny. Again in the decision of In re Agle 26 the Court
was forced painstakingly to justify its construction of Gault, as well as its
interpretation of public policy, with a view to the U. S. Supreme Court's
reaction.27
Despite the dissenting views of some members of the Court, Agler dem-
onstrated a resistance to even implied pressure. It should go without
saying that the Court's reading of Gault was the honest view of strict
constructionists. 28 But the reluctance of the Court at this time to over-
haul the juvenile court system forced it into an otherwise unnecessary de-
fense, one which may have the effect of entrenching opposition to minor
reforms.
This attitude may be compared to that in the obscenity area. The
history of Ohio's decisions is traced hereinafter,- and a review of those
cases will demonstrate that Ohio was allowed to independently develop
its doctrine of obscenity in relation to the state statute. While each opin-
ion pays lip service to U. S. Supreme Court cases, these did not dominate
Ohio law. In fact, the Supreme Court of Ohio was never reversed on an
obscenity issue. And by this term Ohio, in marked contrast to other
states, had narrowed the application of its statute to constitutionally un-
impeachable limits.
22See section II(B) infra, for discussion.
23 The decision in Pruett could have been soundly grounded on foomote 2 of that case alone.
The Court was obviously hesitant to rely on that position, though, and possibly with reason fol-
lowing its experience of several years ago in State v. O'Connor, 6 Ohio St. 2d 169, 217 N.E.2d
685 (1966), rev'd sub nom. O'Connor V. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, (1966).
24391 U.S. 341 (1968).
25 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
26 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969).
2 7 See section 11(A), infra, for discussion.
2 8 lower court disputes as to the appropriate attitude in construing a Supreme Court opinion
with which they disagree are mirrored in the Court's own membership. This term in Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), Justice Harlan reluctantly concurred, "purely out of respect for
stare decisis," in an extension of the Miranda rules. 394 U.S. at 328. Justice Stewart appended
this memorandum to the dissent of Justice White: "Although there is much to be said for Mr.
Justice Harlan's position, I join my Brother White in dissent. It seems to me that those of us
who dissented in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, remain free not only to express our con-
tinuing disagreement with that decision, but also to oppose any broadening of its impact." 394
U.S. at 331.
2 9 See section II(B), infra.
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Whether the Court has had the law imposed upon it or has developed
it alone, there has persisted an uncertainty as to the nature of judicial
discretion. This term the Court weathered another attack upon stare
decisis. Only two cases were assigned for re-argument during the term.30
Admittedly, both followed the retirement of Justice Paul Herbert and res-
ignation of Justice Brown so the Court was reduced to five members who
had participated at the original argument, but when examined more
closely they disclose a divisive quality in a lack of unanimity on Court
policy in changing rather than stating the law.
The syllabus in DiGildo v. Caponi3l is not exceptional when read in
relation to Scheibel v. Lipton,3 the ultimate authority on the duty of an
occupier of land to a social guest. It is the dicta in the case which
catches the eye. As discussed later,33 without it being necessary to the de-
cision in the case, Justice Schneider expressly opens the pandora's box of
the well-established rule that the host's duty to his social guest is limited
to a warning of dangerous conditions on the premises unknown to and
not likely to be discovered by the guest. He goes further and says that an
act occurring a day before the arrival of the guest may be an act or activity
within the Scheible rule prohibiting affirmative harm to a guest. Such an
approach appears to be a conscious effort to throw Ohio law open to judi-
cial revision.34 The barely restrained attitude that this "activism" is proper
is also displayed in the disposition of the argument urging the de-
struction of legal dassifications of visitors to which the opinion replies
"that a just measure of judicial restraint requires that this question be de-
ferred to a later day and to another case." 35
A case such as DiGildo evidences not only a Court split as to a point
of law but also something more fundamental, the role of the Court and
the judiciary as a whole. The varying views of the members of the Court
on the issue of docket composition is noted in connection with the statis-
30DiGildo v. Caponi, 18 Ohio St. 2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969); Carmelite Sisters, St.
Rita's Home v. Board of Review, 18 Ohio St. 2d 41, 247 N.E.2d 477 (1969).
31 18 Ohio St. 2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969).
32 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
33Se section H(E), infra.
34 See also the opinion of Duncan, J., in Frankhauser v. Mansfield, 19 Ohio St. 2d 102, 249
N.X.2d 789 (1969), discussed infra section II(E).
35 18 Ohio St. 2d at 131. Although Ohio already goes well beyond the majority of jurisdic-
tions in charity toward a guest-plaintiff, [See RESTATE NT (SECOND) O1F TORTS § 330, com-
ment h(3) at 175 (1965)) textual commentators have encouraged Ohio to take the second step.
2 F. V. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2711 at 1477-48.
The DiGildo case is also informative in another context. Ohio has the so-called syllabus rule
of the case so that an opinion is technically all dicta except those parts which state the rules of
law adopted as syllabus paragraphs. This has been credited with clarifying the law. But it also
has the effect of building a hornbook mentality in lawyers, divorcing the decision from the facts
of the case. In DiGildo the split in the opinion's attitude and the formalities of the syllabus is
marked, leading two members of the majority to concur in the syllabus and judgment only. This
is not uncommon and perhaps has some merit in that it allows each judge to pinpoint exactly
those aspects of the Court's conclusions with which he disagrees.
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tical review of this term. There has never been a clear understanding of
what standards the Court does or should apply in those instances where
it has a choice as to which cases will be heard on the merits.3 6
In compliance with constitutional requirements motions to certify and
for leave to appeal are allowed when there is a substantial constitutional
question or a question "of great and general interest." The more conser-
vative viewpoint is that these issues are presented when there is a point of
undecided law which will control the decision in a case. Corollaries of
that position are that, despite the rule that all errors are before the Court
upon the merits, if the anticipated issue proves to be illusuory or spurious
the case should be dismissed as improvidently allowed," and that once a
clear syllabus on a point has been written by the Court it is the responsi-
bility of the Courts of Appeals to apply it in the future. The more "lib-
eral" or "activist" theory of review is that the Court should simply correct
error (thus leading to the allowing of motions and disposition on the
merits, sometimes without oral argument, simply on the authority of a
prior decision,38 and if a case is believed to'be correctly decided below it
should not be heard on the merits at all despite its significance). These
two theories may be observed to not only disagree as to the type of case
the Court will hear but also to cause severe problems of precedent since
the Court refuses to consider a lower court opinion, even in a case in
which a motion to certify is overruled, as an authoritative statement of
Ohio law.39 Despite the inconsistency of these two principal philosophies
of Court role, both operated during this Court term.
A third theory of choosing the proper docket for the Court to consider
may be colloquially denominated the "big case." That strain of thought
goes: The "bigger" the case the necessarily greater and more general in-
terest it creates. It would have to be said that this approach also affects
the Court's motion decisions. That which is unclear is how the word
"big" is defined. Thus, there have been instances in which a dispropor-
tionately large verdict has seemed to catch the Court's attention,40 others
-36 Cf. Herbert, Obtaining Certification in the Supreme Court of Ohio: Cases of Public or
Great General Interest, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 32 (1966), and Taft, How to Get Into the Supreme
Court, 26 OHio B. ASS'N. REP. 847 (1953).
3 7 See, e.g., Goughler v. Goughler, No. 68-426, dismissed on March 5, 1969, with no oral
argument on the merits; In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, No. 68-298, dismissed
on February 11, 1969, after oral argument on the merits.
3 8 See, e.g., Haskins v. Liquor Control Comm., No. 68-22, reversed on authority of Dept. of
Liquor Control v. Santucci, 17 Ohio St. 2d 69, 246 N.E.2d 549 (1969), with no oral argument.
Cf. Powell v. Porter, No. 68-701, summarily reversed on authority of Wrinkle v. Trabert, Admr.,
174 Ohio St. 233, 188 N.E.2d (1963), after oral argument.
3 9 State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 15, 247 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1969).
4 0 See, e.g., Diener v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., motion to certify allowed as case
No. 68-565 on January 2, 1969, dismissed as improvidently allowed on May 14, 1969, following
oral argument. This case was an appeal from a verdict for plaintiff in a wrongful death action
with a judgment of $750,000, reputedly Ohio's largest tort recovery. The statutory basis justify-
ing this approach to certiorari is section 2321.17, Revised Code, stipulating as one ground for
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where the size of the parties has been notable,41 and still others where the
number of people affected has been the most outstanding feature of a
case.
42
One other area which has apparently troubled the Court in its self-
definition of scope of review has been the proper function in appeals
from administrative agencies. Some observations in this regard are of-
fered in the statistical review.43 The Court has wavered during the term.
Where judicial review is vested in either the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court, at appellant's choice, the Court has indicated an unwillingness to
weigh facts 44 In other cases there has been equivocation.4 5 Presumably
there will have to be legislative changes in the Court's jurisdiction or a
judicial re-appraisal in the near future.
The persistent questions of role recurred this term, and the Court man-
aged to cope with them. There were no revelations of new insight or
direction, at the most hints of an undefined disagreement. Fundamental
disputes about the validity and motivation of Court actions, so noticeable
last term in Euclid v. Heaton,46 did not again erupt to that degree, de-
spite the provocations of State ex rel. Graves v. Brown 47 and State ex
rel. Corrigan v. Perk.48 Conflicts of that sort are perhaps inevitable with
an elected judiciary which is often unaware that it is operating other than
apolitically; in openly political questions it is debatable whether a judge
with a recognizable constituency has an obligation, or at least an excuse,
to represent it 9 The only conclusion that seems tenable at this time is
granting a new trial, " (D) Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice."
41 See, e.g., Cleveland Trust Co. v. Eaton, No. 69-98, motion to certify allowed April 16,
1969.
42 See, e.g., Pallini v. Dankowski, 17 Ohio St. 2d 51, 245 N.E.2d 353 (1969). This was
one of the series of cases construing Ohio's assured clear distance statute, the clarity of which is
important to all drivers. See discussion infra II(F).
4 3 See, section III, infra. See also section I1(N) infra.
44 For instance, appeals from the Board of Tax Appeals. See Ace Steel Baling, Inc., v. Por-
terfield, 19 Ohio St. 2d 137, 249 N.E.2d 892 (1969).
45See Erie-Lackawanna Rd. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 18 Ohio St. 2d 112, 247 N.E.2d 736
(1969).
46 15 Ohio St. 2d 65, 242 N.E.2d 655 (1968).
47 18 Ohio St 2d 61, 247 N.E.2d 463 (1969). See discussion in section H(O), infra.
4819 Ohio St. 2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 525 (1969). See discussion in section II(L), infra.
4 9 It has been suggested by some observers of the Supreme Court of the United States that
even appointed judges with life terms do not ignore the wishes of the electorate entirely. The
canons of Judicial Ethics recognize an exception for the candidate who must participate in pol-
itics to qualify for his office. Canon 28. This of course does not sanction open partisanship in
the conduct of that judicial office. See Canons 14, 24, 30. Ohio has reached an awkward com-
promise, requiring a candidate to seek the primary nomination of a political party and then pit-
ting the respective parties' nominees against each other in separate contests for each seat in a
"non-partisan" general election (so labeled only because the candidates are not identified by party
affiliation on the printed ballot). By far the preferable scheme is the so-called "Missouri plan"
of appointment of a judge from a list prepared by a select non-partisan committee and submis-
sion of his name at a later election in which he runs unopposed and the electorate approves or
disapproves his "record." This system is not perfect, but it is a more workable attempt to provide
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that the Court is not operating with an expressed understanding of its
function in the broad sense, and, as the pressure of an expanding calendar
increases, substantive decisions of policy will become unavoidable.
II. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE TEnuv
A. Juveniles
Minor as Automobile Guest.-In one of the first decisions of the
term, Kemp v. Parmley,50 the Court reiterated its view that the Ohio guest
statute51 protects the mere giving of automobile hospitality and does not
require assent or acceptance on the part of the guest who is transported.
Karen Kemp was an eight year old, standing near a highway in-
tersection where she expected to be picked up by her regular school
bus. The defendant driver, temporarily parked at a nearby gasoline ser-
vice station, had previously seen the bus depart, and, in order to be help-
ful, stopped and offered Karen a ride to school. It was plaintiff's posi-
tion that a child of Karen's age was incapable of giving affirmative
consent to her status as a guest within the meaning of the statute. The
Court considered this irrelevant, and referred to its 1958 decision in Loin-
bardo v. DeShance,52 a decision by then Judge Taft. The plaintiff in
Lombardo had consumed such a quantity of alcoholic beverages before
entering the defendant's car that she had become virtually unconscious.
The Court stated the question before it as "whether one, who has volun-
tarily become intoxicated to such an extent that he can not know or
understand what he is doing, may, while in that condition, become a guest
within the meaning of the Ohio Guest Statute,"tu and concluded that
such a person was within the contemplation of the statute, the primary
purpose of which was to protect well-meaning operators of motor vehi-
des. In Kemp the Court totally ignored the fact that the inability of the
plaintiff in Lombardo to assent was a direct result of her voluntary intoxi-
cation, while under no circumstances could Karen Kemp have avoided her
disability due to age. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that the only
way for an automobile passenger to avoid the guest statute is to either pay
for the transportation or be forced into it despite active resistance.
Minor as Defendant for Service of Process.-The question of the
proper method of service of summons upon a minor was presented to the
Court in a curious case, an action against a sheriff for negligently and
insulation of a judge from politics while preserving the people's opportunity to reject a man or
his ideas which are offensive. The Ohio State Bar Association has repeatedly supported the in-
troduction of this plan in Ohio.
60 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 NB.2d 169 (1968).
5 1 OmO REv. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Page 1964).
52 167 Ohio St. 431, 149 N.E.2d 914 (1958).
53Id. at 434, 149 N.E.2d at 917.
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improperly failing to make a valid residence service." The plaintiff had
filed an action against a minor, and the clerk of courts had issued sum-
monses directing the sheriff to serve copies upon the minor and his father.
Defendants were vacationing at the time, and the summonses were re-
turned, with no copies left at the defendants' residence. After the grant-
ing of a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the action was not timely
commenced and that the defendants' absence on vacation did not toll the
statute of limitations, this case was commenced.
The Court construed the statute pertaining to service upon a minor"
and that relating to the manner of service in general."' These two stat-
utes, when read together, indicate that the manner of service upon a
minor is identical to that for an adult, the only unique feature being that
the minor's parent must also be served. The Court hastened to point out
that this rule "is defined by statute and is not the product of judicial con-
struction." ' 7
Juvenile Courts.-In May, 1967 the Supreme Court of the United
States disturbed the complacency of the juvenile courts throughout the
country with its decision of In re Gault." Paul Gault was a 15 year old
boy taken into custody by the sheriff of Gila County, Arizona, for alleg-
edily making an obscene telephone call. The boy's parents were not noti-
fied at the time of his arrest, the petition alleging delinquency was not
served on or shown to the boy or his parents, the complaining party was
not present at the hearing, remarks in the nature of a confession were ad-
mitted into evidence despite the failure to warn Paul Gault of his consti-
tutional rights or of his right to counsel, and although the same offense
committed by an adult would have resulted in imprisonment for possibly
two months, Paul Gault was found to be a juvenile delinquent and con-
fined to the Arizona State Industrial School for the entire period of his
remaining minority. The opinion by Justice Fortas emphasized the de-
fects in the juvenile proceedings. ". . .[I]t would be extraordinary if our
Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of
care implied in the phrase 'due process.' Under our Constitution, the con-
dition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."59
This term the Supreme Court of Ohio was faced with a review of
Ohio's juvenile system. This was the case of In re Agler.60  Unfortu-
nately, the Court construed In re Gault as narrowly as its literal words
would permit.
5 4 Thomas v. Tehan, 16 Ohio St. 2d 25, 242 N.E.2d 559 (1968).
55 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2703.13 (Page 1954).
56 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2703.08 (Page 1954).
57 16 Ohio St 2d at 27.
48387 U.S. 1 (1967).
59 Id. at 27-28.
60 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969).
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The thrust of Gault was not just "fairness" 61 but the accuracy of the
fact-finding process. When right to counsel is guaranteed, 62 in addition
to other rights, the process is inherently of an adversary nature. This
was pointed out by Justice HarlanO and recognized by the Supreme Court
of Ohio.64 If one of the parties feels prejudiced by the type of finder-of-
fact, the adversary balance is initially tipped. This feeling by a defend-
ant is always unfortunate but usually unjustified; however, both the Con-
stitution of Ohio and the Constitution of the United States establish a
fundamental right to a jury,65 and where this is denied the apprehensions
of any of the parties are based upon a guiding principle of the Anglo-
American legal tradition.
In what is probably the best-written opinion of the term, the Court
relates the history of the juvenile court system in Ohio. Yet some ques-
tions remain. The mere labeling of the entire structure as special and
"civil" should not automatically end scrutiny of the practical functioning
of juvenile justice. A reasonable man would find himself hard-pressed
to deny the penal atmosphere and effect of commitment to the Ohio
Youth Commission. This is an experience that any normal child would
resist at least as much as would an adult a sentence in a state correctional
institution. The original purpose to counsel and reform wayward juven-
iles, commendable at first blush, does not overcome the attitude of a
youth that he is going to a jail for minors or the similar conclusion of
his peers.66
When the constitutions of Ohio and the United States were adopted
there were no juvenile courts. The offenses which now constitute delin-
quency were then crimes despite the defendant's minority, and the right
to jury trial attached. Sending those adjudged to be delinquents to spe-
cialized penal institutions should not sanction the reduction of the safe-
guards of a fact-finding process which determines whether the particular
juvenile committed the acts with which he is charged. 7
611d. at 78, 249 N.E.2d at 813.
6 2 Rule 74.2(b), proposed Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
2151.352 (Page Supp. 1969). See In re Gault, note 9 supra.
63 387 U.S. at 75-76.
14 19 Ohio St. 2d at 79, 249 N.E.2d at 814. Nonetheless, one of the principal architects of
the revised Juvenile Court Act [OHio REv. CODE ANN. ch. 2151 (Page Supp. 1969)], which
included a statutory right to counsel, said that the committee endeavored to draft the reform
"without resorting to adversary and punitive procedures." Whitlatch, Ohio's Revised juvenile
Court Act, 42 Ohio B. Ass'n Rep. 1389 (1969).
5 OHno CONST. art. I, § 5 ; U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
66 Or of society in general, as noted by the Court, 19 Ohio St. 2d at 79, 249 N.E.2d at 814.
The revised Juvenile Court Act passed in June, 1969 (see note 74, infra) actually changes the
commitment facility for a delinquent male over 16 years of age from the Ohio State Reformatory
to a maximum security institution operated by the Department of Mental Hygiene & Correction.
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (Page Supp. 1969).67 Among those jurisdictions already providing a right to trial by jury are the following:
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-8-2(1) (1963); D.C. CODE § 16-2307 (Supp. IV, 1965); KAN. GEN.
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The same principles apply to the standard of proof which should be
necessary to deprive anyone of his liberty through confinement. No
valid reason was offered for the lower criterion (dear and convincing evi-
dence) than that used in criminal trials (beyond a reasonable doubt).
Furthermore, the latter is what a jury would expect to apply. 8 Justice
Herbert's opinion virtually concedes that, since the Supreme Court of the
United States has indicated juvenile proceedings are more than "civil"
where preponderance of the evidence is the common test, and the Su-
preme Court of Ohio insists that they are less than "criminal," the stand-
ard adopted is conveniently in the middle. 9
This reasoning does not extend to grand jury indictment. Such a pro-
cedure has never been required for all crimes by either constitution, and
initiation of a criminal complaint by information is common in other
jurisdictions.
Adopting procedural protections need not destroy the unique relation-
ship of court and accused which the juvenile court system established. It
is true that juveniles may benefit from that blend of "law and social work"
to which the court refers.70  This may continue at the stage where the
understanding of an informed adult, the judge, enhanced by the cus-
tomary reports of case workers, is most beneficial, namely the choice of
STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (1965); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 56 (1958) (trial de novo
in Superior Court); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27-3178 (598.17) (1962); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 10-603, 604 (1957); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-202 (1960); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717,
437 P.2d 716 (1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 102 (1966); S.D. CODE § 43.0331 (1939);
Doster v. State, 195 Tenn. 535, 260 S.W.2d 279 (1953) (by implication); TEXAs ANN. Civ.
STAT. art. 2338.13 (Vernon Supp. 1967); W.VA. CODE ANN. ch. 49-5-6 (1961); Wis. STAT.
ANN. ch. 48.25 (1957).
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), rehearing denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968), the
Supreme Court of the United States concluded, in an opinion by Justice White, that "because we
believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,
we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee." 391 U.S. at 149. "... [The penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major
relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject
the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment." 391 U.S. at 159. Similarly, the serious
potential penalties for many juvenile offenses should in themselves indicate that the juvenile
trial is criminal in nature. For example, compare the definition of a "delinquent child" under
the new section 2151.02, Revised Code, with the definitions of a "juvenile traffic offender" or
"unruly child" in new sections 2151.021 and 2151.022, Revised Code, respectively.
68 The Supreme Court of the United States has held in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967), and Smith v. Hooey, --- U.S. , 21 L.Ed. 2d 607 (1969), "That, by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is enforceable against
the States...." ___U.S. at .. If that Sixth Amendment right is "one of the most basic rights
preserved by our Constitution," 386 U.S. at 226, surely the ultimate "basic right' is the guarantee
of jury trial itself. It is significant that in both Klopfer and Hooey, Harlan, J., rested the exten-
sion of jury trial procedures to the states upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment instead of upon that Amendment's "incorporation" of the Sixth. This conclusion is a way
of saying that such trial rights are a necessary requirement for fairness, and therefore those that
jurors would assume to be essential.
09 19 Ohio St. 2d at 83, 249 N.K2d at 816.
70 19 Ohio St. 2d at 73, 249 N.E.2d at 810; Whitiatch, The Juvenile Court, 18 W. REs. L.
REV. 1239, 1246 (1967).
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penalty or correction most likely to achieve the end of rehabilitation.
Necessarily, this stage is subsequent to an impartial conclusion as to
whether the juvenile charged has committed a wrongful act, and that de-
termination should not be influenced by impressions of whether he is a
"bad" or "good" boy in general.
One argument occasionally offered, not so much to assuage propo-
nents of the above position as to reconcile those who harbor second thoughts
about the wisdom of the Court's denial of a juvenile court jury, is that a
juvenile defendant who prefers adult trial procedures may obtain these in
the Court of Common Pleas. In addition to the fact that this sacrifices
the valuable features of juvenile treatment merely to provide a different
fact-finding approach,7 the choice is not available to most accused delin-
quents. Rule 74.3 of the proposed Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure stand-
ardizes what has been the prevailing Ohio practice in transferring juvenile
cases to adult courts. After a hearing on probable cause to believe that the
child committed the act(s) charged and a mental and physical exami-
nation ordered by the court, the transfer for criminal prosecution may be
made if all of the following are found: "(a) the child is not amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation as a delinquent child, (b) the child is not com-
mittable to an institution for the mentally deficient or mentally ill, and
(c) the safety or interest of the community require that the child be placed
under legal restraint or discipline greater or for a longer period of time
than are provided under the provisions of . . . [the juvenile statutes)."
Clearly such transfer of jurisdiction is not elective on the part of the ac-
cused, and is restricted in the exercise of the juvenile court's discretion.
The Court displayed genuine legal craftmanship in its struggle to
maintain stare decisis and the principles of its earlier decision in Cope v.
Campbell,7 2 despite the overdue exposure from the light of Gault and sec-
tion 2151.351, Revised Code, amended in 1968. But it is hard to escape
the conclusion that a piecemeal reform of juvenile courts will not satisfy
the increasing public concern. 3 Perhaps the re-evaluation of juvenile
courts is the proper function of the General Assembly where they orig-
nated; or it may be that the grant of constitutional power to the Court to
superintend the lower courts of Ohio was an expression of the legislative
attitude of the future. 4
71 Transfer to an adult court terminates juvenile court jurisdiction and therefore its sentenc-
ing powers. Rule 74.3 (3), proposed Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
72 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964).
73 See series of artides by R. Zimmerman in The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), commencing
Sept. 15 and continuing through Sept. 29, 1968, and a 15-article series by H. James in the Chris-
tian Science Monitor, commencing March 29, 1969.
74 OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 5. But see Sub. H.B. No. 320, passed by House on June 24, 1969,
before the announcement of the decision in In re Agler. That statute establishes standards for
transfer to criminal courts, before hearing the complaint on its merits, which are similar, but
not identical, to those suggested in the proposed civil rules (see text following note 71). It also
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School Attendance, Right or Qualified Privilege?-The travails of
Buddy Lynn Whittington will probably have a profound effect on Ohio
juvenile law. One important side issue presented as a chapter in that
saga raises the question of a student's and his parents' right to insist upon
his attendance at a public school.
After an agonizing battle from the Juvenile Court of Fairfield County
to the Supreme Court of the United States in the course of almost two
years, the latter Court vacated the judgment of the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals," which had affirmed a finding of delinquency, and remanded the
case76 for consideration in the light of In re Gault.77 In the meantime,
Whittington had been bound over to the Common Pleas Court, and was
indicted by the grand jury upon a charge of murder in the first degree.
On June 27, 1968, following remand, the Court of Appeals ordered
Whittington released upon bond in his parents' custody, despite the fact
that the offense for which he was indicted was not bailable under Ohio
law.
At the commencement of the 1968-1969 school year the local board of
education, reacting to some anonymous public protests about the forth-
coming presence of Whittington in school and as a current member of the
high school varsity football team, adopted a regulation that "Any stu-
dent.., charged or convicted of a wrongful act, such as a felony, shall be
excluded from attending the schools of the ...school district until he is
exonerated by the legal authorities." In reaction to that regulation, and
the concomitant determination of the school board that Whittington be
excluded pursuant to the regulation, Whittington and his parents filed an
action in mandamus in the Court of Appeals to require the school board
to admit him, "or in the alternative, that the respondents supply the minor
petitioner with a tutor to enable him to continue his studies and receive
full accredidation." The writ was issued ordering his attendance, despite
the fact that on the same day the petition was filed the board adopted a
resolution to provide Whittington with a tutor. The school board ap-
pealed, and the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Court of Appeals
this term.7
The Court, in the classical tradition of side-stepping controversial dis-
putes where a decision on the merits is not absolutely essential, 79 disposed
confirms the clear and convincing evidence test and denies a jury trial. It continues the right to
counsel. See, Whitlatch, supra, note 64, for section by section summary.
75 In Re Whittington, 13 Ohio App. 2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 333 (1967).
76391 U.S. 341 (1968).
77387 U.S. 1 (1967).
7 8 State ex rel. Whittington v. Barr, 19 Ohio St. 2d 21, 249 N.E.2d 773 (1969).
79 It was said of Mr. Justice Frankfurter by two of his former law clerks: "Related to the
Justice's reluctance to substitute his own judgment for that of the legislature, we find running
through several of his opinions during the year [1947 term] a corresponding reluctance to re-
solve issues, and particularly constitutional questions, that did not have to be decided." Helman
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of the case as moot in the first instance because the school board's tutor-
ing resolution had technically complied with the alternative prayer of the
petition. This decision ignored the illusory qualities of the mootness up-
on which it relied. The school board had repeatedly refused to provide
tutoring service to Whittington over the previous two years and had, in
this instance, adopted the resolution only when faced with a probable ju-
dicial rejection of their Whittington-oriented exclusion regulation.
Without a continuing court order, the board can now repeal its reso-
lution at any time. Once this is recognized, an admission of the need and
justification for a court writ raises another problem. The issuance of an
extraordinary writ is within the discretion of the court, and, if the alle-
gations of the petition justify the issuance at all, the Court of Appeals
could normally exercise its discretion to grant the primary prayer as the
more effective remedy for the board's illegal act. That court could easily
understand that the reason for the alternative prayer was not that peti-
tioners considered tutoring equivalent, but rather that a teenage boy who
had already lost two years of education could not risk another in order to
demand his full rights. It would be unusual for the Supreme Court to
sustain the issuance of a writ and modify the details in order to achieve the
same result as it did in this case.
It is regrettable that the Court didn't reach the fundamental question,
namely the validity of a school district regulation excluding from the pub-
lic schools any potential student who is "charged" with a "wrongful act,"
and continuing that exclusion "until he is exonerated." The substance
and effect of this rule is to impose a significant punishment upon a juven-
ile before he has been proven guilty, and it unabashedly places the bur-
den upon him to prove himself innocent as a condition of readmittance to
school. Such a requirement blatantly denies due process of law to a stu-
dent who is accused of any serious wrong.
The regulation could never be sustained as a penalty provision, but in
its support arguments were offered that it was necessary for school dis-
cipline and efficiency. To this there are two responses. First, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has already severely limited the per-
missable restraints which may be imposed to avoid anything short of
"material and substantial interference with school work or discipline.""0
In sustaining students' rights to peacefully and conveniently express op-
position to the Vietnam war the Court said that
... in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression .... In our
system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.
School authorities do not possess absolute authority over their students.
& Rosenthal, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Legal History, and Law Clerks, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL His-
TORY IN HONOR OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1966).
80 Tinker v. Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Con-
stitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligation to the State.81
Surely the right to freedom of speech is no more sacred than the presump-
tion of innocence in favor of an accused. But second, there was no cred-
ible evidence, other than the prediction of administrators, that Whitting-
ton's attendance would interfere in the conduct of school activities, and
the other evidence before the Court of Appeals showed these fears to be
ingenuine, or at least fanciful. Whittington had been on bail in the small
community for the entire summer without incident; neighbors testified
that he socialized with their children; he had "made" the high school foot-
ball team with which he had been practicing; and virtually the entire team
appeared at court to testify on his behalf. These considerations persuaded
the Court of Appeals but were never dealt with by the Supreme Court.8 2
B. Criminal Law
Obscenity.-Section 2905.34, Revised Code, provides that "no person
shall knowingly sell, lend, give away, or exhibit, or publish or offer to
publish or have in his possession or under his control an obscene, lewd,
or lascivious book, . . ." or other item of communication or display. Sec-
tion 13035, General Code, the predecessor to the current statute, provided
(prior to amendment in 1939) as follows: "Whoever sells, lends, gives
away, exhibits, or offers to sell, lend, give away or exhibit, or publishes
or offers to publish or has in his possession for such purpose, an obscene,
lewd or lascivious book . .." is guilty of a crime. In 1939 the words "for
such purpose" were deleted and replaced with "or has under his con-
trol."8'  In 1943 the word "knowingly" was inserted following the word
"whoever,"84 and the statute reached the substantive form which is in
effect today.
The Court first wrestled with the result of this series of changes in
State v. Mapp.85 In the opinion of the Court by then Judge Taft, it was
stated that "in the opinion of Judges Taft, Bell, Herbert and Peck, the
portion of Section 2905.34, Revised Code, upon which defendant's con-
viction was based, is constitutionally invalid, and, for that reason, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. However, Section
81Id. at 508, 511.
82 An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, upon remand from the United States
Supreme Court, that a finding of delinquency is not an appealable order when the juvenile is
thereafter indicted, was filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio as case no. 69-287 on May 28, 1969.
It is inconceivable that the Court would refuse to certify that case as a question of great and gen-
eral interest or dismiss it sun sponte as not involving a substantial constitutional question.
83118 OHio LAws 420.
84 120 OHIo LAws 230.
s5 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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2 of Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio reads in part: 'No law shall
be held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court without the con-
currence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of
the judgment of the Court of Appeals declaring a law unconstitutional
and void.' "" The opinion of the majority was that criminal liability for
mere possession violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States by discouraging the perusal of non-
obscene literature. And even reading a requirement of scienter into the
word "knowingly" would not avoid the consequence of over-cautiousness
because of the severe punishments for a violation of the law.
On two other significant occasions the Court then had to consider this
statute before the constitutional amendment of May, 1968 permitted a
majority vote to control all constitutional questions. In State v. Jacobel-
lis,8 7 an opinion by Judge Radcliff of the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peals sitting on assignment,"8 the Court adopted Judge Taft's suggestion
in Mapp and construed section 2905.34, Revised Code, to require scienter
as an element of "knowingly." But it went further and also read in
mens tea, i.e., a guilty purpose. Thus, the Court was able to say, with-
out reaching any constitutional issue but as a matter of statutory con-
struction, that the "section might well be held to be invalid" if the phrase
"have in his possession or under his control" related "to the mere private
possession by an individual of such matter for his own personal gratifi-
cation."8' 9 And as a secondary conclusion the opinion limited the forbid-
den possession and control to the purpose of dissemination under the
theory that a statutory phrase "must be read in context with the language
used in the section as a whole." 90
This approach in Jacobellis succeeded in converting Judge Bell from
an advocate of constitutional invalidity to one supporting the construed
statute,9 ' and the conviction was affirmed although the same reading of
the section would have required a reversal of the Mapp conviction since
the evidence there only showed Mrs. Mapp discovering obscene literature
among the belongings of a former tenant and storage in her basement on
86Id., at 433-34, 166 N.E.2d at 391.
87 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom;. Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
88Now the Administrative Director of the courts of Ohio.
89 173 Ohio St, at 27, 179 N.E.2d at 780.
90 Id.
91 Judge Bell's concurring opinion in State v. Wetzel, 173 Ohio St. 16, 20, 179 NE.2d 773
(1962), decided the same day as Jacobellis, sheds light on his views. The line to be drawn is
between obvious intent to disseminate obvious pornography and private possession of any "ob-
scene" material. Given the desirability of such a line, a statute's constitutionality may vary with
the facts; when a case is on one side of the line the statute is invalid, but for a heinous case it
may be resurrected.
A similar theory of constitutional adjudication is exhibited in Justice Brown's opinion in
State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 132, 243 NXE.2d 66 (1968). See also Justice Schneider's
opinion in Euclid v. Heaton, 15 Ohio St. 2d 65, 72, 238 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
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his behalf. Judge Taft specifically refused to bastardize legislative his-
tory and re-write the statute to make it valid, but his opinion concurring
in part displayed not a little eagerness to have found that approach justi-
fiable. Judge Herbert simply dissented, and as a result his attitude on the
evolution of the statutory interpretation at that point was left ambiguous.
State v. Ross 2 was decided after the changes in Court membership in
January, 1965, but also before the constitutional amendment. Judge
Brown, not a party to the previous decisions and therefore more prone to
be candid in his discussion, explained that an indictment charging an of-
fense in the language of section 2905.34 alone is insufficient because
" ... the language of the statute used in the indictment has been judi-
cially limited, and this limitation is not apparent from the language it-
self .... This mens rea requirement was inferred... , and the motivation
behind the inference was undoubtedly the preservation of language of
otherwise questionable constitutionality."9 3  Chief Justice Taft and Judge
Herbert were able to concur, either because the syllabus and opinion re-
flected adversely upon Jacobellis or through a devotion to stare decisis.
Judge Schneider, also new in 1965, concurred in the syllabus and judg-
ment only but did not write a separate opinion.
This term the Court was again faced with the obscenity law. In a
per curiam opinion in State v. Potts9 4 the Ross case was followed, and a
demurrer to an indictment charging only "unlawfully and knowingly
hav[ing] in their possession or under their control" was sustained. The
importance of this case is that the Modern Courts Amendment to the
Ohio Constitution had been passed as Issue 3 on the ballot the previous
May, and the Court had (not without just criticism) accelerated its effec-
tive date from 1970 to that election; so the Court was no longer bound
by the provision which had prevented a majority declaration of uncon-
stitutionality in Alapp. Nonetheless, by acquiescence of all except Her-
bert, the strain which had been made to apply the section around the
constitutional handicaps was accepted. In fact, one very unfortunate
paragraph 5 even seems to show a drift back to the application of the sec-
tion without judicial gloss; the suggestion is that if a bill of exceptions
could demonstrate that adequate evidence of intention to sell was intro-
duced, then Ross would not apply because the defendant would not have
been prejudiced. Justice Schneider was able to concur generally this time.
Justice Herbert's dissent in Potts is ironic. After following the course
of development one would have expected him to either concur or chas-
tise the Court for not polling itself on the old Mapp issue of constitu-
92 12 Ohio St. 2d 37, 231 N.E.2d 299 (1967).
031d. at 38-9, 231 N.E.2d at 300.
94 16 Ohio St. 2d 111,243 N.E.2d 91 (1968).
95 The last full paragraph of 16 Ohio St. 2d at 112.
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tionality now that the opportunity was available. Instead he criticizes the
following of Ross in which he concurred and lauds Jacobellis as "an able
and penetrating opinion "" despite his earlier dissent in that case. He
even describes the vote as "five judges concurred, one dissented and one
concurred in part in Jacobellis," 7 but does not identify himself as the
one dissenter. The only hint of a reason for his change of view is the
observation that "Ohio is apparently becoming a fertile area for the dis-
semination of obscene literature.' 98
By the time the Supreme Court of the United States decided Stanley v.
Georgia9 in April of this year it had become perfectly clear that its judg-
ment condemning "a statute imposing criminal sanctions upon the mere
[knowingl possession of obscene matter"' 00 as unconstitutional was irrel-
evant for Ohio. Although the vulnerable part of the Georgia legisla-
tion'0 ' is virtually identical to section 2905.34, Revised Code, in its use of
the phrase "knowingly have possession of" within a string of phrases
referring to sale, exhibition and transmission, the Supreme Court of
Georgia preferred not to duck the issue with statutory construction.'0 2
At any rate, it worked for Ohio.
Insanity, Standard and Proof.-The opinion of Chief Justice Taft in
State v. Staten'01 reviewed the history of the defense of insanity in Ohio
and dispelled many of the misconceptions which have plagued Ohio
courts and lawyers.
Before this term, it had become the accepted dogma that Ohio fol-
lowed the classic rule in M'Naghten's case. 0 4  That test has generally
been summarized as allowing a defense of insanity only when the accused,
at the time of committing the criminal act charged, was unable to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong. The Court expressly repudiated tex-
tual attributions of this "sole test" to Ohio'05 and chided the legal en-
cyclopedias for relying upon Common Pleas and Court of Appeals deci-
sions for Ohio authority. 0 6
The Court refers to the case of Clark v. State107 as establishing the
defense of insanity in Ohio, in the same year as the decision of the
M'Naghten case and independently of the English court. Clark incor-
96 Id., at 114, 243 N..-2d at 93.
97 Id.
981d. at 116, 243 NX.2d at 95.
99 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
100 Id. at 559.
1D GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
10 2 See Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968).
10' 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969).
104 4 St. Tr. N.S. 847, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
10518 Ohio St. 2d at 14-15, 247 NXE.2d at 295.
106 Id.
107 12 Ohio 483 (1843).
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porated an element that went beyond the right and wrong test, namely
whether the defendant could refrain from doing the act. That element
is obviously a variation of the "irresistible impulse" test. The Court
points out'08 that the failure to use that label in Ohio has not been a re-
jection on the part of the Court of the second element of insanity in the
Clark case. Rather, it has been avoided as a misleading term since the
defense need not be limited to instantaneous incidents of insanity, and the
fact of momentary anger does not itself amount to insanity.
Two stylistic factors in the case deserve mention. One is the tech-
nique which the Court used in stating a suggested charge to the jury." 9
Footnote 5 accompanying the suggested charge seems clearly intended to
alert the Common Pleas Judges Association to change the current model
jury instruction on insanity. 10 The second noteworthy characteristic is
the way in which the Court structured its conclusion on remand with
specific instructions to the trial court for further disposition of the case."'
One valuable service which the opinion performs is its analytical ap-
proach. The Court dearly and candidly explains its understanding of in-
sanity as a refutation of criminal responsibility and states the reasons why
the medical determination does not predominate the application of legal
consequences. Thus, the purposes of sanctions in the criminal law (pri-
marily deterrence) do not completely coincide with the idea of non-penal
treatment for all persons who might benefit to any degree. The only
limitation which the law will recognize upon its power to punish or incar-
cerate in the case of one who knew the reprehensible nature and quality
of his voluntary act is where that person is currently insane so that pun-
ishment would be beyond his comprehension."'
A frequent criticism of the M'Naghten-oriented test of legal insanity is
that there is no scientifically reliable technique for psychiatric evaluation
of the crucial elements.11 3  The important factor to understand is that,
just as the M'Naghten rule is irrelevant to modern psychiatry, psychiatric
valuation is irrelevant to the ultimate factual conclusions upon which the
purposes of the criminal law rely. 14 Ignorance of this point led to the
adoption of the Durham rule."5 The argument made to the court in that
108 18 Ohio St. 2d at 21-22, n. 8, 247 N.E.2d at 299, n. 8.
109 Id., at 21, 247 N.E.2d at 299.
1104 OMO JURY INSTRUCrONS, CRIMNAL 410.51(b) (1967). These instructions were
significantly revised to approximately conform to the opinion's suggestions. 4 OHio JuRy IN-
sRucTioNs, CRIMINAL 410.51(C) (1969).
111 18 Ohio St. 2d at 22, 247 N.E.2d at 300.
1 12 State, ex rel. Townsend, v. Bushong, 146 Ohio St. 271, 65 N.E.2d 407 (1946). Krauter
v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio St. 2d 142, 209 N.E.2d 571 (1965).
113 CoMInTr ON PSYaIrATRY AND LAW OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCHMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, REPORT 26 (1954).
114 Cf. Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 773-74 (1956).
115 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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case was that the M'Naghten rule "compelled a psychiatrist to answer,
or to decline to answer, questions which were in fact irrelevant .... 116
The result is an encouragement of expert testimony in the language of the
profession. The jury is supposedly still vested with the responsibility to
make the ultimate factual conclusions, but in effect the psychiatric testi-
mony will control. The jury merely weighs the reliability of competing
"experts,"117 and these expert's opinions are oriented toward the need
for and amenability to custodial care".8 instead of legal purposes. 19  The
adoption of the "impartial expert"'120 would not correct the fundamental
diversion of responsibility but would instead lead to the equivalent of a
directed verdict based upon his opinion.
Ohio confronted the use of expert testimony this term in State v.
Crampton.'2' There, one of defendant's witnesses was a staff doctor of
a state mental hospital who was assigned to care for defendant; he had
had some psychiatric training but was not qualified as a psychiatrist in
the state. This raised serious questions as to his qualification as an expert
witness at all, but the Court did not reach that issue.
Following the decision in Staten the Court had no difficulty in re-
jecting testimony based upon the Durham rule. This is a tremendous
temptation for the expert witness, and Ohio trial courts will have to be
careful to limit such excursions into the improper. A more difficult, and
more subtle problem was the sustaining of an objection to a hypotheti-
cal question propounded to the witness. The use of such questions
would have the overall effect of enhancing the power of expert testimony,
almost to the Durham level, if they could be grounded upon basic non-
medical facts (which the jury would find) and express a medical conclu-
sion of insanity in that fact situation. Most psychiatrists would be hesi-
tant to reply to such a question, but in Crampton the defense counsel
asked for an opinion on the mental effect of an excessive use of certain
drugs which the defendant had allegedly consumed. The Court avoided
the issue of whether this was a relevant question at all on the issue of in-
116 Supplemental Brief for Appellant on Reargument.
117 "According to the Durham decision, if the defense of insanity has been raised in a crim-
inal trial, it is considered to be a 'matter of fact' for the jury to decide whether the offender suf-
fered from a 'mental illness' at the time of the commission of the act with which he is charged.
"This is unadulterated nonsense. It could come about only as a result of the great prestige
which the medical profession commands in our present-day society, and is, in fact, an expression
of that prestige." Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 COLuM. L. REV. 182, 190
(1958).
118p. Q. RocHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 253-55 (1958).
119 In fact, psychiatrists are instructed that they are to ignore the legal consequences. Baz-
elon, Remarks on Psychiatry and the Law to the American Psychiatric Association on Sept. 30,
1957.
120 Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, III ARc- vEs OF CRIMINAL PSYCHODY-
NAMIcs (1959).




sanity122 and found no error in rejecting the question since the same opin-
ion had previously been offered in non-hypothetical form.
The primary value in the M'Naghten variation adopted in Ohio is that
it expresses the lay understanding of insanity as it relates to criminal ac-
countability. This was emphasized by the Court's attitude in Staten, and
it will be essential that the proof of insanity be directed to that legal con-
cept.
Larceny by Trick and Blackmail.-In State v. Wilkinson 2 ' the Court
construed the statutory sections defining the crimes of larceny by trick 24
and blackmail12 5 and applied them to an interesting factual situation.
Superficially, the crimes would appear to be mutually repugnant, the
former involving the obtaining of an item of value by deception, and the
latter by threat.
Defendant Wilkinson participated with two codefendants in a scheme
to obtain money. They demonstrated a device which purported to change
the denominations of currency to increase the value and apparently suc-
ceeded in persuading the gullible victim of its practicability. When he
hesitated, the defendants threatened him with harm to his family. He
subsequently withdrew funds from several banks and surrendered it to
the defendants, but they had never withdrawn their promise to return him
a profit. Thus, it was impossible to determine as a matter of law which
influence, the threat or the opportunity, was the victim's principal induce-
ment. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts of the indict-
ment.
The Court found that the jury could have reasonably found from the
evidence the elements of larceny by trick: obtaining possession of some-
thing of value with the consent of the transferor, which consent was in-
duced by fraud. But the statutory language on blackmail is more ambig-
uous. It is necessary that there be a threat and a demand for a thing of
value, but the obtaining of possession is not a factor. The first problem
was a determination of whether section 2901.38, Revised Code, itself stip-
ulated the types of threats which are proscribed, since the only references
are to direct attacks upon the victim; the Court held that harm to a vic-
tim's family is within the scope of the general term "threat," and that the
term is not qualified by the statutory language. The second problem,
raised by this interpretation, was how a person could have been required
to surrender the same quantity of money under coercion as he transferred
voluntarily under fraudulently induced consent. The resolution of this
dilemma was the Court's explanation that a jury could have reached the
122 Since use of drugs could be compared to alcohol, the use of which does not excuse sub-
sequent conduct.
123 17 Ohio St. 2d 9, 244 N.E.2d 480 (1969).
124 O1UVI . CODE ANN. § 2907.21 (Page 1954).
125 OMIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.38 (Page 1954).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
conclusion that, despite the intervention of a threat between the offer of
profit and the transfer, the "victim" still thought he was going to benefit
and this anticipation was his primary motivation. Ironically, the efforts
of the defense to discredit the victim's testimony referring to the threat
could have significantly contributed to this impression.
Evidence, Neutron Activation Analysis.-State v. Holt. 6 presented
the Court for the first time with the issues of the legal validity of neutron
activation analysis as an evidentiary tool for scientifically identifying the
source of a substance and the sufficiency of the expert testimony based
upon such analysis. Samples of substances to be compared are bombarded
with neutrons in a nuclear reactor to convert some of the stable elements
into radioactive isotopes; by analyzing these isotopes with radiation de-
tection equipment the chemical elements of the samples may be deter-
mined and measured. The process has two favorable characteristics.
First, extremely small samples will suffice,1 27 and second, the ability to
measure numerous elements permits a detailed classification of similar
substances into an almost infinite number of sub-categories. 28
The Court has apparently accepted the reliability of blood tests when
competently performed, 29 but when used as a technique to associate a
particular defendant with a blood sample located in connection with a
crime the admissibility is usually limited to an exclusion of the defendant
from the blood type class. Other jurisdictions have permitted the admis-
sion of neutron activation evidence, finding it equally as scientific as
blood testing. 30 The significant question that remains open is whether
the value of this test may go beyond exclusion and also be used to affirma-
tively identify a suspect.
Defendant Holt was indicted for rape of a seven year old girl. A hair
was removed from the person of the victim during treatment in a hospital,
another was found on her clothing, and both were preserved. While
defendant was in jail following his arrest, a sample of his pubic hair
was secured from his underwear. These hairs were submitted to a nuclear
chemist for activation analysis.
The defense raised numerous questions as to the performance of the
tests, among them the failure to adequately prepare the samples, the small
number of hair tests previously performed by the chemist-expert, and the
consequence of destruction of the samples which prevented re-testing de-
spite the supposed advantage of the technique that deterioriation of a
126 17 Ohio St. 2d 81, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969).
127 Proceedings, 1961 International Conference: Modern Trends in Activation Analysis.
Wahl & Kramer, "Neutron-Activation Analysis," 216 Scientific American 68 (1967).
12 8 A'roc ENERGY CoMiussioN, NEUTRON ACrIVATION ANALYSIS (1968).
:129 Cf. City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968).
13o Cf. 15 AM. JuR., PRooF OF FACTS Identification of Substances By Neutron Activation
Analysis § 15 at 134 (1965).
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sample should not be required. The Court paid this passing mention but
did not offer any specific opinion on the seriousness of these defects.
Instead, Justice Zimmerman's opinion and the syllabus turned on an-
other "important and determinative factor which leads [the Court] to the
conclusion that the [expert] witness's testimony should have been rejected
and that it was prejudicial error to receive it over objection."'31 That was
the restriction which the Court has placed upon an expert's opinion testi-
mony which is based upon scientific fact.132  When a qualified witness
offers an opinion it must be stated in terms of probability. Here the
opinion was that samples were "similar and are likely to be from the
same source." That did not display the requisite degree of certainty.
The Court's treatment of this statement raises some problems. By
stating the conclusion that "the testimony of the witness, . . . the proce-
dures used in such analysis and his ultimate conclusion based thereon, did
not reach that degree of certainty which the law demands,"' 133 it remains
unclear whether the primary objection to the evidence was the Court's
skepticism of the exactitude of the type of test, the performance of the
particular test, or the lack of precision in the expert's statement.
The unfortunate way in which the expert replied to the opinion ques-
tion would in itself justify the decision of the Court. He technically
stated scientific evidence that went no further than could testimony based
upon blood test evidence, that because the two specimens were "similar"
the defendant is not eliminated as a possible culprit. The opinion that
the hairs "likely" came from the same person then becomes gratuitous.
There is one disconcerting element in the facts of the case which the
Court does not discuss. The young victim originally identified another
suspect in a police line-up, and he was taken into custody. Subsequently,
and for reasons unexplained, the police dismissed him as a possible assail-
ant. Despite the fact that comparable opportunities should have been
available to obtain hair samples from that suspect, none were sought and
no tests were ever run. Thus, the impression was made that the police
used this comparatively recent device to build their jury case and not to
convince themselves. In these circumstances any doubts as to the validity
of the evidence would naturally be construed against the prosecution, and
errors found would be considered prejudicial because of the obvious at-
tempt to awe the jury with expert testimony.
Exclusion of Veniremen Opposed to Capital Punishment.-The fed-
eral restrictions upon a state's standards for selection of a jury in a capital
case, announced in an opinion by Justice Stewart in Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois,134 came before the Court for the first time this term. As a new and
131 17 Ohio St. 2d at 85, 246 N.E.2d at 367.
132 Shepherd v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.Y.2d 156 (1949).
133 17 Ohio St. 2d at 86, 246 N.E.2d at 368.
234 391 U.S. 510 (1969).
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pregnant attack upon the death penalty in the United States it was natur-
ally a point in contention in every death case appealed. Two of these
appeals, State v. Wigglesworth13 5 and State v. Crampton,136 and one
case remanded from the Supreme Court of the United States for consider-
ation of this issue, State v. Pruett,1'7 best presented the position of Ohio
law. All three opinions were written by Chief Justice Taft.
The tenor of the Witherspoon case is a constitutional objection to the
systematic exclusion of a class of jurors, which class as a whole does not
necessarily reject the obligation to return a verdict based upon the facts
in the case and the current state of the law. In these three Ohio cases it
is manifest that there was no systematic exclusion of the entire class, but
only of the sub-class which admittedly was unable to perform its function
according to law.
In each case the Court found no violation of Witherspoon on the
facts. It was also pointed out that statutory challenges for cause in Ohio,
unlike those in Illinois, may be made only when the prospective juror's
attitude about capital punishment would preclude him from joining in a
proper verdict of guilty with no recommendation for mercy.3 A further
legal argument in support of the decision in Pruett was stated in a foot-
note to that opinion, namely, that failure to raise an objection based
upon the statute at trial should prevent reliance upon claimed error in
this appeal since the constitutional right goes no further than the statutory
right which was specific even before the Witherspoon decision.
Although it is true that Section 2945.25(C), Revised Code, comes
within the language of Witherspoon,'39 it was necessary in the hope of
avoiding reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States that the
analysis of the cases before the Court go beyond noting this distinction.
The past rationale for applying the Sixth Amendment requirement
of "an impartial jury of the state" has been that part of section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment which says "nor shall any state deprive any per-
135 18 Ohio St. 2d 171, 248 NXE.2d 607 (1969).
136 18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 248 N.E.2d 614 (1969).
'37 18 Ohio St. 2d 167, 248 N.E.2d 605 (1969), a!f'g mem. remand sub nor. Pruett v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 647 (1968).
138 "A person called as a juror on an indictment may be challenged for the following causes:
... (C) In the trial of a capital offense, that his opinions preclude him from finding the accused
guilty of an offense punishable with death... OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25 (Page
1954). It may be contended that this language does not justify dismissal of a venireman for
cause if he states that he could find an accused guilty but would not be able to deny a recom-
mendation for mercy in a capital case. If so, then the statute is more favorable to the defendant
than is the constitutional rule of Witherspoon.
139 "Nothing we say today bears upon the power of a state to execute the defendant sentenced
to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were
those who made unmistakably dear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposi-
tion of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial
of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt." 391 U.S. at 522, n. 21.
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son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Wither-
spoon seemed to hold that the statute in Illinois, in systematically exclud-
ing all persons opposed to capital punishment, violated the due process
clause by destroying the concept of impartiality. Since the Ohio statute
excludes only those who admittedly would be unable, under any circum-
stances, to enforce the law of the state, including the requisite punish-
ment, there is no state action per se which violates the constitutional
rights of the defendants.
The only state action which may be found is that of the officials of
the state, judges or prosecutors acting in those capacities; and to be con-
demned, their actions would violate both the Fourteenth Amendment and
state statutes. The fact that such actions would be a violation of state
law does not prevent them from being state action within the meaning
of the due process clause. Thus, it was extremely important for the
Court's opinions to persuasively argue the facts of each case to demon-
strate a conscientious effort on the part of the trial court and the prose-
cutor to comply with Ohio law. This was done in sufficient, but conclu-
sory, fashion, possibly due to a fear that the facts which impressed the
Supreme Court of Ohio that the voir dire was fair and conscientious
might be the very quotations which the Supreme Court of the United
States would cite out of context for the opposite conclusion.
The contrast between the attitudes and actions of the three trial judges
in Pruett, Wigglesworth and Crampton, as compared to the judge in
Witherspoon, is marked. All three Ohio judges not only participated in
the voir dire examination, but on several occasions themselves asked the
necessary question as to whether or not the prospective juror's beliefs
would preclude him from finding a verdict based upon the evidence.
In the Crampton case the court refused to dismiss one venireman for
cause when the answers to the questions were equivocal, but dearly pre-
disposed to require mercy, and it was necessary for the prosecution to use
one of its peremptory challenges. This is to be compared with the state-
ment of the Witherspoon trial judge, "Let's get these conscientious objec-
tors out of the way without wasting any time on them." In Crampton
there is no question, and the appellant raised no question as to any partic-
ular juror, that any prospective jurors were disqualified without indicat-
ing that their beliefs would preclude their participating in a verdict of
guilty which could result in the death penalty.
In the Wigglesworth case 13 of 43 prospective jurors were dismissed
for cause; only one of these 13 was not questioned as to whether she could
join in a verdict involving the death penalty. In this case it would have
been worthwhile for the opinion to emphasize two facts: (1) that the
court had demonstrated no bias similar to that in Witherspoon, and there-
fore could competently judge the depth of some jurors' beliefs, and (2) by
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listening to the responses of the prospective juror and viewing the juror's
demeanor, it would be reasonable for the court to terminate the examina-
tion of the juror. Furthermore, in this particular case, the state at the com-
pletion of the voir dire examination, and after the entire panel had been
seated, still retained five peremptory challenges which were unused.
There could have been no prejudicial error in dismissing such a juror who
would undoubtedly have been challenged by the prosecution.
In Pruett the appellant, upon remand from the Supreme Court, com-
plained of the examination of only three prospective jurors. Once again,
it was valid to emphasize the lack of demonstrated bias on behalf of the
court. As to one, or possibly two, of the three prospective jurors, their
responses to the examination by the prosecutor were indicative of their
probable inability to join in the death verdict. The most that could be
said in defendant's favor is that their answers were ambiguous. There is
a suggestion in Witherspoon, which is repeated in Boulden v. Holman,40
that ambiguity is insufficient for dismissal. However, in each case there
was a sustained and repeated effort by the questioner(s) to elicit the
juror's true feelings and anticipated ability to perform impartially. The
responses of the prospective jurors, combined with the evidence of their
demeanor upon questioning, should have reasonably supported dismissal
for cause. As to the third venireman, he dearly replied that he could not
join in even a proper verdict.
One aspect of the selection of a jury is not discussed in either Wither-
spoon or the opinions of the Supreme Court of Ohio. The number of
challenges for cause is unlimited, and to avoid structuring a hopelessly
artificial jury such challenges must be restricted to causes which unduly
prejudice a prospective juror. Similar restrictions would be necessary for
excusing a venireman, either upon his own or another's request, with the
additional consideration that substantial difficulties attending his partid-
pation may qualify as a valid excuse. But the third method of removing a
juror is the peremptory challenge; in Ohio the defense and prosecution
each have six of these, to be exercised alternately (or passed) when a ten-
tative panel is seated. By combining valid challenges for cause with its
peremptory challenges it might be possible for the prosecution to remove
all persons from the jury who affirmatively express any opposition to capi-
tal punishment. In that case an argument could be raised that the effect
was to systematically exclude.
This argument was suggested in Crampton where it was true that, of
the 33 prospective jurors examined, the only five volunteering their philo-
sophical objections were dismissed, four for cause and one peremptorily.
The other facts in that case, though, were convincing: first, the peremptor-
ily challenged venireman could have been dismissed for cause within
140 394 U.S. 478, 481 (1969).
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Witherspoon, and second, the other five peremptory challenges were exer-
cised without specific inquiry of each prospective juror as to his general
attitude about capital punishment, after he had responded to the court's
question that he could join a verdict of death if the facts warranted it.
The bills of exceptions presented in Wigglesworth and Pruett precluded
an examination of this theory, and the brief of neither appellant suggested
its application.
The purpose of peremptory challenges is to permit counsel on both
sides to remove a small number of persons from a jury without having to
explain. It is difficult to understand how a review of the use of this priv-
ilege would be possible. Nothing would appear in the record to estab-
lish more than a doubt as to the actual basis for the exercise of the chal-
lenge in each instance. To conclude from the composition of the eventual
panel would destroy the purpose of permitting such challenges at all. To
prohibit such challenges altogether would be as serious a blow to the de-
fense as to the prosecution. The most that can be said is that the role of
peremptory challenges in "systematic" exclusion should be beyond the
Court's review unless the number of such challenges which a state per-
mits is unreasonably large.
There is at least the suggestion that the issue which the Supreme Court
of the United States expressly reserves141 may be the second stage in that
Court's consideration of Sixth Amendment rights.4 2 It is conceivable that
there could be a holding to the following effect: if a substantial propor-
tion of a community is convinced that capital punishment is immoral or
otherwise reprehensible, a jury should reflect this feeling, particularly in
a jurisdiction such as Ohio where jurors of this persuasion could bargain
with their co-jurors to convict with a recommendation for mercy.'43 This
would appear to be the issue raised by the appellant in Crampton, and one
141 See note 139, supra.
142 Such an apprehension is aroused by the Court's serial approach of individually applying
provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Since this has been
done to the Sixth Amendment, then it is natural to view Witherspoon in the posture of Escobedo
.Y. Illiois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), with the equivalent of AMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), to follow.
143 This facet of Ohio practice which adds weight to a defendant's argument to deny any
challenge for cause on the capital punishment issue is in curious opposition to one of the issues
raised in Cram pton. There it was contended that requiring the jury to return a single verdict
on guilt together with a recommendation for mercy or a failure to so recommend violates a de-
fendant's right to avoid self-incrimination. The basis for that theory is that an accused who does
not admit guilt is effectively barred from testifying on factors supporting mercy, either because
so to testify would impliedly admit guilt (at least in the eyes of the jury) or because of vulner-
ability on cross-examination. The Court summarily rejected this contention, analogizing to
the similar handicaps experienced in attempts to introduce testimony evidence in support of an
alibi, self-defense or a lesser included offense. Of course one distinction, which the Court ig-
nores, is that the examples the opinion offers are all questions of guilt, while the consideration of
mercy is purely one of punishment. For whatever reason, California follows the procedure of a
two-stage trial, and this might affect the evaluation of Witherspoon problems as applied in each
state.
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which the Court ignored as beyond its obligation to consider under With-
erspoon.
If this is an accurate prediction as to the course of the Supreme Court
of the United States, these cases on review will present a balanced consid-
eration of the issues since the facts, within the Witherspoon framework,
demonstrate that the defendants in Ohio were genuinely granted a fair
trial, both in the technical and in the substantive sense of the word.
Right to Speedy Trial.-The Court went beyond recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States during the 1969 term in protecting
an accused's right to a speedy trial. Klopfer v. North Carolina144 and
Smith v. Hooey'45 had held that a person under indictment while incar-
cerated in a foreign jurisdiction has a right to demand the good-faith ef-
forts of the forum state to attempt to obtain temporary custody for pur-
poses of trial without waiting until his release from his current confine-
ment. The two strongest reasons supporting that conclusion are that a
prisoner who has a pending criminal charge against him is customarily
denied probation, and that delaying the trial on the pending charge elimi-
nates the sentencing judge's discretion to provide for concurrent terms.
In Ashmore v. State146 the Supreme Court of Ohio encountered a peti-
tioner requesting the prosecution to proceed with its case against him, al-
though he had not been indicted. Ashmore was an inmate in a California
state prison, and Ohio authorities had issued a detainer against him based
upon a warrant for his arrest on a forgery charge. No effort had been
made to obtain his release for trial in Ohio. The Court held that a con-
scientious attempt to persuade California to temporarily surrender him is
required since the detainer subjects him to the same disabilities as would
an indictment. Furthermore, although the per curiam opinion did not
mention this, denying the writ in Ashmore would have permitted prose-
cutors to delay indictment to avoid the Smith v. Hooey burden. This de-
cision will undoubtedly affect many counties and increase the demands
for funds to proceed in compliance.
In two other cases the Court indicated that the right to a speedy trial
must be reasonably construed. The appellant in State v. Butle' 47 was
bound over to the grand jury and released on bond. For twenty-two
months nothing happened in his case, and it was later discovered that dur-
ing the interim the clerk of the municipal court had misplaced his file.
After conviction appellant contended that his right to speedy trial had
been violated. The Court held that the excessive delay was directly attrib-
utable to the failure of defendant to question the status of his case, and
that he alleged no prejudice as a consequence.
144 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
145 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
146 19 Ohio St. 2d 181, 249 N.X.2d 919 (1969).
147 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969).
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The only weakness in the argument that the right to expeditious trial
must be requested is whether in a particular case a defendant could knowl-
edgably exercise such a request. Defendant Butler was represented by
court appointed counsel at trial and upon appeal, but the Court notes that
after he was bound over to the grand jury he was free on bond. The fact
of this bond is presumed to "belie indigency" and evidence his ability to
have employed counsel.148 That conclusion is questionable.
In addition to constitutional directives there is a statute in Ohio which
particularizes at least one aspect of the right to speedy trial. Section
2945.71, Revised Code, requires the discharge of an accused held in jail
"without a trial for a continuous period of more than two terms [of
court) after his arrest and commitment .... . Relator-petitioner in State
ex rel. Hodges v. Coller 49 filed an action in mandamus and a parallel one
in habeas corpus to seek discharge pursuant to that statute. He had been
arrested on two charges arising in separate counties. He was in jail in one
of those counties for over a year during the course of two trials on one of
the charges, and he was then transferred to the second county from which
he filed his actions three months later. The Court read the statute in rela-
tion to the right to speedy trial and held that, first, the two term period be-
gan to run on the second charge only after the defendant was being held
under the indictment on the second charge which was after his transfer to
the second county's jail (since his principal purpose for being in the first
county's jail was not a detainer but the first trial on a separate charge),
and second, that if the defendant had desired a trial on the second charge
before the conclusion of the first he should have requested it.
In Ashmore, Butler and Hodges, the Court consistently affirmed the
right to a speedy trial where the accused pursues it. But where he contrib-
utes to the delay or acquiesces in it his rights have not been prejudiced.
Miranda, Misdemeanors and Cross-Examination.-State v. Pyle...
raised the question, for the first time before the Court, whether the pro-
cedural safeguards provided criminal defendants by Miranda v. Arizona..
apply to misdemeanor cases as well as felonies.
In Ohio a felony is a crime for which a person may be sentenced to
more than one year of imprisonment and confined to a penitentiary. The
Court drew a sharp line between the two classes of crimes and held that it
was not required by Miranda to apply the pre-interrogation warnings to
persons arrested on a misdemeanor charge. This defensive posture of the
Court prevented an examination of the merits of the defendant's conten-
tions.
The defendant in Pyle was arrested by a State Highway Patrol officer
148 d. at 57, 249 N.E.2d at 819.
149 19 Ohio St. 2d 164, 249 N.E.2d 885 (1969).
150 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 NB.2d 826 (1969).
151384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. A conviction on that charge involves a penalty including a fine of
"not more than five hundred dollars" and imprisonment "in the county
jail or workhouse not less than three days nor more than six months and
no court shall suspend the first three days .... 12 Thus, in all instances
the guilty defendant will suffer some loss of freedom in addition to pecu-
niary injury.
Resistance to the decision in Miranda may or may not be justified per
se. But the Supreme Court of Ohio is faced with a dear statement of con-
stitutional law. The Court is expected to accept that law as a definition
of the requirements of due process. Once that is recognized the relevant
question is not whether Miranda must be extended but whether those per-
sons accused of a misdemeanor in Ohio deserve less protection than that
which felons can demand.153
A misdemeanor is the type of crime that any "ordinary" citizen is most
likely to commit. Unlike the hardened criminal, the accused in a traffic
offense (such as the defendant in Pyle) is exactly that sort of person who
is least familiar with his rights. The inconvenience of giving him the
summary warnings at the time of his arrest would seldom outweigh the
benefit to a person who may well be stunned at having suffered his first
criminal arrest.
Such protection is particularly important for a defendant in Pyle's
position. Ohio has a statutory presumption of intoxication when the pro-
portion of alcohol in a person's blood is over the specified minimum level,
and the Court last term sustained the constitutionality of the admission
into evidence of a person's refusal to submit to the test.'5 4  In order to
overcome this combined evidentiary burden, an accused needs to be ad-
vised that any intemperate remark he may make to the arresting officer
in anger or attempted exculpation may well be used against him as evi-
dence of a general lack of temperance, an impression which will undoubt-
edly compromise his testimony in the minds of a jury (or judge).
The urging of equal protection for all classes of criminal defendants
does not necessarily lead to the approval of the types of protection offered
152 OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.99 (Page 1964).
153 Chief Justice Taft, in his concurring opinion, is undoubtedly correct in identifying a
federal distinction between serious and "petty" offenses and in his conclusion that it would be
impossible for the Supreme Court of the United States to logically impose stricter requirements
on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment than it enforces in the federal system directly
through the Bill of Rights. But this is basically a rear-guard action against Afiranda and does
not face the issue of whether Ohio courts should adopt the policy of denying an extra-constitu-
tional protection to petty offenders which is constitutionally guaranteed to more flagrant law
violators. Furthermore, it will not apply to Ohio misdemeanors with possible penalties greater
than six months, and Ohio might be faced with a procedural protection line drawn between dif-
ferent types of misdemeanors, unless the General Assembly would change the definition of seri-
ous crimes to conform to federal statutes.
54 Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St 2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968).
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any of them. Thus, the holding of the Court in State v. Butler,5' that a
defendant cannot rely upon the failure to give the Miranda warnings to
prevent use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach his testimony, ap-
pears sound. The thrust of Miranda and its predecessors is an attack upon
illegal and coercive police tactics, and in the opinion of a majority of the
Supreme Court of the United States the only effective way to prevent such
practices is to forbid the affirmative use of any benefits the prosecution
might receive therefrom. But the opinion of Justice Schneider seems irre-
futable when it says that voluntary statements made to the police may be
used for impeachment in cross-examination because the privilege accorded
an accused to refuse to testify should not be translated "into a privilege to
lie with impunity once he elects to take the stand to testify."' 58 It is im-
portant to remember that the Fifth Amendment establishes the principle
that no person should be compelled to incriminate himself, not that a
guilty person may use any technique of deception to avoid conviction.
C. Trial Practice
A number of cases were before the Court this term requiring considera-
tion of the proper practices in the conduct of a judicial proceeding. The
issues ranged from initial problems of indictment and pleading, through
the course of trial, to the charge to the jury, and ultimately to appeal. Be-
cause of the relationship of these stages, representative cases are considered
here as a unit, despite the admitted misnomer of the label "trial practice."
The Court may be observed in this area experiencing one of the more
uncomfortable dilemmas of reviewing bodies. In instances where trial
courts indulge in discredited practices or lapses of quick judgment it is
desirable to point out the preferable practices for the guidance of other
courts, but often this does not even cumulatively amount to prejudicial
error reflecting upon the integrity of the result below. This situation calls
for affirmance with words of chastisement as dicta, hopefully not to be
ignored by other courts when faced with a similar situation.
Pleading Guilty before Administrative Panel.-The appellee in Dept.
of Liquor Control v. Santucci " was the holder of three permits to sell
alcoholic beverages and was brought before the Liquor Control Commis-
sion on charges of having violated commission regulations. The commis-
sion is authorized to determine the appropriate penalties when violations
occur. At his hearing, Santucci, apparently anticipating a brief suspension
of his licenses, responded to the inquiry of the commission chairman that
he was "guilty." The commission then imposed suspensions totaling 250
days.
155 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969), note 147, supra.
156Id. at 60, 249 N.E.2d at 821.
157 17 Ohio St. 2d 69,246 N.E.2d 549 (1969).
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On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to Section 119.12,
Revised Code, Santucci contended that the commission proceedings were
defective because there was no presentation of evidence as required by
statute. 58
The opinion of the Court by Justice Zimmerman demonstrated an at-
titude of impatience with such overly technical objections. In this case the
Court gave a reasonable interpretation to the statute and concluded that
an admission by a permit holder of his guilt in a proceeding in which he
was permitted to have counsel, present evidence, and examine witnesses
either amounted to a waiver of evidence or was evidence in itself.
The Court's comparison of these proceedings to criminal cases should
be contrasted with the first paragraph of its per curiam opinion in Kyle v.
Fok.1'5 In that opinion, three members of the Court and one Court of
Appeals judge sitting by assignment stated that "the motion to certify was
allowed because a majority of the Court is of the opinion that such use of
the word 'guilty' in civil damage actions is reversible error." Neither a
Liquor Commission hearing nor a wrongful death action is criminal in
nature. For some reason, the Court was able to draw a line between
these two cases. While this remains unexplained, the only obvious distinc-
tion is that the wrongful death action is tried before a jury which might
be more easily prejudiced than the administrative agency. Another pos-
sible explanation is that Santucci voluntarily defined his conduct as
amounting to guilt, but the phrase in Fok was introduced in the court's
special instructions before argument.
Voluntary Dismissal by Plaintiff After Expiration of Period of Lim-
itations.-A plaintiff may dismiss a civil action without prejudice at any
time prior to its submission to the finder of fact.160 If this dismissal is
prior to the expiration of the period of limitations, there is no restriction
upon recommencement of the action. If the dismissal occurs after the pe-
riod provided in the applicable statute of limitations has expired, the plain-
tiff is barred from instituting a new proceeding unless the dismissal comes
within the statutory savings clause for cases that have failed "otherwise
than upon the merits."'1 1
The plaintiff in Beckner v. Stove"' 2 argued that any voluntary dismis-
sal without prejudice is a termination of a case which is not decided upon
the merits and thereby comes within the statutory one year savings pe-
riod. It is obvious that such an interpretation, together with the acknowl-
edged right of a plaintiff to dismiss for any reason, would allow a plain-
158 OnIo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1968).
159 18 Ohio St. 2d 70, 247 N.E.2d 457 (1969).
160 OH-O REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.05 (Page 1953).
161 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1953).
162 18 Ohio St. 2d 36, 247 N.E.2d 300 (1969).
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tiff to repeatedly attempt to bring his claim before the judge and jury of
his choice. The Court understandably rejected this holding of the Court
of Appeals.
In reaching this solution the Court resurrected two old cases'0 3 and ex-
plained a comparatively recent one.'" The Court of Appeals had con-
cluded that the latter case modified the previous firm position of the Court
by applying the one year provision to a voluntary dismissal entered after
the trial court had sustained a second demurrer to plaintiff's petition.
The opinion by Justice Herbert reasoned that, in effect, a termination
of a case is not necessarily a failure of that case. A case has "failed"
within the meaning of the statute only where the ruling of the Court pro-
hibits the further progress of the suit upon the plaintiff's theory of law.
This is not so where the plaintiff may actually proceed despite a handicap
in the use of his preferred techniques of trial. A trial judge has the discre-
tion and responsibility to supervise the conduct of those cases appearing
before him. An unreasonable use of that discretion may be challenged
upon appeal as amounting to error. A plaintiff does not have the option
to evade such unfavorable court attitudes by starting at the beginning
again.
Amendment of Pleading After Expiration of Period of Limitations.-
The previous discussion showed the Court unwilling to extend a limita-
tions period savings clause to voluntary dismissals of law suits other than
those which are related to the impossibility of trying a case upon the mer-
its. This same reasoning would normally prevent a plaintiff from relying
upon the doctrine of relation back in amending a petition after the expira-
tion of the period of limitations, when the amendment changes the cause
of action.
In Bush v. Kelley's, Inc.165 the Court, in an opinion by Judge Cole,'66
avoided questioning this theory. The plaintiff's original petition, which
was filed within the period of limitations, alleged an intentional tort in
the forcible ejection of him from a tavern. After the expiration of the
two year period of limitations, the petition was amended to delete the al-
legations of intent and substitute negligence. The Court permitted this
amendment to relate back, purportedly on the authority of Cohen v.
Busey.Y67  In that case an amendment of a petition was sustained where
the allegation of negligent injury was enlarged to include intentional acts.
163 Seigfreid v. Rd. Co., 50 Ohio St. 294, 34 N.E. 331 (1893); Buehrer v. Provident Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 N.E. 25 (1931).
164 Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfgrs. Mutual Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E.2d 774
(1960).
165 18 Ohio St. 2d 89, 247 N.E.2d 745 (1969).
160 Sitting on assignment.
167 158 Ohio St. 159, 107 N.E.2d 333 (1952).
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Judge Cole concluded that the Cohen case had recognized "... . a single
cause of action sounding both in intentional and negligent tort."'8
The wisdom of the Cohen case is itself subject to criticism, but it does
not necessarily follow that the holding in Bush is dictated by the result in
Cohen. It is simple to view both of these cases as mere anticipations of
Ohio's adoption of the federal rules for civil pleading. Under that system,
Rule 8(a) (2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.. ."169 Once the defendant
is upon notice of the incident to which the plaintiff refers, the defendant
is expected to resort to discovery devices in order to determine the possible
legal theories which support the plaintiff's claim. But in Bush, the
plaintiff had voluntarily defined his action as one involving an intentional
tort. A defense which would defeat such a claim would be the denial of
the element of intent. By its decision the Court has encouraged plaintiffs
to allege the most serious theory of a case and, when confronted with an
imminent failure of proof, to be benefited by what amounts to a lesser-
included-offense approach to civil actions. Cohen did not involve this
factor. When the petition was enlarged in that case the plaintiff assumed
an increased burden of proof.
The net result of Bush and Beckner is an inconsistent attitude toward
vacillating plaintiffs.
Dismissing Assigned Counsel During TriaL-The indigent defendant
in State v. Deal'70 was represented at trial by appointed counsel. After
the presentation of the state's evidence the defendant repudiated that coun-
sel, complaining to the court that he had failed to adequately prepare a
defense. Among other defects, Deal alleged that the appointed lawyer
had ignored the alibi witnesses of whom he had been informed and failed
to file a notice of alibi before trial. The trial judge urged him to recon-
cile with the lawyer, and when Deal refused to recognize him as his repre-
sentative the court proceeded with the conclusion of the case by directly
asking the defendant questions. In response to one of those questions the
defendent indicated that he would take the stand with different counsel,
but not with the original one and not alone. The defendant requested a
three week continuance and claimed he would somehow get his own law-
yer, despite his continuing indigency. The court refused, closing argu-
ments were waived, and the case submitted to the jury. The defendant,
with new counsel, appealed from a verdict of guilty.
The Deal situation is extremely awkward for both the trial and appel-
late courts. To preserve the fairness of the adversary system the review
of such a case requires particular sensitivity to the prejudicial effect of a
16s 18 Ohio St. 2d at 93, 247 N.E.2d at 748.
'
6 9 See Rule 8 (a), proposed Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
170 17 Ohio St. 2d 17, 244 N.E.2d 742 (1969).
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defendant who is not only unrepresented in the presentation of his evi-
dence, and claims that appointed counsel contributed to his inability to
proceed, but whose dissatisfaction and frustration is repeatedly aired be-
fore a jury in the face of an unsympathetic judge. But the appellate court
must avoid the impression that any indigent accused can obtain a new trial
merely by refusing to cooperate when, at the conclusion of the state's pres-
entation, he can see that his chances for acquittal are nil. The problem
is basically one of evaluating whether a defendant's complaints of inade-
quate or incompetent representation have any merit without involving the
jury in that investigation.
The Court established a sound procedure for the future by requiring
a hearing on the record outside the presence of the jury. This recognizes
that the trial judge is necessarily the master of the court with considerable
discretion. Yet he also has a unique obligation to insure that those law-
yers who are appointed by the court perform in an exemplary manner.
Thus, an indigent defendant in some ways has greater protection than one
with retained counsel who will ordinarily be bound by his lawyer's deci-
sions. In order to obtain this extra measure of court supervision he has, of
course, sacrificed his right to choose his own counsel.
After the trial judge has made the appropriate inquiry, if he finds the
defendant's complaints to be unfounded or insignificant he may order the
defendant to proceed. Any defendant who thereafter is recalcitrant or
dismisses his counsel does so at his peril since his previous objections are
on the record for later review.
In order to avoid the impression that the behavior of the defendant
in this case might benefit him where it was unwarranted, merely because
the trial judge was apparently surprised by the turn of events, the Court re-
manded the case for the Court of Common Pleas to investigate the com-
plaints of incompetence for the record, rather than granting a new trial.
This formal reversal with a limited remand temporarily avoided the
problem of whether the trial judge, in repeatedly asking the defendant
whether he wished to take the stand, violated the principles enunciated in
Griffin v. California' where it was held to be a violation of a defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights for the prosecutor to comment to the jury upon a
failure to testify. If the lower court concludes that the objections to coun-
sel were unfounded, then this Griffin variation will undoubtedly be raised
in a new appeal. The delicate balance there between the efficient con-
duct of a trial by the judge and the protection of the impression of a
judge's neutrality before the jury will again have to be confronted.
Summarizing Petition in Charge to jury.-It has been an historically
common practice for Ohio plaintiffs to phrase petition allegations in the
most prejudicial manner. This was encouraged by the submission of
171 380 U.S. 609 (1965), rehearing denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965).
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pleadings to the jury for perusal during their deliberations. Conscientious
trial courts have eliminated this custom in recent years with written in-
structions to the jury and the withholding of the petition and answer.
The Court dearly indicated this term that this is the favored procedure.
The problem is that some courts have merely compromised, in order
to avoid considerably greater work in the preparation of individual in-
structions in each case, by summarizing or reading the pleadings to the
jury. In many cases this is more harmful than the submission of the writ-
ten documents since only the inflammatory portions may be recalled by
the jurors.
In Valentino v. Keller1 73 the Court reviewed an instruction which sum-
marized the petition and held it not to be error if the trial court also in-
structs that the pleadings are not evidence and the jury's decision must be
limited to the evidence presented. But this case does not necessarily sanc-
tion the practice, even when limited by the further instruction, in all cases.
Valentino was an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas by a workmen's
compensation claimant from a series of adverse administrative rulings.
The statutory authorization for such an appeal requires the petition to set
forth the basis for the trial court's appellate jurisdiction, namely the ex-
haustion of administrative remedies. 7 4  So in this case it was ironically
the plaintiff who was complaining that the trial court summarized the un-
favorable administrative history which the plaintiff was required to in-
dude in his own petition.
There are two sound reasons which support the Court's decision.
First, the statute required the compromising allegations, and the General
Assembly enacted this requirement in the face of the prevalent submission
of pleadings to juries. This was the ground upon which the Court relied.
But second, there is a further relevant consideration that the Court of
Common Pleas is performing a unique function in workmen's compensa-
tion appeals, and the jury is in the position of a Court of Appeals which
is reviewing a case on a law and fact appeal.'75  Appellate jurisdiction is
necessary, and a jury which the law provides to decide an appeal has the
right to understand its relationship to the case, particularly since this is
not the normal jury role.
A similar theory is stated in Masci v. Keller,1'7 also a workmen's com-
pensation appeal decided during the 1969 term. There the petition
named both the Administrator of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensa-
tion and the injured workman's employer as defendants, and the special
instructions to the jury referred to both defendants although only the ad-
172 Cincinnati v. Bossert Machine Co., 16 Ohio St. 2d 76, 78, 243 N.E.2d 105 (1969).
173 17 Ohio St. 2d 21, 244 N.E.2d 750 (1969).
17 4 0 m~o REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.519 (Page 1964).
175 Although the trial is an "appeal," it is de vovo.
176 18 Ohio St. 2d 67, 247 N.E.2d 457 (1969).
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ministrator was actively participating in the litigation. The Court noted
that both defendants had to be named to conform to the statute, and it is
common knowledge that the employer is involved in the case. Thus,
since a proper instruction as to the issue before the jury was given, the
form of special instructions was not prejudicial error.
The Court's holding will serve to prevent similar assignments of error
only in the succeeding few years since its proposed Rules of Civil Proce-
dure contemplate a specific prohibition of either the reading or submission
of pleadings,17 and when effective they will supercede conflicting statutes.
State Appeal from Grant of New Trial.-The indictment involved in
State v. Huntsman'7 charged the defendant with the rape of a female
person under 12 years of age on November 22, 1966. The prosecution ar-
gued to the trial court that the date was inaccurately transcribed and, as a
consequence of a typographical error, recorded as November instead of
October, the month indicated in the evidence presented to the grand jury.
The court allowed an amendment, over objection by defendant's counsel,
and proceeded to trial. This amendment proved to be crucial since the
evidence presented to the jury established the victim's twelfth birthday as
October 26, 1966. A new trial was granted on the basis of a change in a
material element of the indictment which, in its original form, did not
state the crime supported by the evidence. The state appealed.
The Court failed to reach the principal issue which was argued to it-
the merits of allowing the amendment. Instead the syllabus and Justice
Matthias' opinion determined that the state has no right of appeal from
the grant of a new trial, and, therefore, the question of the indictment
was not properly before either the Court or the Court of Appeals. Be-
cause of this procedural complication an opportunity was lost to discuss
the constitutionality of a court amendment of a material defect in an in-
dictment. If a criminal defendant has a right to an indictment when
there is no affirmative waiver,17'9 then part of his protection should be his
right to construct a defense upon both factual and legal vulnerabilities in
the formal charge of the crime. Changes in the indictment which change
the crime should only be made by a grand jury.
The Court adopted the reasoning of the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Taft in Price v. McCoy Sales & Service, Inc.,8 0 to the effect that an
order granting a new trial is a "final order" subject to appeal within the
the meaning of the constitution,'"' and the majority opinion of Chief Jus-
tice Taft in Toledo v. Crews,82 construing the statutory appeal provisions
177 Rule 8 (g).
178 18 Ohio St. 2d 206, 249 N.E.2d 40 (1969).
179 Exparte Stephens, 171 Ohio St. 323, 170 N.E.2d 735 (1960).
180 2 Ohio St. 2d 131, 207 N.E.2d 236 (1965).
1s Omao CONST. art. IV, § 3 (B) (2); formerly art V, § 6.
182 174 Ohio St. 253, 188 N.B.2d 592 (1963).
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for criminal cases as limited to appeals by defendants.183  There is a curi-
ous shift of emphasis in these two opinions, all the more noticeable since
Justice Matthias expressly chose the McCoy concurrence's theory of a con-
stitutional holding in preference to the statutory interpretation of the ma-
jority opinion by Judge Herbert, and then relied upon the statutes enacted
pursuant to that same constitutional provision to reject the instant appeal
on the authority of Crews.
This apparent paradox in choice of authority is subject to explanation.
Section 3(B) (2) of Article IV, Ohio Constitution, allows appellate jur-
isdiction " ... as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or
reverse judgments or final orders . . . ." Thus, the General Assembly
was granted authority to create appellate review of those "judgments or
final orders" which it chose to so qualify, but Chief Justice Taft correctly
observed in Crews that it could not extend review to any order which was
not already "final" as that term is used in the constitution. In other
words, statutory review of an otherwise interlocutory order would be void,
but no final order as such is appealable unless provided for in a statute.
Because an order granting a new trial after a verdict is returned is by its
nature a final order, it may be appealed when the General Assembly has
provided for it, but there is no statutory provision for an appeal by the
state in this situation.
It is important to realize that neither this decision nor the rationale
upon which it is based denies the constitutionality of a state appeal from
a new trial order. The very reasoning which supports the conclusion
that such an order is "final" also suggests that the legislature could extend
review in criminal cases. The jury has returned its verdict, and, unlike
court rulings prior to that point, error in granting a new trial does not af-
fect their determination. There is no difference, for purposes of the ap-
propriateness of a state appeal, between a new trial which is allowed by
the trial court upon defendant's motion after a verdict of guilty and one
erroneously allowed by an intermediate appellate court.
Appeal on Law and Fact.-Lincoln Properties v. Goldslagerll in-
volved an appeal on law and fact to the Court of Appeals from a judg-
ment of the Court of Common Pleas refusing an injunction. The Court
of Appeals concluded that the judgment of the lower court was against
the weight of the evidence presented, but it considered that further evi-
dence would be desirable and remanded the case instead of granting
the equitable relief sought. From this half-victory the plaintiff appealed.
For the first time the Court was faced with the question of an appel-
late court's obligation on an admittedly proper law and fact appeal. The
holding was that the Court of Appeals must enter a final judgment.
'18301o REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.02, et seq. (Page 1953).
184 18 Ohio St. 2d 154, 248 N.Y.2d 57 (1969).
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Historically, an "appeal" or what is now called an "appeal on law and
fact" (as distinguished from the former "error proceeding" or what is now
called simply an "appeal") was available in those cases of an equitable
nature which were quaintly termed "chancery cases."' 8  This remains
the standard, but the General Assembly has attempted to prevent argu-
ment by specifying the varieties of relief which it recognizes as lying pri-
marily in equity. "' In any case where one of those categories is employed
in the primary prayer of the petition, an appellant may obtain a trial de
novo in the Court of Appeals based upon the lower court record, amend-
ments to the pleadings and additional evidence if necessary "in the interest
of justice.' ' 87
The problem shifted during the 1969 term from the applicability of
the law and fact appeal to the substance of that appeal when granted.
The Court sustained the unique Ohio theory that an appeal involving a
trial de novo is an entirely new proceeding, and even the record created in
the lower court does not control.
An interesting discrepancy appears when the two relevant statutory
sections are compared. Section 2501.02 directs the Court of Appeals on
a law and fact appeal to ". . . weigh the evidence and render such judg-
ment or decree as the trial court could and should have rendered upon the
original trial of the case. . . ." But section 2505.21 permits the parties to
present only part of the record below, to amend pleadings and to introduce
new evidence. It is obvious that a Court of Appeals could be presented
a case with a posture entirely different from that before the trial court.
If this occurs, the question arises as to how the trial court "could" or
"should" have rendered a judgment based upon a record significantly dif-
ferent from that which the Court of Appeals reviews.
In hearing an appeal de novo the Court of Appeals often lacks ade-
quate facilities for the practical presentation of new evidence. The use of
depositions and affidavits is sometimes sufficient for testimonial evidence,
but not always. The Court has the power, pursuant to section 2505.21, to
specify the "manner and form" of the taking of additional evidence, and
this has often been used to appoint master commissioners for that purpose.
Lincoln Properties limited this discretion of the Court of Appeals by dicta
to the effect that the appellate court could not ". . . appoint the Court of
Common Pleas as its master commissioner." No authority was cited for
that proposition. The apparent fear is that such a practice would emascu-
late the right to de novo review by creating in effect a new trial below.'
185 See Westerhaus Co., Inc. v. Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.E.2d 318 (1956).
186 Olo REv. CODE ANN. § 2501.02 (Page 1953).
187 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.21 (Page 1953).
188 Similarly, the question has arisen in tax cases whether the Board of Tax Appeals has the
authority, following remand from the Supreme Court, to further remand a case to the Tax Corn-
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Another interesting problem is suggested by the right to amend plead-
ings without leave of court. A litigant who realized that his performance
at trial was inadequate for reversal on questions of law, particularly when
attributable to his omissions, might on appeal amend his pleading to re-
quest equitable relief. The question would then arise whether his right
to an appeal on law and fact should be determined from the original or
amended pleadings. Presumably, even if his right to a de novo hearing
would be sustained, it would not be "in the interest of justice" for the
Court of Appeals to allow additional evidence to fill earlier gaps.
D. Workmen's Compensation
Mandamus as a Remedy.-In two cases this term the Court continued
to apply the doctrine that mandamus cannot be used as a substitute
remedy for an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to section
4123.519, Revised Code. State ex tel. Foley v. Grayhound Lines..9 in-
volved a relator who had been awarded compensation on the basis of per-
manent total disability in 1965. He later had an amputation, attributable
to his original injury, and filed an application to be paid additional com-
pensation for the loss of his member. An order of the Administrator of
the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, vacating an award of additional
compensation made by the assistant administrator, was affirmed by the
regional board of review, and an appeal to the Industrial Commission was
denied. At that point, instead of pursuing his statutory route of appeal,
relator filed a petition in mandamus, and a writ was granted by the Court
of Appeals after overruling a demurrer to the petition. The Supreme
Court reversed, noting that since relator had been previously awarded
compensation for total disability, the application in question was
other than a decision as to the extent of disability....,11o
Although an appeal from the dismissal of a petition in mandamus was
decided on its merits in State ex rel. Latino v. Indus. Comm.19 1 last term,
it was pointed out there in the opinion of Brown, J., that the existence
and adequacy of a remedy at law was not raised in the Court of Appeals.
Appellants in Foley specifically demurred to the petition on this ground.
Thus, the case was squarely within paragraph one of the syllabus in State
ex rel. Benton v. C. & S. 0. Elec. Co.,'92 decided in the same term as
Latino:
"Mandamus can not be used as a substitute for an appeal pursuant to Sec-
tion 4123.519, Revised Code, where an appeal thereunder is available to
test a determination of the Industrial Commission."
missioner. Cf. OMO REV. CODE ANN. § 5703.05 (Page 1953); Clark v. Glander, 151 Ohio
St. 229, 85 N.E.2d 291 (1949).
189 16 Ohio St. 2d 6, 241 N.R.2d 904 (1968).
190 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.519 (Page 1964).
19113 Ohio St 2d 103, 234 NX.E.2d 912 (1968).
192 14 Ohio St 2d 130, 237 N.E.2d 134 (1968).
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In a per curiam opinion this term, State ex rel. Ferris v. Indus.
Comm.,'93 the relator-appellant attempted to avoid the previous decisions
of the Court by alleging an action of the administrator which was invalid
on its face. The administrator had terminated the compensation payments
of relator after finding that he was currently receiving Social Security
benefits and was, as a result of this, no longer within the state work force.
Once again, the Court characterized this as a dispute not going to the ex-
tent of the claimant's disability, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
sustaining a demurrer to the petition, was affirmed. This series of cases
clearly demonstrates the Court's impatience with claimants who attempt to
insert another strike in the form of an original action into the statutory
list of five appeals11 4 already available.
The Court's repeated statements of this theory on mandamus had the
ironic effect of overkill in State ex rel. Lurty v. Indus. Comm. 95 Follow-
ing the decision in Foley, relator in Lurty filed an action in mandamus in
the Court of Appeals for Franklin County requesting that the Industrial
Commission reconsider his claim for compensation on account of an al-
leged impairment of his earning capacity due to an occupational disease. 90
The Court of Appeals denied the writ, stating that: "since extent of dis-
ability is not at issue, the case is governed by the recent case of [Foley]."
However, as the Attorney General conceded on appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals was in error for the reason that there is no right of appeal to the
Court of Common Pleas in cases involving occupational disease claims.'
Therefore, there was no appeal in the ordinary course of the law, and the
court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration on
the merits.
Foley and Ferris, both denying mandamus as a remedy, relied upon
the fact of a remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way of appeal
pursuant to section 4123.519. The issue which that section requires a
jury to determine in such an appeal is whether the claimant shall "... . par-
ticipate or... continue to participate in the fund." In Foley and Ferris the
Industrial Commission had found legal obstacles to any type of further
participation in workmen's compensation fund distributions which were
unrelated to the extent of disability that had been suffered, precisely the
situation envisioned for a statutory appeal. If the Court of Common Pleas
would determine in either case that additional compensation payments
1on 17 Ohio St. 2d 49, 245 N.E.2d 357 (1969).
194 Prom the adverse decision of the administrator to the regional board of review, then to
the Industrial Commission, the Court of Common Pleas for a trial de novo, the Court of Appeals,
and finally to the Supreme Court. This structure was properly used in Valentino v. Keller, 17
Ohio St. 2d 21, 244 N..2d 750 (1969).
195 18 Ohio St. 2d 107, 247 N.E.2d 863 (1969).
1900 OO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.57 (A) (Page 1964).
19 Szekely v. Young, 174 Ohio St. 213, 188 N.Y2d 424 (1963).
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should be made, the Industrial Commission would then have exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the extent and manner of participation.'
Where there is no statutory appeal mandamus may lie. The holding
of the Court in Lurty was simply that the Court of Appeals had been too
hasty and it should consider whether the merits of relator's petition justi-
fied an extraordinary writ. The decision in State ex ',el. Pressley v.
Indus. Comm.1 9 stated the controversial rule that both the Court of Ap-
peals and the Supreme Court must exercise their original jurisdiction in
mandamus when there is a violation of a dear statutory duty and no rem-
edy in the ordinary course of the law. The modern courts amendment to
the constitution prevents restrictions upon that jurisdiction by rule of
court."' 0 But neither of those pronouncements extend the application of
the writs, and the clear statutory duty phraseology is merely an expression
of one of those situations which is "extraordinary" or of great and general
interest, or should be.
By its nature mandamus does not require statutory authorization.
Thus, it is unnecessary for a workmen's compensation question to be a de-
cision of "the extent of disability" for mandamus to apply.20 1 The oppo-
site conclusion is the result of an incorrect reading of section 4123.519.
Although questions of the extent of disability are specifically exempt from
that section's appeal provisions, it does not follow that all other disputes
are appealable thereunder so as to provide a common remedy. On the
contrary, only those disputes which might reasonably be resolved by the
jury's conclusion of participation or non-participation in the fund are
proper subjects of appeal. Issues of the extent of disability plus all other
issues which are inconsistent with the role of the Court of Common Pleas
are not appealable.
But the fact of a lack of a legal appeal for any given question, deter-
mined by the Industrial Commission adversely to the claimant, does not in
itself support jurisdiction for mandamus. This has been a false conclusion
of many litigants, including the office of the Attorney General.202  The
198 166 Ohio St. 477, 144 N.E.2d 189 (1957).
199 11 Ohio St. 2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967).
200 OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 2(B) (3).
2 01 Justice Duncan's opinion in State ex rel. Mansour v. Indus. Comm., 19 Ohio St. 2d 94,
249 N.B.2d 775 (1969), appears to fall into this trap of either/or statutory construction. The
double negative wording of paragraph two of the syllabus has the distinct advantage of permit-
ting the Court to explain in a later case that this did not amount to an affirmative statement, and
a broader theory of mandamus may be adopted. To state the affirmative of Justice Duncan's
double negative namely that a dispute not logically solved by the jury verdict under section
4123.519 is one involving "the extent of disability," tortures the clear import of that language,
as demonstrated in the Mansour case where the issue was the election of manner of payment
after the percentage of disability had been found and the claim allowed.
2 02 See Brief for Appellee, State ex rel. Shewalter v. Indus. Comm., 19 Ohio St 2d 12, 249
N.E.2d 51 (1969). Here the Attorney General, as counsel for the Industrial Commission,
conceded that the Court of Appeals erred in basing its denial of a writ of mandamus upon Foey
and the availability of an appeal, but failed to urge the alternative ground of immunity of the
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other prerequisite of an extraordinary situation or ruling must also be al-
leged for a valid petition and found to support a writ. In State ex rel.
Mansour v. Indus. Comm. 203 the Court went beyond the formal entry of
the commission and found such facts, which had been raised before the
Court of Appeals by the petitioner. The commission had adopted a rule
prohibiting a change in election as to manner of compensation where the
claimant had been represented by counsel at the time of his original elec-
tion of one of the two statutory alternatives. In view of the provision of
section 4123.57, Revised Code, permitting a change of election for good
cause shown, the Court held that a rule arbitrarily denying good cause
where counsel advised the original election was unreasonable. The case
therefore dissolved into a classical abuse of administrative discretion to
which mandamus may always apply as the traditional remedy, regardless
of any statute. Paragraph 2 of the syllabus in Alansour was totally unnec-
essary to support the judgment.
The Mansour case did not erode the principle that the ordinary deci-
sions of the commission in individual cases, including particularly the
factual determinations of extent of disability based upon medical reports
and acquired expertise, are not subject to judicial review. There is no rea-
son to believe that the legislature would have more confidence in a Court
of Appeals or Supreme Court mandamus hearing than a Court of Common
Pleas de novo review of such questions. In AVansour itself, if the com-
mission had reached the same conclusion, of no good cause to change the
election, after a consideration of the matter beyond its rule, there would
have been no basis for any court to give an independent judgment.04
The decision in State ex rel. Shewalter v. Indus. Comm. 20 5 may be rec-
onciled with this presentation of the law. There the dispute dearly re-
lated to the extent of disability, and the Court of Appeals was totally in-
correct in relying upon Foley to deny the writ. The majority of the Court,
after recognizing the lack of a remedy by appeal, then joined in a per
curiam opinion allowing mandamus to issue because they interpreted the
stipulation of facts to indicate an undisputed disability which the commis-
sion refused to compensate.
But the division of the Court suggests, and the stipulated facts dis-
close, that the case is not that simple. The Industrial Commission is not
the type of board to obstinately deny compensation for admitted disabil-
commission from judicial review in the ordinary course of administration of the workmen's com-
pensation fund.
203 See note 201 supra.
204 See Szekely v. Young, supra note 197. However, Justice Schneider's concurring opinion
seems to suggest the contrary. His conclusion that, applying Foley only prospectively, the proper
remedy is either an appeal or an injunction does have the desirable effect of reducing the use
of mandamus in the superior courts as a regular course for relief, but it impliedly rejects the
conclusion that for many commission decisions there will be no judicial review.
205 19 Ohio St. 2d 12, 249 N.E.2d 51 (1969).
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ities. Its refusal to authorize an award for an injury to a location for
which the claimant had been compensated after a previous injury, or to
authorize an additional award for an aggravation to the previous injury,
may have been based upon either of two decisions. First, it may have be-
lieved the first medical report following the second injury to the effect
that there was only a minimal degree of disability. Or secondly, it may
have concluded as a matter of law (interpreting Foley) that since the
modified original award was for 50 percent permanent partial disability,
and no medical evidence showed an increase to in excess of that percentage
after the second injury, there was no further disability justifying either
an additional award or a second award. The first basis should be secure
from judicial review if any reasonable mind could have so concluded, with
special consideration given to the commission's familiarity with these cases
and doctors. The second basis might be a valid ground for mandamus
if the Court would hold that this is a mistake of law. However, they did
not even consider the issue. Shewalter can only be described as a digres-
sion from the construction of a well-balanced theory of mandamus as a
workmen's compensation remedy.
E. Negligence
Duty of Possessor of Land.-In 1951 the Court clearly defined the
status of a social guest and the concomitant duties of an owner or occupier
of land. Scheibel v. Lipton", rejected the classification of a social guest
as a licensee, 07 but it did not confer all the protections given to a busi-
ness invitee. The social guest became a legal category with its own rules
of law. This approach was an obvious compromise, allowing broader
rights of recovery for injuries sustained by the innocent social guest when
the risks outweigh the public value of promoting private hospitality, but
retaining the advantages of predictable rules of law. Such rules are nec-
essary for the host to understand his duties and anticipate the requirements
for various types of uses of his land, in other words to plan ahead and make
informed decisions. The rules are also necessary for the guidance of trial
courts; it is evident that if all cases go to a jury the ability of a possessor
of land to rely upon legal definitions of his duty is seriously impaired be-
cause predictability of liability is decreased.
Scheibel proceeded to stipulate two legal duties of the social host.
First, while the guest is on the premises of the host the latter must refrain
from any act or activity, not consistent with ordinary care, which might
cause injury to the guest. And second, if there are dangerous conditions
on the premises, which the guest would not reasonably anticipate or dis-
cover, then the host must warn of their existence.208
206 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 NXE.2d 453 (1951).
2 07 Id. at 328-29, 102 N.F.2d at 462-63.
208 Id. at 308, para. 3 of syllabus.
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This term the Court had to apply its Scheibel rules. In DiGildo v.
Capon" 9 a four year old child accompanied his family on a social visit to
the home of friends where they had often gone on other occasions.
While in the second floor apartment the adults directed the children of
both families to play outside. There the host family's car was parked on
an inclined driveway, and it was left unlocked. The children played in
the vehicle, the gear-shift lever was removed from the "park" position,
possibly the emergency brake was released, the vehicle began to back down
the drive, and the four year old soon-to-be-plaintiff injured his hand in
trying to escape.
The Court showed no inclination to decide the case on grounds other
than a jury verdict. In the factual situation it would not have been incon-
ceivable that as a matter of law the plaintiff's parent, who had accompan-
ied him and must have noticed the position of the automobile since he had
to walk past it up the drive to enter the home, would have been respon-
sible rather than the social host. Why should the host be required to
warn the child of a guest when the child's parent is equally aware of the
danger and the host would not normally so warn his own children?
Nevertheless, the decision turned around the rationale for properly
submitting the evidence to the jury. The opinion of Justice Schneider
presents a sound theory, but it is somewhat obscured by dicta. The hold-
ing may be summarized as follows: The child-guest's infancy is one condi-
tion in determining the guest's ability to perceive a dangerous condition;
the location and vulnerability of the automobile may properly have been
found dangerous by a jury; and the host failed in his duty to warn.
For some reason which is unclear and which goes beyond the necessity
to decide the case, before stating the above analysis the opinion tilts at the
windmill of static conditions versus acts or activities, the first part of the
Scheibel two-stage rule prohibiting affirmative injury. The suggestion
is made that the parking of the car the previous evening may have been an
act or activity in relation to the visit of plaintiff. This approach would
leave the remoteness of an act as a question for the jury to consider in
applying what would become the non-rule of Scheibel.
Chief Justice Taft, Justice O'Neill and Judge Leach (of the Tenth
District Court of Appeals, sitting on assignment for Justice Herbert) did
not concur in the opinion of the Court; they joined in both the syllabus
and judgment. Although Justice Schneider had three other votes for his
opinion with the static-active discussion, his argument that the Scheibel
guest category (as well as those of licensee and invitee) should be totally
ignored was relegated to a footnote.210
Aunicipal lmmunity.-Ohio municipalities have long enjoyed immu-
209 18 Ohio St. 2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969).
210 Id. at 131, n.2, 247 N.E.2d at 736, n.2.
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nity from tort liability for damages caused in the performance of a "govern-
mental" function.211  Such functions are in theory distinguished from
"proprietary," "ministerial" or "private" activities of a municipal corpora-
tion. Despite repeated attacks on this dual structure212 the distinction
has survived in Ohio and a decreasing majority of other states, and it es-
caped destruction once again during the 1969 term in Fankhauser v. ' ans-
field.213
Municipalities operate as an extension of sovereign powers. But in
those areas where they engage in operations which may be performed by
private persons or corporations, or where they earn a profit, they are usu-
ally considered to assume private liabilities. A recurring problem is classi-
fication of the activity in a given case. Fankhauser also failed to confront
that problem by assuming the maintenance of an overhead traffic light to
be a governmental function.
In the absence of judicial activism, the only liability for a governmen-
tal function is that to which the sovereign consents. Since the state can
control municipalities through general law,214 the General Assembly can
provide for tort liability in those cases where it sees fit. There is no stat-
ute waiving immunity for mere negligence, but section 723.01, Revised
Code, does require municipal corporations to keep streets, sidewalks,
bridges and public grounds under their supervision "open, in repair, and
free from nuisance." That section has been held to create civil liability in
damages for the maintenance of a nuisance.215
The question in Fankhauser resolved into whether the failure of the
city to repair or take other safety precautions within a reasonable time af-
ter notice of a defective overhead traffic signal at a street intersection
amounted to the maintenance of a nuisance within the meaning of section
723.01. It is obvious that if the governmental immunity is to be recog-
nized the only way to judicially expand liability in appropriate cases is to
construe that section liberally.
The Court did noticeably loosen its construction in Fankhauser. The
recent decision in Gabris v. Blake 16 had limited the statute to conditions
211 From 1854 to 1919 (City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80 [1854]; Fowler, Adm'x., v.
City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 [1919]; overruling Frederick, Adm'x., v. City
of Columbus, 58 Ohio St. 538, 51 N.E. 35 [1898]) and from 1922 to the present (Aldrich v.
City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 [1922]; Broughton v. Cleveland, 161
Ohio St. 29, 146 N.E.2d 301 [1957]).
21 2 See concurring opinion of Gibson, J., in Hack v. Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d
857 (1963).
213 "The experience our courts have had with the segregation of municipal activities into
governmental and proprietary categories has been awkward .... However, the resolution of
the instant cases does not require us to take up the governmental or proprietary gauntlet." 19
Ohio St. 2d 102,-, 249 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1969).
214 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
215 Gaines v. Village of Wyoming, 147 Ohio St. 491, 72 N.E.2d 369 (1947).
216 9 Ohio St. 2d 71, 223 N.E.2d 597 (1967).
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on or in a street. In order to bring an overhead light within that defini-
tion the opinion of Justice Duncan rejected Tolliver v. Newark,21 in
which a stop sign alongside the street was held not within the statute, and
great reliance was placed upon the first paragraph of the syllabus in
Yackee v. Napoleon.18 That syllabus interpreted the predecessor of sec-
tion 723.01 to hold that a municipality's duty . . . to keep its streets open,
in repair and free from nuisance, extends to structures or conditions lo-
cated not only upon but above the surface of such streets .... ." The struc-
ture referred to was a viaduct, and that syllabus statement was misleading
in its broadness because viaducts are specifically provided for in the stat-
ute itself. Thus, this was dubious authority.
The opinion, particularly in its reference to a Michigan decision," 9
seems to rely not only upon the existence of a nuisance but also that the
governmental activity itself (installation of a light) created the condition
permitting the nuisance. The issue naturally suggested is whether powers
to "regulate the use" and "care, supervision, and control" of streets im-
poses the obligation upon municipalities in the statute to correct nuisances
not of their own making. This term the Court allowed a motion to certify
a case involving a low-hanging tree limb, without any allegation that the
city had planted the tree.220 Although the syllabus in Fankhauser did not
mention the element of establishment, and as written would support a re-
versal in the tree limb case, the principle is still another step from Tol-
liver.
The tenor of the opinion of the Court is dear. Immunity is on the
defensive. The problem is how far a single statute will stretch. Perhaps
an outright decision, such as was necessary for charitable immunities,2
is inevitable.
F. Motor Vehicles
Assured Clear Distance Ahead.-In Pallini v. Dankowski222 the Court
continued to construe narrowly the phrase "assured dear distance ahead"
as it is used in section 4511.21, Revised Code.
Defendant's car was proceeding southbound in the inside lane of a
four-lane, two-way street around dusk. Plaintiff alighted from a stopped
car at the easterly curb, proceeded to the crosswalk, and began to cross the
street. The evidence in the case indicated that defendant could have seen
plaintiff at the time she stepped into the street, and by reacting at that
217 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357 (1945).
218 135 Ohio St. 344,21 N.E2d 111 (1939).
219 O'Hare v. Detroit, 362 ich. 19, 106 N.W.2d 538 (1960).
220 Robert Neff & Sons, Inc. v. City of Lancaster, No. 69-62 (Ohio Sup. Cr., April 9, 1969).
2 2 1 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
222 17 Ohio St. 2d 51, 245 N.E.2d 353 (1969).
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moment could have stopped his car before it reached the point where their
perpendicular paths crossed. Plaintiff moved rapidly across the street and
proceeded to literally run into the front left fender of defendant's car.
The argument made by plaintiff was that the trial court should have
charged in these circumstances on the issue of defendant's violation of
the assured clear distance ahead statute. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Thomas Herbert, insisted that the statute applies only to an ob-
ject within the path or lane of travel of the vehicle. The fact than an ob-
ject which is moving towards the lane of travel may be within the periph-
eral vision of the driver of the vehicle is irrelevant for purposes of an al-
leged violation of this statute.
Authority of Registrar Under Financial Responsibility Law .- Toledo
v. Bernoir 2 - confirmed the broad discretion assumed by the Registrar of
Motor Vehicles in enforcing Ohio's financial responsibility law.224 The
Court held that following the filing of an accident report involving a
motor vehicle, the registrar may determine the amount of any reasonably
possible recovery for injury or damage and, if there is no policy of insur-
ance which is applicable, require both the driver and the owner to post
sufficient security or have their licenses and automobile registration sus-
pended.
This holding of the Court indicates a possible choice between two the-
ories explaining Ohio's non-compulsory insurance law. The purpose of
having any law to encourage or require motor vehicle insurance is obvious,
to assure compensation for innocent parties whose person or property is
damaged by the operation of a vehicle. But the reason for the one-free-
shot aspect of Ohio's statute is not as obvious. On the one hand a vehicle
which causes injury should be backed by a fund sufficient to pay the in-
jured party; but other states have had no difficulty in using this theory to
require proof of insurance in order to initially register a car and not only
after the first accident.2 5 On the other hand, a driver who has demon-
strated a proclivity to cause an accident should be removed from the road
as a proven greater probable hazard or thereafter be forced to demonstrate
financial resources sufficient to make right past and future wrongs. The
latter theory would seem to justify the application of the statute only to
the driver of a car, or to an owner if the driver was operating under his
direction or the cause of the accident was otherwise attributable to the
owner. That reading of the statutory language was specifically rejected
by Justice Schneider's opinion.
= 18 Ohio St 2.d 94, 247 N.E.2d 740 (1969).
224 O-no REv. CODE ANN. § 4509 (Page 1965).





Public Construction Bids.-State construction contracts must gener-
ally be awarded to "the lowest and best bidder" on any project, and this is
the standard for community college districts.2 2 6  In Weiner v. Cuyahoga
Community College Dist.,2 7 the Court read into the word "best" a per-
missible, if not necessary, element of public policy going beyond the econ-
omies and quality of the construction involved. That interpretation
opened the door wide for the interjection of multiple political issues into
all future public works.
The Cleveland campus of the Cuyahoga Community College is financed
with a combination of state capital improvement funds and federal
urban renewal land purchases. As such it is classified as a federally as-
sisted project. The low bidder for the heating, ventilating and air-condi-
tioning phase of the construction was a contractor with an exclusive union
hiring hall contract. The bid advertisement required the successful bid-
der to submit an affirmative action plan which will "have the result of as-
suring that there is minority group representation in all trades on the job
and in all phases of the work." The low bidder agreed to this obligation
insofar as it forbade his discrimination in employment practices and work-
ing conditions and required him to exert good-faith efforts to obtain avail-
able minority employees. However, the college and federal officials in-
sisted that a plan drawn in these terms was unacceptable and nothing
short of a commitment of actual minority employment on the job would
suffice. Thus, a deletion of limitations in the plan to availability, with
the reservation that "this company cannot and, therefore, does not guaran-
tee that it will have Negro apprentices on this project," was determined by
the defendants to fall short of the bid specification requirement of "as-
suring" minority representation.
The facts of the case placed defendants in an uncomfortable position.
Chief Justice Taft's dissent points out that they admitted, as the majority
of the Court was also forced to conclude, that an insistence upon a "guar-
antee" of racial hiring (either as a token or a quota) would violate the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.28 It should also run afoul of the commerce
clause of the constitution as a restriction upon the free movement of labor
in interstate commerce.
The only qualification upon the low bidder's assurance which remained
226 OIo REv. CODE ANN, § 3354.16 (Page Supp. 1968).
227 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969).
22842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (j) (1964). This was also the conclusion reached in Opinion No.
B-163026 of the Comptroller General of the United States on August 5, 1969, disputing the
legality of the "Philadelphia Plan" announced by the Assistant Secretary for Wage and Labor
Standards, Department of Labor, on June 27, 1969. The Solicitor's memorandum relied upon
by the Department of Labor (and supported by the Department of Justice) cites the Weiner
case as it principal judicial authority.
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at the final rejection of its bid was the phrase rejecting a guarantee, quoted
above. Since that rejection is an admitted legal truism, it is difficult to
understand what justifiable basis the defendants had for the conclusion
that the bidder's assurance was equivocal. This fence straddling is espe-
dally precarious in the light of the Court's recognition that the "plaintiff
does not question the requirement that public contractors promise not to
discriminate in employment," and that the plaintiff's "submitted Affirma-
tive Action Plan reflected the company's equal opportunity employment
practices." The opinion of Justice Herbert retreated to the only tenable
ground on which the judgment could be supported, namely the limited
scope of review on questions of fact.
If the good intentions of the bidder are not in issue, the only com-
plaint that any of the defendants may rely upon is the bidder's exclusive
hiring contract. The Court did not attempt to resolve the inherent con-
flict between the federal policies expressed in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act 29 encouraging such union contracts230 and the reverse-discrimi-
nation policies established by Presidential Executive Order No. 11246 (as
interpreted and applied by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance).
The failure to pursue union discrimination at its source has left union em-
ployers caught between policies. In fact the federal government, as an
attack on discriminatory unions, is engaged in what was once considered
the reprehensible practice of a secondary boycott.
Real Estate Broker's Exclusive Contract.-The plaintiff in King v.
Dean23' was a real estate broker who had obtained an exclusive listing
contract for the sale of defendants' home. The listing period was for
three months with an extender clause of three months reserving a commis-
sion to plaintiff for a sale by anyone within the extension period to a per-
son with whom plaintiff had "negotiated" during the original three
month term. The plaintiff did show the house to several parties but did
not even approach receiving a commitment to purchase, and the term ex-
pired; Thereafter, one of the couples which had been first shown the
house by plaintiff sold their former home and purchased defendants'
house from a different broker. This occurred two months after plaintiff's
exclusive listing expiration, but he claimed a commission on the basis of
the extension provision.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, established a sound
principle of agency law for Ohio. The syllabus denies the effect of the
contract's benefits to the agent-broker where he did not communicate his
efforts on behalf of the principals to them. Curiously, this proposition of
law never appears to have been squarely confronted in Ohio, and seldom
22 9 29U.S.C. § 151 (1947).
23029 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1959).
23119 Ohio St. 2d 17, 249 N.E.2d 45 (1969).
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elsewhere. But it seems an elemental requirement of fairness that, when
the agent knew that by the terms of his contract the principal was free to
engage others to perform the same functions, if there existed at that time
any basis for a possible future compensation to the agent, he should warn
the principal of this. Particularly is this so where the agent himself pre-
pared or presented the contract.
In order to reach that proposition the Court skipped over the question
of whether the case was properly submitted to the jury on the facts in the
first place. The issue of the agent's breach of his duty under the contract
disqualifying him from the extender benefit would not arise at all if there
had never been any "negotiation" within the meaning of the contract.
The Court of Appeals read that word to include even the most tentative
exchange. It defined negotiation to require "a process of discussion
whereby parties mutually interested seek to resolve differences with the
purpose of arriving at agreement."2 -3
The contract in question was executed on a printed form supplied by
the plaintiff. The terms of the contract did not define the word "negoti-
ated" as used therein to give it any meaning other than customary usage.233
The normal rule of law should apply that ambiguities will be construed
against the plaintiff in this circumstance.
The testimony of the plaintiff, which was relied upon as evidence that
the plaintiff had "negotiated," did not satisfy the test stated by the Court
of Appeals. Plaintiff testified that, after showing the house, the parties
said to him that as soon as their home was sold "they would be interested."
This statement, together with a question as to the probable sales price,
amounted to a mere inquiry, not active bargaining, conditional or other-
wise. It is difficult to understand how the Court of Appeals could derive
from this brief conversation "discussion directed to the adjustment of dif-
ferences." Even the most casual shopper, in the course of his rounds of
touring houses for sale, would be interested in a professional's prediction
of the eventual sales price. Such an expression of interest should not, as a
matter of law, constitute a commencement of negotiation.
Rescission of Sale of Securities under Blue Sky Law.-The Ohio Se-
curities ActP 4 requires registration by description or qualification of non-
exempt securities and registration by description of non-exempt securities
transactions. Any sale or contract for sale of securities which should be
registered under those provisions "is voidable at the election of the pur-
chaser... unless the court determines that the violation did not materially
affect the protection contemplated ,, where there was no registra-
tion.
32 15 Ohio App. 2d 15, 238 N.E.2d 828 (1968).
-%3 Smith v. Eliza Jennings Home, 176 Ohio St. 351, 355, 199 N.E.2d 733, 735-36 (1964).
2 34 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. ch. 1707 (Page 1964).
235 OHIo REV. CoDE ANN. § 1707.43 (Page 1964).
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During the 1969 term the Court put teeth into those provisions by sus-
taining a Court of Appeals decision allowing restitution to a plaintiff-
purchaser who probably had knowledge of the realties of the transaction
involved. Justice Brown's dissent in Bronaugh v. R. & E. Dredging Co. 36
complained that with this holding "form must prevail over substance."
That is exactly the purpose of registration and disclosure statutes in the
securities field. The Court's decision has the great merit of creating cer-
tainty by reducing the ambiguous defense (based upon the "materially
affect the protection" phrase) to apply only in those cases of "a trivial
nature."
The opinion also is valuable in construing the exemption of a transac-
tion which "is not made in the course of repeated and successive transac-
tions of a similar character."23 7 That exemption was held not to apply
where "several persons [nine] . . . were solicited at different times to sub-
scribe to varying amounts of stock .... " A more narrow interpretation is
hard to imagine, and this dearly puts the burden of establishing an ex-
emption on the seller where it belongs. The principle has been fixed that
a seller's good faith is not sufficient when he fails to register.
Justice Brown further complains that "[t~he result of the majority
opinion in this case is to refund the investment of one who makes no com-
plaint except loss of investment. . ". .. 3" But that is the beauty of the sys-
tem: a seller of securities, who does not register and is not exempt, is an
insurer of the buyer's investment, and the buyer is thereby motivated to pri-
vately enforce the law which was enacted to protect persons in his position.
Antenuptial Agreement.-The plaintiff in Osborn v. Osborn2'" was,
at the time of her marriage, 54 years of age. Her fiance was a 77 year old
widower. Both parties had substantial means, although his were greater
than hers, and both had children by previous marriages. The prospective
husband was a resident of Cleveland, but also had a home in Massachu-
setts, while the prospective wife was a resident of Massachusetts. In con-
templation of their marriage the two parties agreed to maintain their
separate properties for their separate families, and (in spite of the fertile
octogenarian rule) no issue were contemplated in their forthcoming mar-
riage (and none were produced).
The decedent had had the antenuptial agreement drawn by his Cleve-
land counsel. This was then given to plaintiff's Massachusetts lawyer
who advised on its validity under Massachusetts law. After that consul-
tation both parties executed the agreement approximately four weeks be-
fore their marriage, both of which occurred in Massachusetts. The couple
moved to Cleveland and resided there and in Florida. Following dece-
230 16 Ohio St. 2d 35, 242 N.E.2d 572 (1969).
2 3 7 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03 (B) (Page 1964).
238 16 Ohio St. 2d at 41, 242 N.E.2d at 576.
239 19 Ohio St. 2d 144, 248 N.B.2d 191 (1969).
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dent's death almost slx years later, plaintiff then sought to have the agree-
ment set aside and take the wife's distributive share of his estate.
There was a dual issue before the Court: (1) choice of law, and (2)
whether the antenuptial agreement was valid under the applicable law.
The two jurisdictions in question were Ohio and Massachusetts. The
plaintiff-wife's attack upon the validity of the agreement rested primarily
on ignorance of the extent of decedent's wealth, and Massachusetts law
does not require disclosure. 4 0 It is true that the Massachusetts cases in-
volve situations where the agreement made some provision for the wife by
its terms, but here the wife's independent means were sufficient to sup-
port her. The plaintiff's best chance was therefore to persuade the Court
to reject the place-of-contract conflicts rule, and if successful to urge an
extension of the case of Juhasz v. Juhasz41 where the Court announced the
standard that an antenuptial agreement is invalid, in the absence of dis-
closure or knowledge of assets, if "in the light of all surrounding circum-
stances" the provision for the wife is disproportionate to the husband's
property.
The Court ignored the conflicts question and proceeded to decide the
case on Ohio law against the plaintiff. The "fairness" test of Juhasz was
distinguished on the facts and by implication limited to those cases where
the wife has no personal estate and is forced to depend on her husband for
support. By relying upon Troha v. Sneller,242 where the syllabus sup-
porting an antenuptial agreement's validity turned only on "each [pros-
pective spouse) owning a substantial amount of property and each having
grown children by prior marriages," the Court has recognized one rule for
those less well endowed where the law will extend its protection and an-
other for those who do not require it. One may only speculate as to
whether Juhasz would be further restricted in a case where one of the
parties owned only a small amount of property, there was no disclosure of
the other party's substantial worth, but the former was well aware of the
purposes of the agreement and the latter did not affirmatively deceive.
This is at least suggested by the Osborn opinion's recital of the Juhasz facts
which showed a serious disability in the wife's comprehension of what
she was signing, not simply a failure to realize the monetary loss she would
suffer.
H. Estates, Wills and Trusts
Parties to Exceptions to Inventory.--In November, 1968 the Court
heard oral argument on the merits in Cole v. Ottawa Home and Savings
Assn.243 In January, 1969, following the retirement of Justice Paul Her-
2 4 0 Wellington v. Rugg, 243 Mass. 30, 136 N.E 831 (1922).
241 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 NX.2d 328 (1938).
242 169 Ohio St. 397, 159 N.E.2d 899 (1959).
243 18 Ohio St. 2d 1, 246 NE.2d 542 (1969).
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bert and the resignation of Justice Brown, the Court considered In re
Estate of Marsek.2" These two cases were consolidated in a single opinion
with a unanimous Court, 5-0 in the former and 7-0 in the latter. The com-
mon issues decided in those two cases were (1) who are the parties to a
hearing on exceptions to an inventory in the probate of an estate, and (2)
what persons are bound by the determinations of the Probate Court in such
a hearing?
In the ordinary course of estate administration the executor files an in-
ventory with the Probate Court pursuant to section 2115.15, Revised
Code. Exceptions may be filed to the inventory "by any person interested
in the estate or in any of the property included in the inventory." Follow-
ing the filing of exceptions, only the executor or administrator must be
notified; others may or may not receive notice.
Each of the cases before the Court involved exceptions alleging that,
among other items, joint and survivorship bank accounts in which the
deceased had an interest should have been included as assets in the estate
inventory. In the Cole case the account survivor was not the estate exec-
utor. In Marsek the accounts had two survivors, one of them the exec-
utrix and the other her sister. The Court held that in Cole the account
survivor, not otherwise a party to the hearing on exceptions, did not be-
come a party by reason of notice that a hearing would be held, and not
having voluntarily appeared was not bound by the Court's determinations
as to the account; therefore, her action against the bank upon the account
contract was not barred by res judicata from the exceptions proceeding.
In Marsek the executrix, although admittedly maintaining two legal ca-
pacities (namely, executrix on the one hand and account survivor on the
other) was bound by her participation as a party to the Probate Court
hearing, while her sister was not so bound and could attack the Court's
determination in a separate action.
The banks involved, literally caught in the middle, have two methods
of recourse for self protection. First, section 1107.08, Revised Code,
allows the bank to pay the survivor of the account. Second, a bank may
file a declaratory judgment action joining all of the interested parties. -4
The one action which such a bank should not take, it unfortunately being
the most obvious response to the problem, is to obey the order of the Pro-
bate Court and pay the account balance to the Court for inclusion in the
estate.
It is at first disturbing that in the Marsek situation two account sur-
vivors, presumably in an identical position in relation to that account, may
obtain different rights to the property in the account. This is a neces-
sary possibility since the Probate Court judgment binds the executrix-sur-
244 Id.
24 5 OHIO RimV. CODE ANN. § 2721.02 (Page 1953); 18 Ohio St. 2d at 8, 246 N..2d at 544.
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vivor as to her share of the account, while the other survivor may bring an
action against the bank upon its contract or defend a declaratory judg-
ment action by the bank or an action on behalf of the estate brought by
the executrix, without the intervention of res judicata. But it must be rec-
ognized that this is a consequence, not of the survivors' contractual rela-
tionship with the bank, but of their distinct relationships to the estate.
The bank, as long as it proceeds properly, has no risk of double liability.
The final result is merely that the account is distributed after each survivor
has had his day in court, although these may be separate days. When
there are multiple survivors to an account, or multiple claimants to any
property which is the subject of an exception to an estate inventory, any
and each of them may voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Pro-
bate Court, participating there as parties and being bound by that determi-
nation. However, no claimant should be obligated by the defense offered
by another and in which he was not required to join.
Proper Party to Will Contest.-The Cole case discussed above showed
the Court to be unsympathetic to executors maintaining another legal ca-
pacity adverse to the interests of the estate. 46 In Steinberg v. Central
Trust Co.147 the Court exercised an opportunity to prohibit such a conflict
of interest.
Decedent in Steinberg died testate leaving a daughter and two grand-
daughters. The daughter, decedent's only heir at law, was named coexec-
utor with the Central Trust Co. which also served as sole trustee under
the will's provisions. The two granddaughters' only interest in the estate
was as remaindermen of the life estate devised to their mother.
Following the admission of the will to probate, decedent's daughter
qualified and accepted appointment as coexecutor. As sole heir at law she
would have taken the entire estate outright, not subject to trust or only
for life without powers of appointment, had the will been set aside. Alli-
son v. Allison,248 decided by the Court last term, had indicated that an exec-
utor with an interest in challenging the will may only do so after resigna-
tion. This raises two problems for the executor who has already been ap-
pointed. First, the resignation may result in a taxable gift of the executor's
fee to the other devisees and legatees if the will is upheld. And second,
if the will contest is unsuccessful the other coexecutor (or if there is none,
2 4 0 In this same spirit the Court also held during the 1969 term that, where the Probate
Court elects on behalf of an incompetent spouse to take against the will of a deceased instead of
under the will, the executor of the deceased's will, the trustee of deceased's testamentary trust,
and legatees of the will all have no standing to challenge the election because of their poten-
tially adverse interests versus the surviving spouse. Only the guardian of such spouse may con-
test an election, and that would be on the ground that the court failed to choose the "better"
provision in the exercise of its discretion. In re Estate of Cook, 19 Ohio St. 2d 121, 249 NE.2d
799 (1969).
247 18 Ohio St. 2d 33, 247 N.E.2d 303 (1969).
248 15 Ohio St. 2d 44, 238 N.E.2d 768 (1968).
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the administrator) will be left with complete control of the proceedings,
and often this will be someone outside the family.
Obviously in order to circumvent these and other handicaps, the
daughter-coexecutor did not follow the Allison delineated procedure. In-
stead an action was conveniently brought in the name of her daughter, the
decedent's granddaughter, and the daughter-coexecutor as nominal defend-
ant answered but joined in the prayer of the petition to set the will aside.
Fortunately for the preservation of an adversary proceeding, codefendant
Central Trust Co. demurred to the petition on the ground that the plain-
tiff granddaughter was not a proper party to contest the will. The appeal
came to the Court from the sustained demurrer.
Will contests are governed by section 2741.01, Revised Code, which
authorizes any "person interested in a will" to challenge its validity. That
language has been limited by judicial construction to pecuniary interests.249
This interpretation guarantees the integrity of probate, fosters confidence
in testators, and prevents extensive litigation by persons whose status quo
would not be affected by the validity or invalidity of the will. But the
rule also requires that the pecuniary interest of the plaintiff be one which
is adversely affected by the probate of the willW 0 In effect this would
normally consist of only that class of heirs at law for whom the provisions
in the will are less than their intestate share. Also, since the limitation of
contestors turns on pecuniary interest, presumably an heir at law who
would take a different type of devise under the will, than as his share un-
der the statute for intestate distribution,251 will be barred as a contest plain-
tiff unless he is able to establish a greater present value for his interest at
law.252
In anticipation of this holding appellants argued in the alternative
that the answer filed by defendant-coexecutor should be treated as a cross-
petition seeking the same relief since it admitted all the allegations of the
petition and joined in the prayer. Despite the prevalent practice of sepa-
rately denominating a cross-petition in an answer in Ohio, the statutes do
not so require.253 With no formal bar to this construction of the pleadings
the Court had to dispose of the claim on Allison grounds. Treating the
coexecutor as plaintiff, Allison covers the Steinberg case, but the Court
249 Chilcote v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St. 98, 119 N.E. 364 (1918).
250 Id. Compare Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46, 84 N.E. 604 (1908); and Kennedy v. Wal-
cutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336 (1928); with Comer v. Comer, 175 Ohio St. 313, 194
N.E.2d 572 (1963).
2 5 1 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page 1968).
252 This theory is supported by other decisions which have required the Probate Court, in
electing whether an incompetent surviving spouse of a testate decedent should take under or
against the will, to choose as the "better" pursuant to section 2107A5, Revised Code, the higher
net value as computed without regard to other factors such as age of survivor, type of bequest,
need, or other family interests. In re Strauch, 11 Ohio App. 2d 173, 229 N.E.2d 95 (1967),
af 'd on other grounds, 15 Ohio St. 2d 192, 239 N.E.2d 43 (1968).
253 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2309.13 (Page 1953).
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states that it is extending the Allison ruleY- This is misleading since the
rule of fiduciary duty enunciated is identical; the only change which may
be considered an extension of the former case is the effect on the judgment
since in Allison the executor was given an opportunity to resign and pro-
ceed upon remand. In Steinberg final judgment was entered affirming
the lower courts and sustaining the demurrer. Justice Schneider dissented
from an otherwise unanimous Court in this application of Allison, as well
as from the rule itself as stated in the syllabus.255
Premarital Conveyance of Real Property.-Perlberg v. Perlberg258
brought the Court to reconsider this term its decision of seventy years ago
in Ward v. Ward.27 The common issue was whether the conveyance in
contemplation of marriage by an engaged grantor of his real property to
children of a former marriage without adequate consideration other than
love and affection is a fraud upon the marriage and the unwitting prospec-
tive spouse's right to dower as a matter of law. Ward held that it was.
Perlberg noted the valid distinction that the Ward deed, executed before
marriage but filed thereafter, was not record notice as was the deed in
Perlberg which was filed the day before the wedding, but it went further
and expressly overruled Ward.
The Court significantly stated that "[i]f evidence is adduced in the req-
uisite quantum that a betrothed woman has been the victim of actual
fraud, her cause of action to set aside such a fraudulent conveyance will
lie."' 58 Although it went on to say that the record "contains no such evi-
dence," this should have been phrased as an affirmance of the Court of
Common Pleas which found no facts amounting to actual fraud. The rec-
ord is unclear: on the one hand there is testimony that the engaged
grantor intentionally took the plaintiff fiance to view his real estate hold-
ings, while on the other hand there is evidence this may have been only to
obtain a loan from her, and this latter theory is buttressed by evidence of
"family meetings" at which the transfers of the title were discussed. The
practical result is that an action to set aside such conveyances will depend
on affirmative deception, and the findings of fact in this regard will con-
trol. Nonetheless, parties to a prospective marriage with peculiar property
dispositions, particularly when one or both are of advanced age or sub-
stantial means, will be well-advised to execute an antenuptial agreement
to establish firm evidence of disclosure.
It is interesting to speculate on one prominent factor in Justice Dun-
can's opinion. Perhaps as an accident, the four blatant overrulings of
prior Court decisions were in candid opinions by the Court's junior mem-
254 18 Ohio St. 2d at 36, 247 N.E.2d at 305.
2Z5 He also dissented with an opinion in Allison.
256 18 Ohio St. 2d 55, 247 N.E.2d 306 (1969).
257 63 Ohio S. 125, 57 N.E. 1095 (1900).
258 18 Ohio St. 2d at 59, 247 N.Y.2d at 308 [emphasis added).
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ber. Per/berg states the reason as follows: " . . . we do not believe that
Ward v. Ward, supra, provides a reasonable rule for our time." He ap-
proaches the rejection of a very recent case in Carmelite Sisters259 in a sim-
ilar fashion, and again in Fankhauser v. Mansfield. 60
Mental Hospital Expenses of Beneficiary.-The only trust case before
the Court this term presented an unusual fact situation. The beneficiary
of a discretionary trust for support was an otherwise destitute mental pa-
tient at a state hospital. There her needs consisting of room, board and
care were supplied by the state. The trustees concluded that her mainte-
nance had been otherwise provided for, and the income from her share of
the estate was attributed to the other shares. The Department of Mental
Hygiene and Correction brought an action for reimbursement, and a unan-
imous Court in Bureau of Support v. Kreitzer261 affirmed a judgment in
the state's favor.
The state was found to be in the position of a supplier of necessities.
Such a person has often been recognized to have an enforceable claim
against a spendthrift trust or a trust for support which other creditors or
the beneficiary himself could not reach.62
The principal difficulty encountered by Justice Schneider in reaching
that conclusion was obscured by his structure of the opinion. He divided
it into three sections, and sections I and III are not perfect complements.
Section III attempts to clinch its argument that the state is a supplier of
necessities by citing its duty to perform this function; "[ilt is, therefore,
no volunteer." 263  But this has the effect of indirectly tarnishing the gloss
of section I where the conclusion is that "[w~hatever may be the nature of
the liability of the state to a patient with dependents, we have no diffi-
culty in arriving at the conclusion that in the case of one without depend-
ents . . . the state's liability is secondary .... 2'64 The circle, which the
subtitle of section III ("The Resolution of the Impasse") implies is bro-
ken, remains.
Survival Statute.-The Court's first estates and wills decision of the
term is exemplary of the usual function which the Court is relied upon to
perform. Since 1953 there had been an uncertainty in the law of Ohio
regarding the necessary period of survivorship in order to qualify as an
heir at law or legatee of a decedent.
Justice Herbert's opinion in Henry v. Central Nat'l Bank265 points out
259 Discussed infra at section (N).
260 Discussed supra at section E. See also Ziegler v. Ohio Water Svc. Co., 18 Ohio St. 2d
101, 247 N.E.2d 728 (1969), discussed infra at section M.
26116 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83 (1968).
262 2 A. Scowrr, THE LAW OF TRUSTs § 157.2 at 1216-20 (3d ed. 1968).
263 16 Ohio St. 2d at 152, 243 N.E.2d at 86.
264 Id. at 149, 243 N.E.2d at 85.
265 16 Ohio St. 2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968).
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that the statutory confusion originated in what was one of the most im-
portant legislative sessions of recent years, the 100th General Assembly,
which considered the adoption of the Revised Code. He also documents
the principle which was essential to the passage of the long-awaited recod-
ification: no substantive changes in the statutes were to be incorporated.
Any actual amendment of a statutory provision required a separate bill in
the same session.
This complication in a state which has a woeful neglect of legislative
history would be disturbing enough alone, but there was another facet.
The Bureau of Code Revision had inadvertently omitted part of section
10503-18, General Code, in its conversion to section 2105.21, Revised
Code. To correct this and similar discrepancies in other sections the Om-
nibus Bill""' was introduced, passed on August 7, and signed on August
12; and it became effective October 1 (the same date as the Revised
Code). That section required an heir or legatee to survive a decedent by
three days to avoid a conclusive presumption that he had pre-deceased the
decedent.
In that same session a substantive amendment was introduced to ex-
tend the survival period from three to 30 days. 267 This was passed on July
9, signed on July 17, and became effective October 16 (the normal consti-
tutional period of 90 days, there being no emergency clause as in the
Omnibus Bill).
Thus, the problem arose with the ordinary rule of statutory construc-
tion, namely that the later in time of two conflicting enactments prevails,
in conflict with the only sensible application of the several bills. Actu-
ally, the Court could have applied this general principle and concluded
that "later in time" refers to the later effective date, rather than the later
date of enactment. That may have been the theory of Chief Justice Taft
and Justice Schneider who concurred only in the fourth paragraph of the
syllabus and the judgment. But Justice Herbert, with four other mem-
bers of the Court concurring generally, elaborated at great length in both
the syllabus and opinion on the necessity to allow exceptions where rea-
sonableness so requires.
The conclusion reached was the only rational one possible: the Omni-
bus Bill purported to correct all errors in the code revision, and in this
enthusiasm had the effect of clarifying only the interim between October
1 and October 16 for purposes of section 2105.21, Revised Code, because
of the additional amendment of that section. However, the Court of Ap-
peals had managed to reach the opposite result,"" and perhaps to demon-
strate to lower courts that they need not blindly follow general principles
206 S.B. 361.
2 6 7 Amended S.B. 40.
20 s Although Baldwin's Ohio Revised Code lists only the version of the section enacted in
Amended S.B. 40, Page's Ohio Revised Code Annotated for 1967 sets forth both versions and
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which lead to absurd determinations, the majority opinion was written in
terms of interpreting "legislative intention."
I. Private Associations
Bowling.-This term the Court was presented for the first time the
question of judicial review of the actions of private associations. The first
case to be decided was that of Lough v. Varsity Bowl, Inc.,269 and it in-
volved an action filed by the participants in an American Bowling Con-
gress tournament. The A.B.C. is a voluntary association which sanctioned
the tournament involved and provided the rules and constitution regu-
lating tournament operation. By entering the bowling tournament, the
participants became subject to the rules and procedures of the A.B.C.
The Court decided the case upon the traditional rule, which it stated
in its syllabus, as follows: "Where the rules of a voluntary association
provide for the final settlement of disputes among its members, its action
thereunder will not be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of allegations
of arbitrariness, fraud, or collusion, even though property rights may be
involved." 270 The only contribution of the Court to the interpretation of
this rule was that the fact of an effect on property rights will not automat-
ically vest a court with jurisdiction. When viewed in the light of the facts
presented in the Lough case this proposition is not startling. Here, the
property involved was the prize money offered to the winner of the tourn-
ament in question. It should not be surprising that, if an association may
validly establish its own rules and procedures for internal operation which
govern both the association and the membership, the award of a prize by
that association or on its behalf should be governed by the established
rules, and a dispute as to the application of those rules should be decided
within the appellate framework of the association.
Churches.--On January 17, 1968 the Court overruled a motion to cer-
tify the case of Serbian Orthodox Church Congregation of St. Demetrius
of Akron, Ohio v. Vladislav Kelemen.271 That appeal involved a dispute
over the right to control church property following a schismatic split in
the church hierarchy. As stated in the opinion of the Court of Common
Pleas by Matz, J., "The issue joined by these pleadings is whether or not
the plaintiffs and their associates constitute the St. Demetrius Church or
whether the defendants and their associates constitute such church. That
there is a schism of the church is quite apparent from the evidence. The
plaintiffs and their associates claim that plaintiff church is an integral
explains the legislative history, allowing the reader to choose which version he believes to be
correct, with the warning that the Henry case is pending before the Court.
269 16 Ohio St. 2d 153, 243 N.X.2d 61 (1968).
270 Id.
271 Case No. 41380.
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part of the original diocese in the United States of North America and
Canada, and that the defendants and their associates are the schismatic
group. The defendants, on the other hand, claim that the Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Church with its see in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, is the head of the
church and that they and their associates constitute the true church belong-
ing to the hierarchy with its see in Belgrade."
This case was remanded to the Supreme Court of Ohio by the Supreme
Court of the United States2 72 on February 24, 1969 for consideration in
the light of Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church. 3  On March 5, 1969 the Su-
preme Court of Ohio allowed the motion to certify the record, pursuant to
the order of the Supreme Court of the United States. This case was not
argued on the merits during the 1969 term.
The Presbyterian Church case arose when two local churches withdrew
from an acknowledged hierarchical general church organization, the Pres-
byterian Church in the United States. As reported in the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Georgia law made the right to the
property previously used by the local churches "turn on a civil court jury
decision as to whether the general church abandoned or departed from the
tenets of faith and practice it held at the time the local churches affiliated
with it."2 74  The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Su-
preme Court of Georgia and held that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States prohibited a civil court
from making its determinations on the basis of church doctrine and dog-
ma. While this appears to be a sound principle of constitutional law, the
Court failed to suggest any valid criteria which could be used to determine
church property disputes, an emotional issue but one which is of necessity
litigated at least as to property rights.
On remand the Supreme Court of Ohio will be faced with an impos-
sible situation. It will be precluded from considering any of the ecclesi-
astical factors which dominate the views of the litigants. The Presbyterian
Church case seems somewhat easier to resolve. There the local churches
were admittedly withdrawing from an acknowledged superior organiza-
tion. As former members of the denomination these churches could be
said to have submitted themselves to the organization's constitution and
internal procedures. In order to validly withdraw, they would have to
pursue their remedy within the private framework. However, in the
Serbian Orthodox case the plaintiffs deny their association with the hier-
archy represented by defendants. Thus, they refuse to recognize the au-
thority of any private association other than their own.
272-393 U.S. 527 (1969).
273 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
274 Id. at 441.
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J. jurisdiction
Long-arm Statute.-In Kilbreath v. Rudy275 the Court considered the
retroactive effect of Ohio's "long-arm" statutes2 76 upon actions accruing
before the statutes' effective date in 1965 but filed thereafter. The appel-
lant in Kilbreath argued against retroactive applicability on three grounds:
(1) that this was barred by Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitu-
tion, (2) that this was prohibited by section 1.20, Revised Code, and (3)
that the statutes are analogous to those nonresident motorist statutes
which were held to be prospective.
The Court distinguished the prohibitions in the Constitution and the
statute as applying only to those laws affecting "substantive rights, and
[havingj no reference to laws of a remedial nature providing rules of prac-
tice, courses of procedure, or methods of review. 277  Paragraph three
of the syllabus in the case characterizes the long-arm statutes as expanding
the personal jurisdiction of the courts, and therefore as "remedial," but
does not suggest whether they are "rules of practice, courses of procedure,
or methods of review." It is apparent that the Court concluded that any
statute which might be classified as remedial is, by that definition, not sub-
stantive.
The remedial label was derived from the Court's observation that the
statutes "do not create new wrongs, they merely let local courts reach far-
ther for personal jurisdiction over those who have committed established
wrongs.278  But this overlooks the more well-reasoned analysis exempli-
fied by an Ohio Court of Common Pleas considering the same problem:
Although a "long-arm statute" does not affect vested rights, it makes
such a profound change in established law concerning jurisdiction,
venue and service of summons upon non-residents that it must be consid-
ered at least partially substantive and will not be construed as having
retrospective application in the absence of an express statement of legisla-
tive intention to that effect.279
The Supreme Court felt that the appellant could only be relying upon
its absence from the local jurisdiction, and "this kind of reliance does not
seem worthy of judicial protection."28 0 With the demise of the doctrine of
Pennoyer v. Neff2"' the Court no longer felt obligated to honor what it
viewed as legal gamesmanship over jurisdiction which hindered the claims
of Ohio plaintiffs. What it failed to recognize was that decisions of the
275 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 242 N.E.2d 658 (1968).
2
T6 OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.382-.383 (Page Supp. 1968).
277 16 Ohio St. 2d at 72, 242 N.E.2d at 660.
2781d.
279 Paragraph 7 of syllabus in Bruney v. Little, 8 Ohio Misc. 393 (1966).
280 16 Ohio St. 2d at 73, 242 N.E.2d at 660.
28195 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Supreme Court of the United States expanding state jurisdiction282 empha-
sized that an element of gaming remains involved in the commencement
of any law suit and that due process requires respect for "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice."'283 Although Ohio may consti-
tutionally expand its jurisdiction and provide for service of process upon
non-residents falling within that expanded jurisdiction, it does not seem
fundamentally fair to incorporate into this group those persons who had
done business previously in Ohio under conditions where no law provided
that they would have to engage in legal actions in Ohio courts. Any
wrongs committed by such persons could then, as well as now, be litigated
in other forums.
The prospective application of nonresident motorist statutes was dis-
tinguished by the Court on the issue of the fictional agency of the Secre-
tary of State, and the reasoning that under Pennoyer v. Neff he could only
be "designated" by a motorist's future presence within the state. Although
it is indisputable that contrived technicalities of statutory agency for ser-
vice have been replaced with schemes more likely to achieve actual notice
to a defendant, and this is constitutionally valid because the contacts of the
motorist with the state subsequent to the enactment of the statute create
local jurisdiction and put him on notice, the expansion of jurisdiction and
modernization of techniques of service, in and of themselves, in no way
justify their application to persons acting before the legislative enunciation.
Chief Justice Taft, in his dissent, preferred to attack retroactive appli-
cation of the long-arm statutes upon the theory that section 1.20, Revised
Code, applied. Unfortunately, he did not see fit to explain his reasoning
in reaching that conclusion, and the position of the Court seems justified
to the effect that this statute applies only to amendments and repeals,
while Ohio's long-arm statutes are an addition to the statutory law rather
than a change.
K. Territorial Disputes
School Districts.-In State ex rel. Erwin v. Board of Education" the
Court considered a conflict between the statute providing for transfer of a
local school district's territory to a city school district8 5 and that providing
for the creation of a new local school district2 86 The county board of educa-
tion adopted a resolution pursuant to section 3311.26, Revised Code, pro-
posing the creation of a new local school district consisting of the old
2 8 2
ntemational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
283 326 U.S. at 316.
284 17 Ohio St 2d 63, 245 N.E.2d 730 (1969).
,285 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3311.231 (Page Supp. 1967).
286 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3311.26 (Page Supp. 1967).
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Bloomfield Local School District and two others. That section provides
that the consolidation would become automatically effective on the thir-
tieth day after the adoption of the resolution, unless a petition of referendum
was filed containing the signatures of thirty-five percent of the qualified
electors voting at the last general election in the territory of the proposed
new district. The residents of the Bloomfield district, without explanation,
but probably because they aggregated less than thirty-five percent of the
combined new district, failed to present such a referendum petition. Instead,
they proceeded under section 3311.231, Revised Code, and countered with a
petition proposing the transfer of the Bloomfield district to an adjoining city
school district. This transfer petition required "fifty-five percent of the
qualified electors voting at the last general election residing within that por-
tion of a school district proposed to be transferred." Thus, while a larger
percentage of electors was necessary, the relevant territory was considerably
reduced. Furthermore, if that transfer petition could have been properly
placed upon the ballot at the next general election, and if the consolidation
of the county school districts could have been avoided in the meantime, only
a majority of the electors residing in the Bloomfield district would have
been necessary to authorize the transfer to the city.
The Court concluded that the resolution of the county board, adopted
March 16, became effective thirty days later on April 15 since no petition of
referendum against it had been filed. This ended the existence of the
Bloomfield district on April 15. The petition to transfer which was ini-
tiated by the Bloomfield electors was not filed until April 11, and since
the county superintendent had "thirty days following the filing of said peti-
tion"2 7 to present that petition to the county board, the Bloomfield dis-
trict was validly terminated before the transfer petition had to be consid-
ered.
The Court went on to say that the subsequent submission of the trans-
fer petition to the electorate in the succeeding election was a nullity, and
the request by the petitioners to have their opportunity to submit the trans-
fer proposal was without merit because there would have been an oppor-
tunity to properly object with a referendum petition.
The Court here displayed its eagerness to terminate the proceedings in
this case which had caused delay and confusion in the orderly administra-
tion of the public schools involved. However, in doing this it ignored the
fact that even after the Bloomfield district was validly consolidated into
the new county district a majority of the electors residing in the old
Bloomfield district could propose by petition under section 3311.231, Re-
vised Code, to transfer the old Bloomfield district from the new consoli-
dated district. The only difference would be that the approval of this
petition at an election would require a majority of the electors residing in
.
2 8 7
0 1no REV. CODE ANN. § 3311.231 (Page Supp. 1967).
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the entire new district of which the Bloomfield district was a part. This
submission at an election never occurred, and the election that was held
was limited to the electors of the old Bloomfield district. A proper dispo-
sition of the case would have been for the Court to remand with an oppor-
tunity for the appellants to request the submission of their original petition
to all of the electors of the new district.
Local Option.-The status of township territory, subject to a valid
local option election prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor, and sub-
sequently annexed to a municipal corporation, was raised in Canton v. Im-
perial Bowling Lanes288 by the city of Canton in an action for a declara-
tory judgment. Normally, all actions affecting the regulation of liquor
originate in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County pursuant to
section 4301.31, Revised Code. This case was filed in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Stark County, and the Court held that as a declaratory judg-
ment action against a liquor permit holder the case did "not purport to be
an action against either the board, the director, or the Department of Liq-
uor Control." 89
Section 709.10, Revised Code, states that territory annexed to a city "is
deemed a part of the municipal corporation, and the inhabitants residing
therein shall have all the rights and privileges of the inhabitants within
the original limits of such municipal corporation." The defendant-appel-
lant argued that one of the rights and privileges is the opportunity to uti-
lize a permit to sell intoxicating liquor, but the Court noted that section
4301.32, Revised Code, allows either a municipal corporation or a part of a
municipal corporation to hold a local option election. Therefore, the use
of a liquor permit is not a right common to all inhabitants of a municipal
corporation. Recognizing this, it then becomes immaterial that part of the
former "dry" township territory had been transferred by annexation to a
city. The conclusion reached was that, in effect, after a valid local option
election has taken place the alteration of political or corporate boundaries
does not affect the status previously conferred on the territory. The only
way for the annexed portion to change its status is to participate in a new
local option election based upon a district as defined in section 4301.32,
Revised Code. It is interesting to note that, after the annexation of this
territory to the city of Canton, even if the remaining township territory
were to hold a new election and vote "wet," the annexed portion of the
old township would remain dry because the territory covered by the new
township election would be "exclusive of any municipal corporation or
part thereof located in such township. '290
Annexation Statutes.--Section 707.01 et seq., Revised Code, and sec-
288 16 Ohio St. 2d 47, 242 N.E.2d 566 (1968).
289 Id. at 49, 242 NXE.2d at 568.
2900 nio REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.32(C) (Page 1965).
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tion 709-01 et seq., Revised Code, relating to incorporation of and annexa-
tion to municipal corporations, respectively, were amended by the Gen-
eral Assembly, effective December 1, 1967.291 These statutory revisions
made several changes in the procedures for altering the status and bound-
aries of unincorporated territory. Since the acts did not expressly apply
to proceedings pending on their effective date, such proceedings were still
subject to the provisions of the statutes as they existed prior to December
1, 1967.292
In November, 1967 there were several petitions filed with the appro-
priate local boards in Hamilton County to either incorporate the unincor-
porated area known as Kenwood or to annex a part of that area to one of
the adjacent incorporated municipalities. These petitions were pending
before the board of county commissioners on December 1, 1967. On
December 11, 1967, after the effective date of the amendments, an addi-
tional petition to annex a portion of Kenwood to another municipal cor-
poration was filed.
What had apparently been the accepted standard, and which standard
the county commissioners were intent on following, was that the various
petitions would be heard in the order of their filing. As might be ex-
pected, procrastination in such hearings and decisions had become the
rule. A conflict then arose due to the provision in the amended version
of the annexation statutes requiring the commissioners to set a hearing on
the annexation petition in not "less than sixty nor more than ninety days
after the petition is filed," and further requiring that the board decide the
petition "within ninety days after the hearing."293 When that period had ex-
pired, the petitioners for annexation commenced an action for a writ of
mandamus. That case reached the court this term as State ex rel. Hannan
v. DeCoucy.294
The board of county commissioners relied upon Hoye v. Schaeffer 9
and the opinion therein of Judge Bell, where he accepted the theory that
"proponents of annexation and those of incorporation are required to en-
gage in races to the court house." 296  The court in Hannan repudiated
this assumption: "The time of filing of various petitions was not deter-
minative of any priority for their consideration. Their order of preced-
ence was within the discretion of the board of county commissioners sub-
ject, of course, to applicable statutory limitations.""29  The Court seemed
291 132 OHIo LAws 353, 362.
292 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.20 (Page 1969).
293 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 709.031 (Page Supp. 1968); OHo REV. CODE ANN. §
709.033 (Page Supp. 1968).
294 18 Ohio St. 2d 73, 247 N.E.2d 465 (1969).
295 166 Ohio St. 277, 141 N.E.2d 765 (1957).
296 1d. at 278, 141 N.E.2d at 766.
297 18 Ohio St. 2d at 82, 247 N.E.2d at 470.
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to say that the board could, within its discretion, hear various petitions in
whatever order it wished, without regard to the promptness of the peti-
tioners. This was undoubtedly a frontal attack upon the general under-
standing which had prevailed since Hoye. While that may have been
desirable, it was also probably unnecessary. The board had more than
adequate time, within the 90-day period provided in which to hear the
annexation petition in question, to also hear all of those pending petitions
which had been filed before December 1. And it could have heard those
petitions in the order in which they had been filed. The amended statutes
gave the subsequent petitioners the right to a hearing and decision within
a set time, and these amendments were well known to the prior petitioners.
If they had wanted to protect their rights under the Hoye doctrine, they
could have brought independent mandamus petitions to have required the
board to act before the expiration of the subsequently enacted statutory
period. Therefore, the enactment of the statutory amendments without
provision for pending petitions would not necessarily have prejudiced their
position under the then accepted theory of law.
L. Local Government
County Government Forms.-The county has traditionally been a unit
of state government, a territorial and political subdivision. 98 As such, it
has been distinguished from the semi-autonomy of a municipality which,
since 1912, is assented to by the people as local self-government rather
than superimposed as an administrative convenience by the state?99  Ohio
counties were uniformly of this mold until the constitutional amendment
of Article X, adopted in November, 1933, provided for county home
rule."' By adopting a county charter through a double election proce-
dure 01 the county becomes a political entity distinct from a branch of state
government, and it may legislate on local matters. In November, 1934,
the voters in Cuyahoga County approved a county charter, 302 and a simi-
lar one was defeated in Hamilton County.30 3
29 8 See Shoup, Constitutional Problems of County Home Rule in Ohio, 1 W. RBV. L. REv.
111, 113 (1949).
299 Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, 118 (1857).
300 Omo CoNsr. Art. X, §§ 3-4.
301 Pursuant to section 4 the question is submitted to the electors whether a county charter
commission should be chosen. If a majority respond favorably, the commission is elected and
the charter it subsequently proposes is submitted to the electors, with various simple majorities
required for approval depending upon the charter's effect.
302 However, the Board of Elections of Cuyahoga County refused to certify the results due
to a dispute as to the effect on municipal powers and a consequent disagreement as to the types
of simple majorities required, and the Court denied a writ of mandamus. State, ex rel. Howland,
v. Krause, 130 Ohio St. 455, 200 N.E. 512 (1936).
3 0 3 Shoup, supra note 298, at 124. See also Walker, County Home Rule in Ohio, 1 OMO
ST. LJ. 11, 12 (1935); and Lowrie, Interpretation of the County Home Rule Amendment by
the Ohio Supreme Court, 10 CIN. L. REv. 454 (1936).
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A non-home-rule county is an agent "of the state, primarily concerned
with the local administration of state policies." 304 The county is author-
ized to perform numerous local functions by general law.30 The General
Assembly is empowered to enact such laws by the Ohio Constitution in
Article X, section 1. Before the adoption of this amended article in 1933,
general law and the constitution provided only for the election of county
officials; this became the standard form-locally elected county officers
applying Ohio general law. The constitutional amendment, in addition to
permitting county home rule, also included a provision allowing the Gen-
eral Assembly to establish "alternative forms of county government" in
the section which continued its power to govern counties by general law
in the absence of a home rule charter adopted by the electorate30
Bills proposing alternative forms were introduced in the General As-
sembly in the sessions immediately following the adoption of the amend-
ment, but they failed to pass.307 In fact, no alternative form law was en-
acted until 1961.808 The sponsors of that bill recognized the constitutional
limitations on such a law and admitted that the General Assembly could
not circumvent the elective procedures of sections 3 and 4 of Article X
by constructing an alternative form under section 1 with municipal powers.
Thus the 1961 law had "one basic objective: to provide means for meeting
modern county governmental problems, within the existing governmental
framework."30 9 The technique was to permit a county executive for ad-
ministrative management of the policies adopted by the elected county
commissioners. This was undoubtedly a wise modernization for urban
counties, and one which was constitutionally valid.
In 1967, with no counties having adopted the alternative executive
form since 1961, the General Assembly amended the enabling legisla-
tion.310 On September 6, 1967 the Board of County Commissioners of
Hamilton County adopted a resolution determining to place on the ballot
"the county appointive executive form." An action was filed to enjoin
the submission of the question because of alleged constitutional infirmi-
ties in the statute. The election was held, but the ballots were impounded
without a count to await the decision on appeal. The case of Blacker v.
Wiethe 11 thus came to the Court.
The principal contention of plaintiffs-appellees in objecting to the
304 Reilly Leach, The Ohio Alternative Form County Government Law, 22 OHio ST. LJ.
696 (1961).
305 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3 (Page 1953).
3 06 OMo CONST. Art. X, § 1.
307 S.B. 134, 91st Gen. Ass. (1935-36); H.B. 464, 92d Gen. Ass. (1937-38).
308 129 OHo LAWs 1638; OHio Rnv. CODE ANN. ch. 302 (Page 1953).
309 See Reilly, supra, note 304, at 698.
310 132 OHIo LAws 235.
31116 Ohio St. 2d 65, 242 N.E.2d 655 (1968).
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statutory scheme was that section 302.13(M), Revised Code, a wholly new
subsection added by the 1967 legislative amendments, constituted a stand-
ardless and unlimited delegation of legislative power in violation of the
constitutional principle that "the legislative power of the state shall be
vested in a General Assembly.131 2  In effect, the opponents of the execu-
tive plan were saying that the General Assembly had misinterpreted its
constitutional mandate to provide alternative forms and had wrongfully
emphasized its power to provide for the government of counties. This
raised a significant constitutional question.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, dismissed the argu-
ment by first admitting that legislative power is granted to the Board of
County Commissioners by section 302.13(M), Revised Code, and then
concluding that this is limited to purely county matters.3 13 Perhaps this
would have been sufficient for the decision, and it could have been ap-
pended to this rationale by later decision that county legislation remains
subject to general law. But that which follows in the opinion, and which
may or may not be dicta as it reflects upon the legislative delegation
issue, is more ultimate in its implication.
The opinion states that "[s]ection 1 of Article X gives the General
Assembly the authority to provide not only 'forms of county government'
but in doing so to provide for the 'government of counties.' One of the
powers of government is the power to legislate."3 14 This overlooks the
fact that the phrase providing for the "government of counties" is in the
clause which merely continues, from the pre-1933 constitution, the Gen-
eral Assembly's power to "provide by general law for the organization and
government of counties." That power exists through the constitution
without specific provisions for alternative forms in Chapter 302, Revised
Code, and is the authority for all the traditional county statutes which ex-
isted before 1961 and remain throughout Title 3, Revised Code. It was
never suggested that the General Assembly could delegate legislative
powers to traditional counties, and the import of that clause in section 1
suggests that the General Assembly is the sole legislative authority for
section 1 counties.315 Constitutional history, in comparing the pre-1933
version of Article X with the current one, is persuasive that the "alterna-
tive forms" provision did not intend an alternative legislative body for a
county to replace the General Assembly's duties, but meant an alternative
to the strictly elective pattern.
Sections 3 and 4 of Article X establish the mechanism to achieve what
the Court has condoned under section 1. The Court's opinion ex-
312 ino CONs. Art II, § 1.
313 16 Ohio St. 2d at 67-68, 242 N.E.2d at 656-657.
314 Id. at 68, 242 N.X.2d at 657.
315 "The General Assembly shall provide by general law .... (emphasis added).
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pressly views section 1 as a short-cut to the same end.3 16 Its reason in sup-
port is that: "Probably, because of confidence in the General Assembly,
the requirements for approval of such a charter are less stringent where it
is, in effect, prepared by the General Assembly . . . than those require-
ments are where the charter is prepared locally by a charter commis-
sion . .." This is not substantiated by cited authority. Also, it is note-
worthy that those writing in the 1930's, when the intentions of the initia-
tors of the amendment were fresh in their minds, did not mention such a
theory.3 1 7 Furthermore, it is logically open to question: why should the
General Assembly be presumed more capable of anticipating local self-
government needs, and especially when the amendment had to be proposed
by initiative petition due to the opposition of the rurally dominated legisla-
ture ?3 1
8
The first paragraph of the syllabus of the Court leaves some room for
re-consideration in another case. It only holds that the delegation of leg-
islative power pursuant to section 1 "is not unconstitutional on its face."
It must be remembered that the case arose as a challenge to the election,
and therefore to the entire plan. As previously noted, and as conceded
by appellees in their brief,31 the basic alternative form idea is probably
sound and permissible. When a challenge to the operation of a specific
county-legislated act arises, perhaps the Court will strike down section
302.12(M), Revised Code. This was argued by appellants, urging that
the provisions of the plan were severable and could be individually chal-
lenged after the adoption of the entire plan. The Court seemed to ignore
the severability issue, but this is the best distinction of the case which is
available for the second round of litigation.
Exemption of "Emergency" Ordinances from Constitutional Refer-
endum Requirement.-Sections 3 and 7 of Article XVIII of the Ohio
Constitution authorize a municipality to adopt a city charter and exercise
home rule. A charter municipality may provide its own initiative and ref-
erendum provisions, but where the charter does not so provide, or if the
municipality has no charter, the provisions of sections 731.29 and 731.30,
Revised Code, apply.
Article II, section If of the Ohio Constitution guarantees the powers
of initiative and referendum to the people of each municipality "on all
questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized
by law to control by legislative action; such powers shall be exercised in
316 "Under Section 1 of that artidcle, the General Assembly, in effect, prepares such a charter,"
as the one which "the people, through their elected representatives, prepare" under sections 3
and 4. 16 Ohio St. 2d at 69, 242 NE.2d at 657.
3 17 See Walker, supra, note 303, and Lowrie, supra, note 303.
3 18 See Lowrie, supra, note 303, at 455.




the manner now or hereafter provided by law." Section 731.30, Revised
Code, adopted pursuant to Article II, section if purports to establish "the
manner" of exercising the referendum power. In so doing it appears, at
first impression, to go substantially beyond the authorization of the con-
stitution in providing that, among other ordinances, "measures necessary
for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety in
such municipal corporation, shall go into immediate effect." Thus, "emer-
gency" measures adopted by a two-thirds vote of the municipal legislative
authority are effectively exempted from the referendum power guaranteed
to the people.
In Shryock v. Zanesville3 20 the Court held that section 4227-3, General
Code (now section 731.30, Revised Code), was constitutional. In reach-
ing that conclusion the Court construed section if, in the light of sections
la through id, noting that section id removed state emergency laws from
the initiative and referendum provisions. However, section if appears on
its face to be absolute and itself refers to no other sections.
State ex rel. Fostoria v. King 21 followed Shryock and also said that
the courts will not scrutinize those measures passed pursuant to section
731.30, Revised Code, to determine whether or not there was a legitimate
emergency involved. It noted that the statute, as well as most municipal
charters, requires a vote of the legislative authority in excess of a simple
majority to pass a measure as an emergency. This was said to be a suffi-
cient protection to compensate for the people's loss of their constitution-
ally guaranteed referendum power. The opinion went on: "[iff there was
in fact no emergency or if the reasons given for such necessity are not valid
reasons, the voters have an opportunity to take appropriate action in the
subsequent election of their representatives." '22
With this background the Court obviously considered the issue closed
this term and decided State ex rel. Brunthaver v. Bauman313 with a two
sentence per curiam affirmance referring to its previous decisions. It is
unfortunate that the issues could not have been presented as a case of first
impression. The ordinance objected to by plaintiff-appellant appropri-
ated $400,000 for the purpose of constructing a flood protection project
along the Sandusky River at Fremont, Ohio. This amount was the first
of what promised to be a long series of capital expenses, and the invest-
ment of this initial fund would represent sunk cost encouraging future
legislators to continue the project in order to achieve some benefit. In
these circumstances the King reasoning is strained. Those taxpayers ob-
jecting to the commencement of the expensive long-range project would
32092 Ohio St. 375, 110 N.E. 937 (1915).
321 154 Ohio St. 213, 94 N.E.2d 697 (1950).
322 Id. at 221, 94 N.E.2d at 701.
323 18 Ohio S. 2d 59, 247 N.E.2d 310 (1969).
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not have an adequate remedy in removing the current city council at a
future election.
Permissive County Sales Tax Referendum.-In enacting sections
5739.021 and 5741.021, Revised Code, the General Assembly delegated its
authority to impose additional sales and use taxes, respectively, to the sev-
eral boards of county commissioners. This discretionary one-half of one
percent tax may be adopted for any county by resolution of that county's
board. By virtue of sections 305.31 et seq., Revised Code, such a resolu-
tion is subject to a referendum election where local electors present ade-
quate petitions as provided for in section 305.32. The constitutional va-
lidity of the delegation of state taxing authority is itself suspicious,3 24 but
the contemptible aspect of the legislature's approach to increased reve-
nues is the illusory quality of the referendum subjecting the new tax to the
people's approval. It is dear that the draftsmen of the statutes intended
to avoid responsibility for new taxes but also hoped to prevent effective
taxpayer opposition. With the decision of State ex rel. Corrigan v. Perk3
late in the 1969 term, it was obvious that they had been successful.
Following the adoption of the necessary resolutions by a politically
divided Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners on March 10,
1969, petitions seeking a referendum on those questions were circulated.
Approximately 47,000 valid signatures were required to place the ques-
tions on the ballot. Over 76,000 signatures were filed, but only 10,000
of those included the signer's ward or precinct as required by section
305.32. The board of elections split evenly on political lines in voting
on whether to count the signatures, and the Secretary of State decided the
tie in favor of counting. This decision was challenged by a petition for a
writ of prohibition filed in the Court by the Prosecuting Attorney of Cuy-
ahoga County, who was ironically the official legal counsel to the board
he was opposing.
In this posture the issue before the Court was reduced to the interpre-
tation of section 305.32 which requires, in part, that "'each signer . . .
must be an elector of the county . . . and shall place on such petition,
after his name, . . . the ward and precinct, if any." A long line of prior
cases virtually dictated the conclusion that when the legislature uses the
term "shall" it intends a mandatory provision. It is difficult to fault the
Court on this principle, although two members dissented in extended opin-
ions. The dissenting opinion of Justice Duncan candidly admitted that
"I am aware that certain decisions of this court disagree with the position
I have taken. Ordinarily, I am a firm believer in the sanctity of legal de-
cisions and stare decisis.... Here, we are not concerned with a rule of
24 A temporary restraining order was granted in July, 1969, by the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas in a suit filed on this theory, but the plaintiff lost in a hearing on the merits.
325 19 Ohio St. 2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 525 (1969).
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property under which rights have vested, or with a prescribed rule of con-
duct on which many have relied in shaping their actions." 326 This reason-
ing would be more persuasive were it not for the fact that the legislature
adopted the permissive tax scheme in the light of the past decisions which
Justices Duncan and O'Neill would have rejected. It is not the function of
a court to write better laws, but rather to determine what the legislature
intended and whether it had the power to take the actions it did. Where
that power existed, a court has to accept foolishness where it finds it.
That is not to say that a court may not construe statutory language in
its most reasonable sense. It should never be presumed that a ridiculous
conclusion was intended if an alternative does not strain the words and
context. Thus, in regard to that very section, the Court has held that the
word "shall" requires that wards and precincts be placed on a petition in
a registration county, but it is not essential that the signer himself write
these.2 When so liberally applied, the only basis for objection which re-
mains is that the use of wards and precincts at all is superflous and such a
burden that it is void. Justice O'Neill's dissenting opinion attempted to
pursue that path in terms of the irrelevance of this information in the
practical work of the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections. Even if his
contentions were true, it is untenable to argue that the burden violates the
Ohio Constitution since Article II, section ig itself requires the ward and
precinct on statewide referendum petitions for municipal residents. Any
claim of a federal constitutional infirmity is doubtful at best since the
legislature need not have subjected a tax issue to referendum at all.
M. State Regulation
Although all of the cases discussed hereunder do not involve regula-
tion in the traditional sense of a delegation of quasi-legislative, judicial
and administrative powers to an expert agency or board, they are grouped
under this heading as examples of the application of state power. Each
subject subcategory shows the state in its governmental role affecting sub-
stantive economic rights, relationships and activities. This economic
power is distinguished from taxation (examined in the next section) and
workm an's compensation (examined in section D). The principal purpose
of the former is to efficiently and equitably raise revenue, and in the latter
situation the state has assumed the function of trustee for a defined class
of insured employees in the state.
The conclusion which the regulatory cases suggest is that the Court en-
tertains a significant presumption in favor of broad state power, particu-
larly where inherent authority is involved as in the case of eminent domain.
326Id. at 12, 249 NX.2d at 531.
327 State ex rel. Poor v. Addison, 132 Ohio St. 477, 9 N.E2d 148 (1937); Lynn v. Supple,
166 Ohio St. 154, 140 N..2d 555 (1957).
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The public utilities decisions of the term might raise doubt about the con-
sistency of the predisposition for the state, but two factors are important
in that area: The Court is construing a limited statutory grant of commis-
sion jurisdiction, and the particular commission involved has not been of
uniformly high quality.
Appropriation.-Section 19 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution re-
quires the state to compensate a property owner for the acquisition of his
interest in private property or the imposition of an additional burden upon
that property. Both a total and a partial taking may be considered appro-
priation.
The question raised in Ziegler v. Ohio Water Service Co." was what
constitutes an "added burden," when the state has previously acquired less
than a fee. Ohio has consistently maintained a distinction between the public
interest in municipal streets, which is considered a fee, and that in highways
outside municipalities, which is an easement with the fee divided in the
centerline between the abutting property owners.2 9  The use of city
streets by a municipality for many public services was thereby unrestricted,
but the laying of pipes or wires in the right-of-way outside municipal
limits necessitated further compensation to the abutting owners in those
cases where the activity could not be classified as travel or assisting travel
within the limits of the state's easement. The decision in Ziegler, under
the guise of easing the state's urban expansion, explicitly overruled the
traditional distinction and concluded that the interest in existing rural high-
ways is equivalent to a fee: to hold otherwise "would be the rejection
of evolutionary change." This holding ended the efforts at distinction in
a previously discredited case to describe the construction of water mains or
sewers as a variation on transporting water330 or as not amounting to a
burden' 31
Where the fact of appropriation is admitted, the question becomes one
of the method of taking and the owner's protection. The Uniform Eminent
Domain Act and many local ordinances contain what is known as a "quid
take" procedure which permits the appropriating authority to deposit its
appraised value of property to be appropriated and then immediately
commence entry and construction. This is naturally a great advantage for
32818 Ohio St. 2d 101, 247 N.E.2N 728 (1969).
329 Daily v. State, 51 Ohio St. 348, 37 N.E. 710 (1894); Hofius v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corp., 146 Ohio St. 574, 67 N.E.2d 429 (1946).
30 Ibis was the Court's description of State ex rel. Graham v. Board of County Cormrs.,
123 Ohio St. 362, 175 N.E. 590 (1931).
331 This seems to be the actual basis for Graham, id., but one which the Court understand-
ably ignored since the constitution explicitly directs that benefits to the property owner(s) are
to be ignored. Thus, under the traditional rule of highway ownership the Hofius case, supra




public projects, involving no delay and no prior adjudication of either the
ultimate liability to the property owner or the sufficiency of the deposit.
Since 1851, the Constitution has restricted this practice in Ohio to the
building of roads and in times of general emergency. In an extremely
important per curiam opinion this term in Worthington v. Carskadon332
the Court stated a narrow definition of public roads and outlined the
owner's proper remedies.
The project in the Worthington case involved a drainage pipe con-
structed under a highway and into an open ditch dug on the appellant's
property. The city initiated its quick take procedure by filing a petition
and making a deposit. The owner responded with an answer to the peti-
tion. On appeal the owner challenged the legality of the take and prayed
that the city be required to fill the ditch and return the property to its
original condition. Such a request was manifestly unreasonable in view
of the city's right to pursue the project through the normal route of jury
trial prior to construction, and the appellant had been compensated by a
jury subsequent to completion.
But the Court went out of its way to quote the concurring Court of
Appeals opinion to the effect that at least the portion of the ditch on
appellant's property was not within the Constitution's concept of a public
road, and that it could have been blocked by an injunction against the
city and by criminal trespass and civil damages against the contractor en-
tering pursuant to the city's invalid authority. This was an unusual half-
victory for an appellant in a case fought primarily on principle.
Where there is both an admitted appropriation and a reliance by the
authorities upon the normal route of petition and adjudication, prior to
commencement of the project, the question is one of the necessary re-
sponse of the property owner in order to protect his right to a jury's assess-
ment. This problem was considered in two cases during the 1969 term.
After the filing and service of an appropriation petition, the defend-
ant-owner has until the third Saturday to file his answer.333  The owner
need not answer at all, but under section 163.09, Revised Code, he is obli-
gated to accept judgment and waive his right to jury trial if a value for the
property has been "set forth in any document properly filed with the
clerk of courts, by the public agency." That provision was held in Board
of Education v. Dudra3 to apply only where the document has been "filed
within a reasonable time prior to the expiration of the time for filing an
answer." This rule is to further the purpose of allowing the defendant-
owner to examine the value which would be awarded automatically if he
chose to waive a jury. On the other hand, when no value has been filed,
3218 Ohio St. 2d 222, 249 N.E.2d 38 (1969).
n
3 OMo REV. CODE ANN. § 163.08 (Page 1969).
34 19 Ohio St. 2d 116,249 N.Y.2d 832 (1969).
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Dud-ra held the failure to answer irrelevant, and the constitutional jury
right remained. Cincinnati v. Bossert Machine Co.335 interpreted "docu-
ment" to include the petition and thereby allowed the court to enter judg-
ment on the alleged value with no evidence of appraisal.
There was a division of the Court in Bossert as to the prohibition of
any extension of answer time in section 163.08, Revised Code. 36 Four
members considered that stipulation to be jurisdictional. If that position
had been blindly followed, it would have led to the conclusion that the
failure to answer in Dudra should have been fatal to the jury right.
An appropriation case presented to a jury is uncommonly simple so far
as the definition of the issue, namely valuation. But the courts have been
repeatedly faced with disputes over the proper measure of valuation. Ohio
has adopted the highest-and-best-use standard for the computation of com-
pensation, and this term in Masheter v. Board of Education137 the Court
reaffirmed that principle by applying it to property with no recognizable
market value for its current use.
In Masheter, the state appropriated a vintage 1880 public school for
highway construction, and the trial court charged the jury that in the case
of public facilities the rule of fair market value would not apply and in-
stead the jury should compute the cost of a substitute equivalent facility.
That effort by the court is not without merit since it reasoned that (1) a
school building is normally the highest and best use of the particular prop-
erty, (2) there is no ascertainable market for a school, and (3) the only
reasonable measure of market value in such case is that which planners
would have to consider as the cost of constructing a building which would
provide duplicate services. This approach, however, does not adjust the
cost to the state for the factor of depredation or recognize that the school
board is acquiring a building with a longer useful life than the one it pre-
viously had. That is a necessary fault because the provision of a substitute,
which the school authorities may not have independently constructed for
many years, requires new construction since a similarly depreciated equiva-
lent facility is seldom available.
The Court applied the market value test as a method of correcting the
depreciation problem. It concluded that where there is no active market
an assumed market value may be constructed from replacement cost less
depreciation. But the Court also emphasized a more important valuation
principle, that is the best-use standard. Thus, in situations such as the one
before it, the property as a whole, and not just the building, should always
have some ascertainable market value. In some cases that value could bene-
fit public bodies since a facility maintained on appreciated land would not
335 16 Ohio St. 2d 76, 243 N.E.2d 105 (1968).
33 Id. at 78, 243 N.E.2d at 107. See also dissent of Herbert, J., at 79.
33 17 Ohio St. 2d 27, 244 N.E.2d 745 (1969).
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be adequately compensated by the construction of an equivalent on a site
of considerably less value.
Private Use of Land.-Regulation and restriction of a private owner's
use of his land was before the Court in two forms during the 1969 term.
First, there was the question of the limits of state power to restrict for pub-
lic benefit in State v. Buckley.33 And second, there was the problem of
the administration of land regulations in State ex rel. Broadway Petroleum
Corp. V. Elyria. 39
In his last opinion before resigning from the Court to become Attor-
ney General, Justice Brown upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's junk-
yard statutes in Buckley. Following the opinion's definition of the issue,
the Court held that regulation of a junkyard, with the state's police power
to protect the public health, safety and morals, could constitutionally be
founded upon purely or primarily aesthetic considerations.
The opinion equivocates in its support of the syllabus, and the impres-
sion created is that "aesthetic" is used in an extreme sense. The view of
unfenced junkyards is described as "generally patent and gross, and not
merely a matter of taste."340 As a conclusion of law that description might
be considered overly arbitrary, but its greater vulnerability is that it is
followed by the statement that "it cannot be effectively argued in this case
that the statutes would be unconstitutional as applied, . . . [but] we do
not hold that these counterarguments could not be persuasive on another
set of facts. ' 34  It is difficult to coordinate that theory of selective con-
stitutionality with the other conclusion in the case that the laws are valid
because they "are neither vague nor uncertain." A statute as explicit as
that involved in Buckley, with no internal provisions for varying applica-
tions in specific situations with different degrees of aesthetic offensive-
ness, is either valid or not, and a court should exercise its imagination as to
the range of fact patterns to which it might apply.
It is well understood that as to almost every phase of government regu-
lation of land the private owner has the protection of judicial review.
But this term in Broadway Petroleum342 the Court recognized that judi-
cial intervention may become a burden on the landowner, and his right to
rely upon favorable administrative determinations was protected from in-
ternal bureaucratic disputes.
By holding that a building inspector, who refused to issue a permit
because of a zoning restriction, could not seek judicial review of the re-
versal of his decision by a board of zoning appeals, the Court implied that
the administrative process should be weighted slightly in favor of the pri-
M8 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 NX.2d 66 (1968).
339 18 Ohio St. 2d 23, 247 N.E.2d 471 (1969).
340 16 Ohio St. 2d at 132, 243 N.E.2d at 70.
341 Id.
342 13 Ohio St 2d 23, 247 N.E.2d 471 (1969).
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vate party. Its rationale seemed to be two-fold: first, the complaining
official was an administrative inferior to the board, and second, one of the
board's purposes is to provide an administrative remedy for an incorrect,
arbitrary or inequitable decision. The first of these propositions is the
more significant, for it establishes a theory of judicial restraint in the inter-
ference with agency and departmental decision-making. It also states a rec-
ognition of final authority. The result suggested is that subordinates
must learn to respect the finality of authorized superiors, and while the
wisdom of decisions may be internally questioned, third parties need not
have their rights compromised or left open to attack. As such the opinion
by Chief Justice Taft goes beyond the premise of Professor Jaffe which he
cites. 4 Jaffe's admission that revisory power within a department should
be ultimate is extended in Broadway Petroleum to a functional basis: any
administrative (i.e. non-judidal) level with power to review and revise
lower determinations is by reason of its position the final decision-maker
for purposes of third parties. This seems important to maintain the integ-
rity of the structure, a result more valuable to a reviewing court than the
consequences in the particular case.
Public Utilities.-It has become commonplace for the Court to chastise
the Public Utilities Commission for construing its authority too liberally,344
but this term the Court also reviewed a case where it affirmed the com-
mission's decision that it lacked jurisdiction. In an unusual procedural
development the Northern Ohio Telephone Company, a regulated utility,
filed an application under section 4905.40, Revised Code, for permission
to issue securities which would technically facilitate a merger of that com-
pany into General Telephone & Electronics Corporation, a holding com-
pany not subject to commission regulation. That application was immedi-
ately and summarily approved, without hearing. Then, almost two
months later, International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation filed
a request that the commission vacate its earlier order and reconsider its
approval. This the commission did, relying upon its inherent authority to
review. At a prehearing conference, Northern Ohio reversed its allega-
tion on the original application and contended that the transaction was not
within commission jurisdiction. Once again the commission adopted
Northern Ohio's contentions without a full hearing, and an order was
issued to that effect. In International T. & T. Corp. v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n,3 5 the Court affirmed that second conclusion.
The principal difficulty with the I. T. & T. decision is that it is appar-
3 43 Jaffe, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACnON 538 (1959); 18 Ohio St. 2d
at 31-32, 247 N.E.2d at 477.
3 44See B. & 0. Rd. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 16 Ohio St. 2d 60, 242 N.2d 577 (1968);
Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 17 Ohio St. 2d 45, 245 N.E.2d 351 (1969), dis-
cussed infra.
345 18 Ohio St. 2d 83, 247 N.E.2d 726 (1969).
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ently the first occasion on which a reverse merger has been considered in
an Ohio public utility context. It is manifest that the commission gave the
implications of this method of acquisition only cursory attention, and the
holding of the Court appears to accept the theory of regulatory immunity
without reaching the merits and details of the transaction. The unusual
route to the Court suggests two thoughts in that regard. First, without
elaboration of the contentions and findings below, the record was inade-
quate and confusing to a Court which seldom considers complicated cor-
porate financial problems. As a consequence, this was not a desirable case
in which to make any precedential statements. Second, there was an op-
portunity for the Court to affirm on a procedural theory. A utility is not
required to file an application for an action which is not subject to regula-
tion, and presumably an unnecessary application may be withdrawn.
However, if a utility's interpretation of the extent of jurisdiction is incor-
rect, either the P.U.C.O. or the Attorney General may proceed against
it.346  A third party may urge those objections or institute a private ac-
ton.347 I. T. & T. may have been correct on its law but mistaken in its
remedy.
The dangerous implication of the language in the case, however, is
that neither the commission nor the courts will be justified in reviewing
similar mergers in the future. That abdiction will streamline and en-
courage the trend toward utility consolidation into holding company struc-
tures whose overall business decisions are exempt from state scrutiny.
Possibly that is justified from a management efficiency viewpoint, but it
does not appear to be consistent with the language of the statute which
purports to cover all securities issues. The most favorable rationale for
that result would be a theory that state regulation is only intended for
companies whose financial structure remains within the commission's con-
cern after the completion of the transaction, but that interpretation of the
statutory scheme has never in fact been made.
In two other cases, Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n 348
and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 49 the Court demon-
strated its traditional chastisement of the commission. In each case the hold-
ing was that the commission had overreached its authority. The former de-
cision determined that the commission may not rely upon its general power
to protect the public welfare to extend its explicit authority for particular
utility actions. In other words, the specific is a limitation upon the gen-
eral rather than vice versa. In a similar commission order in Ohio Bell,
both cases having been attempts by the P.U.C.O. to hold proposed utility
340 OHIO REV. CoDB ANN. § 4905.60 (Page 1953).
34 7 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.61 (Page 1953); Sylvania Home Telephone Co. v. Pub.
Uril. Comm'n, 97 Ohio St. 202, 119 N.E. 205 (1918).
348 16 Ohio St. 2d 60, 242 N.E.2d 577 (1968).
34) 17 Ohio St. 2d 45, 245 N.E.2d 351 (1969).
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actions in abeyance pending review, the Court also said that this was un-
justified from the applicable legislation. The Ohio Bell case was easier
than the B & 0 case on the facts, however, since the railroad was decreas-
ing service while the telephone company was proposing to establish a new
service with a related rate schedule. In such a case it is almost beyond
dispute that, even if the rates requested were too high, there would be no
reason to withhold the service from those members of the public who
would be willing to purchase the equipment in the interim before approval.
While the B. & 0. and Ohio Bell cases showed a Court with a skepti-
cal view of commission eagerness, that attitude is easier to understand in
the light of an appeal which was argued to the Court during the first week
of the term and pending decision during the ensuing eight months in
which the above cases were heard and decided. A comparison of the per
curiam opinion and the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Taft in Erie-
Lackawanna R. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n350 reveals a disagreement with-
in the Court only as to the form of criticism of the commission. The Erie
case was one in which the P.U.C.O. dearly had jurisdiction, but the com-
mission's inadequate handling of the routine proceedings suggests a
natural hesitancy to extend its authority to any area in which an ambiguity
exists. Taft's opinion reviewed the case history construing the statutory
section which outlines the procedure which the commission is to fol-
low in contested cases and charitably concludes that the commission
may have "misinterpreted" some of those cases as an easing of technical
standards. As a minimum, the findings of fact upon which legal con-
clusions are based must be stated for purposes of review as to reasonable-
ness. The only findings of the commission were the ultimate conclusions
which in and of themselves are worthless without a review of the entire
record, a task undertaken in the per curiam opinion and one dearly un-
called for in the utility appeal situation where the scope of review is lim-
ited. A proper basis upon which the commission should, and hopefully
will come to operate is (a) the initial adoption of objective standards for
determining the necessity for a railroad grade crossing (or any other statu-
torily vague requirement)35 1 and (b) the recital of facts found in support
of or against the application of that standard. This dual commission de-
termination would then provide a comprehensive basis for judicial review
of the reasonableness of the standard and the adequacy of the facts to
support the decision reached.
Industrial Commission Safety Requirements.-In order to im-
prove working conditions in Ohio and make the state more competitive in
350 18 Ohio St. 2d 112, 247 N.E.2d 736 (1969).
351 Substantially this argument was presented by appellant and noted by the Court at p. 113.
However, it was ignored in the opinion and will likely be side-stepped by the commission until
squarely confronted in a later case. Such a case would appear to be inevitable since the lack of
a delineated standard for decision makes the entire statutory provision vulnerable to attack.
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the attraction of labor, the General Assembly adopted chapter 4121, Revised
Code, authorizing the Industrial Commission to promulgate specific safety
requirements for Ohio workplaces, whether or not there was an Ohio em-
ployer in terms of state of incorporation, principal place of business, or
place of execution of the employment contract. This term for the first
time, and in spite of active objection by the commission which adopted and
administers the rules, the Court in State ex rel. Bailey v. Krise3 2 applied
the regulations extraterritorially to a workplace in Iowa where a resident
of Pennsylvania was injured while in the employ of a corporation organ-
ized under the laws of Ohio.
The injured employee had previously been compensated from the Ohio
state fund pursuant to chapter 4123, Revised Code, in a proceeding which
was not appealed. That award itself was questionable. Had he entered
into the contractual agreement provided for in section 4123.54, Revised
Code, binding both the employer and employee to recognize Ohio law as
applicable to the employment relationship, no question as to his right to
participate in the fund would have arisen .3 0 Such an award is predicated
solely upon an injury to an employee in the course of his employment for
an employer amenable to chapter 4123, Revised Code, without regard to
the employer's fault.
Chief Justice Taft's dissenting opinion noted the obvious distinction
between the two statutory chapters, with no mention of enforcement of
safety rules outside Ohio.
It is also dear, as emphasized by the posture of the commission in this
case, that, even if the enabling legislation could be otherwise construed,
the commission never has exercised the rule-making power to include extra-
territorial places of employment. A delegation of quasi-legislative power
is simply that, and it remains unused until orders are promulgated there-
under. The provisions for safety requirements in the Industrial Commis-
sion Act "are not self-executing and must be supplemented by special or-
ders of the Industrial [Commission]." '354 The commission expressly re-
futed the implication that it had ever done this, and it is unjustifiable to
assume that the same requirements would be adopted if they were intended
for nationwide or worldwide application. Working conditions and stand-
ards necessarily vary with local peculiarities and economic realties.
There are sound reasons why the safety requirements do not automati-
cally apply wherever workmen's compensation is appropriate. An em-
ployee such as Bailey is not deserving of more compensation than any other
injured employee. All are compensated according to the nature and extent
of their injury under chapter 4123. As Chief Justice Taft pointed out, the
352 18 Ohio St. 2d 191, 249 N.E.2d 55 (1969).
353 Prendergast v. Industrial Commission, 136 Ohio St. 535, 27 N.E.2d 235 (1940); Alaska
Packers Co. v. Industrial Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
354 Zajkowski v. American Steel & Wire, 258 F. 9, 15 (6th Cir. 1918).
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"additional award" under chapter 4121 is a penalty upon the employer,
and it is paid to the employee to aid in enforcement rather than to compen-
sate further.
Despite the contentions of Justice Schneider's majority opinion, the
history of Section 35, Article II of the Constitution of Ohio is completely
consistent with this explanation. It is true that, as the majority opinion
notes, before the amendment in 1923 an Ohio employee was limited to the
workmen's compensation fund, to which his employer had made a com-
pulsory contribution, for an injury sustained as a consequence of "mere
negligence. 3' 5   However, for an injury caused by "the failure of the em-
ployer or [his] agent to comply with legal requirements, as to safety of
employees, then the injured employee or his legal representative ha[dl his
option to claim under the [workmen's compensation] act or sue in court
for damages. 350 A landmark decision of the Court held that safety rules
of the Industrial Commission were such "legal requirements," but the In-
dustrial Commission Act itself did not establish any such requirements until
the commission had created them.3 57
The termination of this employee option in 1923 did not substitute the
additional safety requirement award for the civil action. Rather, it simply
insisted that all employees rely upon the normal workmen's compensation
award and proceed through the commission instead of the courts. Section
1465.61, General Code, which was in the original Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, provided an optional civil action for violations of "any municipal
ordinance or lawful order of any duly authorized officer, or any statute for
the protection of the life or safety of employees, .... 3" and its amended
version continued the option for the failure "to comply with any lawful
requirement for the protection of the lives and safety of employees."
This amended language was merely a condensation of "the elements of
lawful requirements which were enumerated in the original act." 360 These
statutes recognized that the employee had a common law civil action based
upon the employer's violation of legislative requirements other than those
promulgated by the Industrial Commission with its delegated authority.
The 1923 constitutional amendment abolished the right to this action as
well as the one grounded upon commission safety requirements but pro-
vided an additional award only in the safety requirement cases. The rea-
son for this is obvious: municipalities and other legislative bodies could
provide their own enforcement techniques now that the civil action was
355 State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N.E. 602 (1912).
3561d. at 393, 97 N.E. at 607.
357 American Woodenware Mfg. Co. v. Schorling, 96 Ohio St. 305, 117 N.E. 366 (1917).
358 102 OHIo LAws 524, 529.
359 OHI GEN. CODE § 1465-76 (Page 1945); 103 OHIO LAWS 72, 84.
360 96 Ohio St. at 314-15, 117 N.E. at 369.
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prohibited, but the Industrial Commission would still require an incentive
for employees to bring violations to its attention.
In the light of this historical review, it is apparent that the termi-
nation of an employee's right to seek damages was not a manifest in-
justice requiring an award in addition to compensation. It was a policy
decision that all compensation should be determined by one tribunal to
promote uniformity of awards, to improve the expertise of the administra-
tive agency, and to permit employers to enjoy some advantages of a com-
pulsory insurance plan in the form of a predictable and consistent level
of cost. Therefore, to deny any employee who is subject to workmen's
compensation an opportunity to obtain an additional award for a safety re-
quirement violation is not to deprive him of a right for which his com-
mon law action was exchanged.
There is a more significant reason, though, why such a recovery should
have been denied the relator in Bailey. No cases exist which allowed re-
covery in a civil action before 1923 because of a violation of an Ohio ordi-
nance, order, statute, or "lawful requirement" at a place of employment
outside Ohio. The Ohio workmen's compensation statute was directly de-
rived from Wisconsin law." 1 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in re-
viewing the parent of the Ohio statute, held that the compensation pro-
visions were applicable whether an injury occurred within or without the
state, but "The Legislature had no power to require safeguards, legally to
authorize the employment of minors, or to regulate or supervise places of
employment or public buildings without the state. The fact that the laws
relating to the employment of minors, the safeguarding of machinery, and
the supervision of places of employment and public buildings are to be
considered in determining the liability of employers does not limit the
application of the act, but relates solely to particular classes of injuries,
and confers special powers upon the Industrial Commission." 3 2 No act-
ion premised on an extraterritorial violation of a state regulation could have
been maintained in Ohio or elsewhere with a similar statute before 1963, and
in surrendering the right to a civil action the plaintiff-workman in those
circumstances lost nothing.
Sound policies prevented a civil suit in a case such as Bailey before
1923, and those same policies should have governed Bailey. The majority
opinion acquiesces in Iowa's superior sovereignty on its territory: "As-
suredly, Ohio will not sanction performance contrary to the law of the
place of performance. . . ." But it concludes from the absence of conflict-
ing Iowa citations in the record that the Ohio regulations will not violate
Iowa law. The imposition of Ohio administrative provisions upon work-
361 See dissenting opinion of Wanamaker, J., in American Woodenware Mfg. Co. v. Schor-
ling, 96 Ohio St. at 341-43, 117 N.E. at 376, for a comparison of quotations.
302 Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 112-3, 170 N.W. 277 (1919).
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places located in another state should not depend upon the whims of
counsel. The courts of Ohio should be indifferent as to whether Iowa's
law is in accordance or conflict, by inconsistent provisions or lack of them
entirely.
There is absolutely no mention that the contract of employment was
entered into in Ohio, or that there ever was a contract at all. There is no
mention that Bailey individually, or as a member of a group or class of
employees, ever entered into an agreement to be bound by the workman's
compensation law of Ohio upon Form C-110 which must be filed with the
Bureau of Workmen's Compensation to be valid. The existence of such a
signed agreement would not have foreclosed the decision because of the
distinction between workmen's compensation and safety requirement
awards, but its absence considerably muffles the argument that Bailey was
relying upon Ohio law. Thus, the question before the Court was whether
any employee of a corporation organized under the laws of Ohio is eligible
for an award for an injury resulting from the corporation's violation of an
Ohio workplace regulation, regardless of the place where the employee
was hired, the place where the work was performed, or the residence of
the employee. Bailey was before the court in the same posture as if he
had been a Iowa resident who had contracted in Iowa for an Iowa job with
an Ohio corporation.
The practicalities of compensation insurance and regulation penalties
are distinct. Unless Form C-112 (agreeing to be bound by another state's
law) has been filed, an employer should reasonably presume that he may
make contributions to the fund of his home state. It is important for the
equitable administration of a state compulsory insurance fund that an em-
ployer can contribute in confidence to a single state for each employee.
However, the more reasonable approach for the supervision of safety prac-
tices in each of an employer's business and work locations is for the em-
ployer to look to the law of the particular state in which the operation
occurs. Unquestionably, that state has the authority to regulate the work
locations within its borders. Under the rule which the court adopted, a=
employer must choose from among the regulations of all the states in
which it does business that particular variation of each safety precaution
which might later be determined by a court of an unknown jurisdiction to
provide the greater protection to employees. Furthermore, this holding
leaves employees uncertain as to which state's regulations they may insist
upon when they are employed by a foreign corporation.
N. Taxation
The Court's review upon appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals is
generally limited to determining whether the decision of the board was un-
reasonable or unlawful and does not involve a de novo weighing of the
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evidence. This principle is often stated by the Court in its opinions, yet
they commonly go into more detail than a strict adherence to that doctrine
would require. This might raise some question as to the actual extent of
the Court's review if it were not for the fact that the decisions usually fa-
vor the board. This term in published opinions the Court affirmed on six
occasions, reversed on two, and allowed one writ of mandamus to issue
directing the Board of Tax Appeals to proceed in requiring uniformity of
county assessments.
Charities, Real Property and Unemployment Tax.-Bowers v. Akron
City Hospital30 involved a real estate tax exemption for property owned
and used by an admittedly charitable institution for a vehicle parking fa-
cility. Carmelite Sisters, St. Rita's Home v. Board of Review" involved
an exemption from contributions to the Unemployment Compensation
Fund for a home which cares for the aged and infirm and is operated by
a corporation not for profit. The former case was an appeal from the de-
cision of the Board of Tax Appeals granting an exemption, and the latter
case was an appeal from the Court of Appeals which had affirmed the
lower court and administrative determination that the home in question
was an employer and not exempt by statute. The Court affirmed the
Board of Tax Appeals and reversed the Court of Appeals in the respective
cases, recognizing charitable exemptions in each case.
Section 5709.12, Revised Code, allows an exemption of real property
"belonging to institutions that is used exclusively for charitable purposes."
Section 4141.01(B) (2) (h), Revised Code, exempts from the definition
of "employment," for purposes of the required employer contribution to
the Unemployment Compensation Fund, "service performed in the em-
ploy of a corporation ... [not for profit] and the activities of which are
confined exclusively to the rendition of service ... for... charitable ...
purposes." (Emphasis added.)
A common factor to each of these cases was that the activity for which
an exemption was requested required payment to the institution. In Bow-
ers the parking lot actually showed a net bookkeeping profit, while in
Carmelite Sisters the home operated on a break-even budget. In both in-
stances any surplus revenue which was available was used to improve the
facilities.
The Court stated in Bowers that "it is the use of the property rather
than the fact that revenues are collected and received from property
which is controlling."""; The real property owned by the home in Carme-
lite Sisters had been determined by the Board of Tax Appeals to be used
33 16 Ohio St. 2d 94, 243 N.E.2d 95 (1968).
364 18 Ohio St. 2d 41, 247 N.E.2d 477 (1969).
365 16 Ohio St. 2d at 96, 243 N.E.2d at 97. However, the Board of Tax Appeals has con-
tinued to ignore that holding. See, In -re Baptist Foundation Inc., No. 71522 (April 28, 1969)
(unreported).
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
exclusively for charitable purposes and was therefore exempt from other
taxation. The standards used in the real property and unemployment stat-
utes are virtually identical, and it would have been most awkward for the
home to be exempt for real property taxation and not exempt for purposes
of the unemployment tax. The opinion of Justice Duncan hints at this
consideration: "There may be good reasons why charitable institutions
which are exempt from real property and inheritance taxation should not
be exempt from contributing to the Unemployment Compensation Fund,
but such reasons are not readily apparent from the statutes creating the
various charitable exemptions which are similarly worded." But the
Court does not rely upon the expertise of one administrative board in
applying its statute as being more influential than that of the other board.
Instead, the Court expressly analogizes a rest home to a hospital and con-
cludes that the fulfillment of a need for care is a charitable purpose. In
doing this it was necessary to distinguish or otherwise dispose of two pre-
vious decisions in which exemptions for homes had been denied. The
Court took the courageous route and specifically overruled its decisions in
Crestview, Inc. v. Donahue66 and In re Exemption of Real Property from
Taxation by Lutheran Senior City. 67
Use Tax.-Miller Brewing Co. v. Schneider6 8 was a decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals formulating the principle that materials shipped
into Ohio by a supplier, which relinquishes ownership, possession and con-
trol of the materials outside Ohio by consigning them to a common car-
rier, are not subject to the Ohio Use Tax. 69  Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.
v. Porterfield70 raised the narrow question of whether depositing items
in the United States mail outside of Ohio for delivery without charge to
residents of Ohio is within the Miller doctrine, accepted by the Tax Com-
missioner. The Court in its per curiam opinion did not review Supreme
Court decisions on the constitutional limits of state use tax applications to
interstate commerce and did not establish its own theory of relinquishment
of control. Rather, the opinion engaged in dubious comparisons of the
similarities in delivery by common carrier and by mail. The Court noted
that "there is authority in other jurisdictions that delivery of a gift is com-
pleted at the time the item is deposited in the mail .... 371 It did not refer
to the traditional "mail box" rule of contracts which emphasizes deposit in
the mails over receipt. Perhaps this was because the Court attempted to
distinguish postal regulations allowing a mailer to recover mail at any
366 14 Ohio St. 2d 121, 236 N.E.2d 668 (1968).
367 9 Ohio St. 2d 151, 224 N.Y.2d 352 (1967).
3683 Ohio Tax Cases, 5 200-521 (1964).
369 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5741.01-.22 (Page 1953).
370 16 Ohio St. 2d 158, 243 N.E.2d 72 (1968).
371 Id. at 161, 243 N.E.2d at 74.
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time prior to delivery,371 while some textual commentators have playfully
used this development to question the current correctness of the historical
"mail box" approach, viewing the postal service as the sender's agent.
Franchise Tax, Cooperative Apartment Corporation.-In Woodland
Gardens Apartments v. Porterfield373 the Court considered the basis for
assessment of the Ohio franchise tax owed by a corporation, the sole func-
tion of which was to own and operate a cooperative apartment building
occupied by the shareholders of the corporation.
The Court formally held that the franchise tax applies to any corpora-
tion organized for profit and authorized by its artides of incorporation to
operate for profit. In reaching this conclusion there is the suggestion that
the Court was impressed by the fact of a bookkeeping surplus existing at
the end of each fiscal year. Although it was pointed out by appellants,
the Court does not mention that this surplus was entirely due to the ar-
rangement for quarterly assessments upon the shareholder-residents for
purposes of maintenance of the building.
In considering the proper utilization of the franchise tax formula stated
in section 5733.05, Revised Code, the Court insists that the only permis-
sible figure for value of the issued and outstanding shares of the corpora-
tion is book value. Also, in calculating the formula provided by statute,
the phrases "business done by the corporation in this state" and "value of
its business ... wherever transacted" do not refer to the activity of busi-
ness as it is normally thought of in terms of commerce. These phrases are
only used as a technique for allocating that part of a taxable corporation's
book value appropriately subject to the Ohio franchise tax. Thus, al-
though the corporation in question would probably not be considered by a
layman to be engaged in business, the entire corporate enterprise is doing
"business" in Ohio.
This case represents a harsh attitude on the part of the Court towards
corporate cooperative ventures, but the decision will probably not affect
the structure of such corporations to a great extent. Their accounting rec-
ords, with the maximum value of land and buildings capitalized, are pri-
marily constructed to allow large federal tax depreciation deductions. The
savings thus realized would normally more than compensate for the in-
creased Ohio franchise tax cost.
City Income Tax, Effect on Distribution of Local Government Fund.
-The Board of Tax Appeals, in reviewing the allocation of a local gov-
erment fund by a county budget commission pursuant to section 5705.37,
Revised Code, must "determine the amount needed by each subdivision
[of a county] for current operating expenses ...in addition to revenues
available from all other sources, except those revenues which a subdivi-
372 39 C.F.R. §§ 153.5 (a)-(c).
373 16 Ohio St. 2d 56, 242 NXE.2d 580 (1968).
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sion receives from an additional tax or service charge voted by its elector-
ate, in order to enable it to carry on its essential local governmental func-
tions."3 74
The city council, as the legislative authority for the city of Painesville,
enacted a city income tax. This tax was never submitted to the electorate.
In its application of section 5739.23, Revised Code, the board included
the revenues of the Painesville income tax in its tabulation of those "avail-
able from all other sources" and reduced the fund share for that city.
The interesting issue raised in City of Painesville v. Bd. of County
Commrs.3 75 was whether taxes voted by an elected city council are indi-
rectly "voted by [the3 electorate." The unanimous Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Taft, explicitly rejected this contention. The effect of this
holding is that a municipality in seeking to obtain the maximum benefits
from a local income tax, despite the provisions of its charter, must subject
the proposal to a popular vote.376
Real Property, Uniformity of Assessment .- Section 2 of Article XII
of the Ohio Constitution requires that "land and improvements thereon
shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value." In compliance with
that section in 1965 the General Assembly enacted section 5715.01, Re-
vised Code, which obligates the Board of Tax Appeals to "adopt, pre-
scribe, and promulgate rules for the assessment of real property by uniform
rule according to value .... The taxable value shall not exceed fifty per-
cent of true value in money." Section 5715.24, Revised Code, directs the
board to
determine whether the real property and the various classes thereof in the
several counties, municipal corporations, and taxing districts have been as-
sessed by an equal and uniform rule at taxable value, and if the board
finds that the real property or any class thereof .. .is not listed by uni-
form rule at taxable value, the board shall increase or decrease the aggre-
gate value of the real property or any class thereof ...by a percent or
amount which will cause such property to be assessed on the tax list at its
taxable value so that every class of real property shall be listed and valued
for taxation by an equal and uniform rule ....
3 7 4 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.23 (Page 1953).
375 17 Ohio St. 2d 35, 244 N.E.2d 892 (1969).
376 When the electorate do approve a tax the Court scrupulously insists that they receive full
benefit. "There is no reason for any county electorate to vote additional taxes upon itself to
cover certain needs if this additional taxation is to result in a reduction of the county's allocation
from the local government fund." Bd. of County Commrs. v. Budget Comm., 17 Ohio St. 2d
39, 41,244, N.E2d 888, 890 (1969). An interesting question is whether a tax issue, passed by
a local legislative authority, is subsequently "voted by ... [the] electorate" if a majority fails to
nullify it in a referendum election. Although most taxes are not subject to referendum, this
could arise under section 305.31, Revised Code, with the permissive one-half of one percent sales
tax involved in State, ex rel. Corrigan, v. Perk, 19 Ohio St. 2d 1, -- N.E.2d --- (1969), this
term. However, that particular tax is county-wide and therefore the distribution of the county
local government fund would not be altered.
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In State ex rel. Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals,"'7 de-
cided in 1964, the Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Board
of Tax Appeals to observe its statutory and constitutional duties. The
Court construed those authorities as prohibiting the separation of real prop-
erty according to use with different percentages of tax valuation. The
Court also held that the relevant value of real property is "the amount for
which that property would sell on the open market." Although the writ
of the Court only directed the Board of Tax Appeals to determine whether
the tax assessments in Cuyahoga County were made by uniform rule and,
if not, to order the county auditor to equalize such assessments, it was
clear that the Court interpreted uniformity as a common statewide rate of
assessment.3
78
This term the Court was expressly faced with the question of varia-
tions in the level of assessment between counties. The same lawyer, rep-
resenting one client in Hamilton County and another in Cuyahoga County,
presumably in order not totally to mistake his remedy, brought two separate
actions. Phelps Realty Co. v. Bd. of Revision379 was a taxpayer com-
plaint against the Hamilton County assessment upon the tax duplicate
which was 4.22% higher than the statewide ratio. This action was
filed pursuant to section 5715.19, Revised Code. State ex rel. Park
Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals,.80 decided the same day as Phelps, was
an action in mandamus seeking a writ similar to that issued in the previous
Park Investment case.
The Phelps case was appealing for two reasons. First, a judgment in
favor of the taxpayer would have permitted him a substantial tax recovery
and would have thereby partially compensated him for the costs of litiga-
tion. Second, the experience of the first Park Investment case, after which
the Board of Tax Appeals seemed to ignore the necessarily broad writ of
the Court, would have been avoided. The statute, however, only contem-
plates relief against a claimed "discriminatory valuation" where such valua-
tion varies from "the common level of assessment of real property in the
county for the year stated in the request." There is no statute which
provides for such relief where valuation varies from the common level of
assessment of real property in the state.
Thus, in order to correct an inexcusable error on the part of the Board
of Tax Appeals, the Court was forced again to rely upon mandamus. Be-
cause of the decision in the Phelps case, there would be no relief for Park
Investment Company against the county auditor, and therefore there was
no adequate remedy at law.
377 175 Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908 (1964).
378 "... [In other words, the tax basis must be relatively uniform not only throughout the
state but also as to the various classes of real property." Id. at 413, 195 N.E.2d at 909.
379 16 Ohio St 2d 83, 243 N.E.2d 97 (1968).
280 16 Ohio St 2d 85, 242 N.E.2d 887 (1968).
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The choice of the Court was not without advantages. Allowing the
recovery under section 5715.19, Revised Code, would discriminate in favor
of taxpayers who had filed under a statute which was inapplicable on its
face as against those who had not filed for relief. Further, this would
have unsettled the collection of taxes on the current tax duplicates. And
in prompting the Board of Tax Appeals to fix a uniform rate at the com-
mon state level of assessment, a decision in favor of the taxpayer in Phelps
would have tended to reduce the common state level toward the lowest
level in any county since every time relief would be given to an individ-
ual, the common level in his county would necessarily fall and the lower
level in any one county would necessarily result in a lower common level
throughout the state.
The Board is not obligated by the mandate to adopt the average level
of assessment currently in effect in the state. This would deprive some
of the more heavily populated counties of their anticipated revenues. In-
stead it could set the common and uniform percentage at the highest coun-
ty's level. Contrary to many reservations which have been expressed on
the effect of such an action, that increase would not levy more taxes than
otherwise due to the automatic adjustment in rate of taxation applied to
the altered valuation as provided in section 5713.11, Revised Code.
Following the decisions in these cases, and at the urging of the Board
of Tax Appeals, a bill was introduced into the General Assembly to delay
the effective date of the Court's writ."' The constitutionality of this leg-
islative action as an interference with the Court's power to entertain orig-
inal actions, and as a direct contravention of the Court's application of the
Ohio Constitution, was bound to eventually become a hotly contested and in-
teresting issue. In what was truly an inspired legal maneuver the Park In-
vestment Company brought this appalling administrative and legislative
abuse before the Court less than a week after the new law was signed by
filing a motion for the Court to issue an order to the Board of Tax Appeals
to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of the December
writ of mandamus. The Court issued an order to show cause on June 6.
Property of a Raih'oad.-The preceding discussion noted that in 1964
the Court had determined that the statutory phrase "true value in money"
referred to current market value of taxable property.382 This term the
Court had to interpret market value in the context of property taxation of
a railroad and chapter 5727, Revised Code.
Based upon information supplied to the Tax Commissioner annually
as stipulated and required in sections 5727.08 and 5727.09, Revised Code,
he would make an arbitrary, cost-related adjustment to the previous year's
381 Amended S.B. 199. Signed by Governor Rhodes and effective the same day, May 14,
1969.




assessment to arrive at the taxable year's base figure. The adjustment
formula has been used, with slight variations, for many years, and even
the Tax Commissioner has been unable to authenticate its origin. Each
year it has been customary for public utilities to appear before the commis-
sioner, as authorized by section 5727.10, Revised Code, and in effect
bargain for further adjustments. The consequence of this procedure, the
Tax Commissioner urged, is an unchallengeable annual assessment: "the
formula or formulae employed by the present and past Tax Commissioners
to arrive at preliminary or tentative valuations each year were not pre-
scribed by the legislature. But legislative prescription of such administra-
tive detail is not necessary and neither this absence nor the absence of his-
torical documentation of its evolutionary detail can invalidate the resulting
valuations providing the resulting valuation is consistent with the law."
The attitude of the Court, evidenced in an opinion by Chief Justice
Taft in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Porterfield,3 was that this method of
assessment bore no necessary resemblance to actual value, and therefore
it is impossible to conclude that the "resulting valuation is consistent with
the law." The opinion noted that neither a book value as carried by the
utility nor computed value based upon cost with fixed depreciation adjust-
ments is a reliable estimate of market value, particularly in the case of a
railroad. Essential to a valuation is at least a reference to the capitaliza-
tion of the railroad, the market value of those securities, and the corpora-
tion's earnings. In saying this the Court did not reject the value of a
formula, especially for arriving at an initial approximation, but it did say
that the formula employed by the Tax Commissioner included irrelevant
and insufficient variables.
Another basis for the Court's reversal was that, apparently by reason
of the acquiesance of utilities in the past in the bargained tax valuations,
the Tax Commissioner had formally avoided section 5727.11, Revised Code.
That section required the commissioner to deduct from the over-all valua-
tion the value of the railroad's real property, and to apply a rate of assess-
ment to that property which was equal to that required for all other real
property in the state.3 4 There was no evidence that the Tax Commis-
sioner had ever complied with that statute.
Evidence.-What was probably the most untenable contention of the
term was offered in Transport Motor Express, Inc. v. Porterfield.85 Each
taxpayer subject to the highway use tax is required to maintain records of
the movements of his vehicles over Ohio highways.380 Transport Motor
Express, a foreign carrier, had its corporate headquarters and relevant
383 16 Ohio St 2d 136, 243 N.E.2d 87 (1968).
38 4 See discussion supra at Section (N).
385 16 Ohio St. 2d 81, 242 N.E.2d 662 (1968).
a80 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5728.07 (Page 1953).
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records in another state. Some drivers' logs were available for audit, and
the tax examiners computed the total non-exempt miles which Transport's
vehicles traveled from those. In cases where the logs were incomplete
but there were references to succeeding locations of a vehicle, the ex-
aminer would infer that the vehicle had moved from the one location to
the next over the shortest route. It is almost inconceivable that this sort
of inference could prejudice the taxpayer in any instance, and in fact if
any error could result in additional mileage this would be directly attrib-
utable to the taxpayer's own failure to maintain the records required by
statute.
Nonetheless, Transport argued to the Court that section 5728.10, Re-
vised Code, only authorized the commissioner to assess "upon any informa-
tion in his possession," and the lack of recorded mileage was a lack of
"information." This complaint did not impress the Court.
A question such as that presented in Transport, whether specific types
of information constitute evidence which the Tax Commissioner and
Board of Tax Appeals may consider, is purely one of law. A final resolu-
tion of that dispute, which will affect assessment procedures in many
cases, is a valuable function of the Court. But where an appeal involves
only the weighing of evidence, it is ridiculous for the court of highest jur-
isdiction to become involved.
The Court went out of its way to underline this attitude in the first
syllabus paragraph of Ace Steel Baling, Inc., v. Porterfield.38 7 The eager-
ness of the majority to assert that proposition is apparent from the fact
that it is pure dicta. The Court having failed to rely upon the assertion
of limited review beyond the Court of Appeals, and having willingly de-
cided Ace Steel Baling itself as a question of law arising from a factual
conclusion, it is likely that taxpayers will strain to present their factual dis-
putes as legal questions until the Court finally denounces that formula by
affirming the board in several close cases.
0. Ohio Constitution
Modern Courts Amendment.-It is fair to say that the decision of
Euclid v. Heaton s8s on June 19, 1968 startled both professional and lay
observers of Ohio government. In numerous newspapers editorial reac-
tions approached indignation. The electors of Ohio were informed by the
opinion of then newly titled Justice Schneider that the provisions of
Amended Substitute House Joint Resolution No. 42 of the 107th General
Assembly, proposing the "Modern Courts Amendment" to the Ohio Con-
stitution which included an effective date of January 10, 1970, had be-
come effective at the preceding election of May 7, 1968. This undoubt-
387 19 Ohio St. 2d 137, 249 N..2d 892 (1969).
388 15 Ohio St. 2d 65, 238 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
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edly came as a surprise to those electors who had troubled themselves to
become informed of the text of the proposed amendment, and it was noth-
ing short of a shock to those legislators who had participated in the draft-
ing and passing of the much bargained-over resolution.
The Court, purporting to follow State, ex rel. McNamara, v. Camp-
bell,3 interpreted the syllabus in that case, which voided a delaying ef-
fective provision for a constitutional amendment because "the proposition
to postpone the time named in the Constitution [was not] also submitted
to the electors ... ," to require that the summary ballot description 90 also
contain the substance of the language of the delaying clause. Chief Jus-
tice Taft, in a separate opinion, vehemently disagreed with this theory.
He cited other decisions of the Court reflecting on the insignificance of
the specifics in a ballot condensation39 and concluded that the amend-
ment had to be either passed as proposed by the General Assembly or
voided in toto due to an invalid submission of a misleading summary.
One prior commentator suggested that this decision "may present tran-
sitional problems." a92  These problems began to arise during the 1969
term.
Section (B) of the amendment's schedule provides that "[i]n accord-
ance with the provisions of this article, the general assembly shall enact
such laws and the supreme court shall promulgate such rules as will give
effect to the provisions herein." The amendment itself, as well as the
Heaton decision, provides that "[p]aragraph (B) of the Schedule... shall
become effective immediately upon the adoption of this amendment by
the electors of this state." Section 5 (B) of the Constitution, as enacted
by the amendment, grants rule-making power to the Court to prescribe
uniform "rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state."
But Section 5(B) requires the Court to file its proposed rules "not later
than the fifteenth day of January, with the clerk of each house of the gen-
eral assembly during a regular session thereof," where any of them will be
subject to legislative amendment or veto by concurrent resolution. The
Court apparently caught its own rules advisory committee by surprise
with its acceleration of the amendment's effective date, and it proved to be
tactically unfeasible to promulgate rules for filing before January 15,
1969.33 This may have avoided the embarrassment of the General As-
sembly notifying the Court that, despite the recent custom of annual ses-
sions, the legislature is a bi-annual organization and the phrase "regular
session" meant January of an even-numbered year. These various provi-
sions, when read together, obviously intended to authorize the Court to
38994 Ohio St. 403, 115 N.E. 29 (1916).
300 Required by OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.06 (Page 1960).
39' 15 Ohio St. 2d at 79, 238 NXE.2d at 799.
392 Miligan, supra, note 4, at 820.
303 61 Omno BAR 1570-71 (1968).
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begin preparing rules during the interim period before the amendment's
effective date so that they would be in final form for presentation by the
Court to the General Assembly between the tenth and fifteenth days of
January, 1970.
Another transitional problem created by the Heaton decision resulted
from the legislature's loss of the two-year interim period in which it could
have studied the practical difficulties the amendment would create. After
the elimination of justices of the peace by the creation of County Courts
in Ohio, 04 there remained Mayor's Courts in several Northeastern Ohio
communities. Mayor's Courts have jurisdiction only over traffic cases, the
mayor is not necessarily a member of the bar, and the courts are not courts
of record. The judgments of Mayor's Courts, County Courts, and in some
cases Municipal Courts were appealable to the Courts of Common Pleas.
The new section 4(B), Article IV, of the Ohio Constitution now defines
the jurisdiction of Courts of Common Pleas as original "over all justiciable
matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative of-
ficers and agencies as may be provided by law." Thus, there is no longer
any appellate jurisdiction in Courts of Common Pleas from lower courts.
The commendable theory of the draftsmen of the amendment was that all
first appeals should be to the several Courts of Appeals under section 3 (B)
(2), Article IV. Probably as an oversight the review is limited to the "....
judgments or final orders of the courts of record ....... The Mayor's
Courts are the only trial bodies in Ohio which are not courts of record.
Therefore, and this has been overlooked so far, there is no appeal as of
right from a Mayor's Court judgment. The only apparent recourse would
be a writ of prohibition. The General Assembly, when this anomaly is
recognized, should eliminate the few Mayor's Courts which remain.
There is also the question of the retroactivity of Heaton's majority-of-
the-Court rule on constitutional questions to pre-1968 cases. The delay
of effective date would have mitigated the difficulties of injustice to a liti-
gant since few cases decided by a Court of Appeals before the May, 1968
election would have come to the Court after January 10, 1970; those fall-
ing in the interim would be on notice of what to expect. Footnote 2 in
Chief Justice Taft's opinion hints at the thought that earlier cases should
be decided on the basis of section 2 of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution
as in effect prior to the May 7 election. Justice Schneider attempted to
thwart this suggestion by describing the former constitutional rule as "not
procedural but organic, substantive law," and the language of the proce-
dural savings clause in section (A) of the amendment's schedule would
not require only prospective application 95  The unsatisfactory aspect of
this explanation is that if the former rule of review was "substantive" then
394 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1907.011, effective June, 1957 (Page 1968).
395 15 Ohio St. 2d at 75, 238 NXE.2d at 796.
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its amendment should not destroy the rights of parties which had accrued
prior to the amendment's adoption. What is dear is that the Court did
proceed to decide cases this term with the majority rule.
The question of effective date acceleration was specifically before the
Court for the first time near the end of this term. State, ex tel. Graves,
v. Brown 396 was an original action filed in the Court seeking a writ of
prohibition to prevent a Municipal Court judge who was 70 years old from
running for re-election. Section 6(C) of the amended Article IV of the
Ohio Constitution forbids such a candidate to run for any judicial office.
As one of the compromises to prevent hardship to elderly judges and to
eliminate a block of solid and influential resistance within the judicial
community, section (E) of the amendment's schedule made any such
judge eligible for re-election in 1970, the year of the planned effective
date.
The Court in Graves had to choose from four possible approaches.
One was to apply the amendment as written: The "grandfather" clause
applies only to judges running for re-election in the primary and general
elections of 1970. This would have supported prohibition for the 1969
elections. A second approach could be to apply legislative purpose: No
judge is disqualified for age until 1971 except those non-incumbents run-
ning in 1970. A third theory would protect those ten judges who were 70
or over and were nominated to succeed themselves at the same primary
election in May, 1968 at which the amendment was submitted to the
electors: The purpose of the draftsmen is construed to allow a one year
savings clause from the effective date, and Heaton had the effect of com-
mencing this year on May 7, 1968.apt This approach would have created
some ambiguities, however, since the May 6, 1969 primary would have
been within the year while the November general election would not.398
The per curiam opinion of the Court in allowing the writ in Graves may
arguably have adopted the third theory or the first theory since the writ
applied only to the 1969 primary election; without doubt the second theory
was rejected. But the language of the Court seems dearly to represent a
fourth and more absolute rule: The savings clause in section (E) of the
schedule was "an attempt to postpone the effective date of a part of the
constitutional amendment" and as such was totally ineffectual because not
summarized on the ballot as required by Heaton. Four members of the
386 18 Ohio St 2d 61, 247 N.E.2d 463 (1969).
397 Such judicial liberty could have been based upon language in State, ex rel. Duffy, v.
Sweeney, 152 Ohio St. 308, 313, 89 N.E.2d 641, 644 (1949) as follows: ".... a schedule, pro-
viding for the amendment becoming effective on the happening of some specific event, will not
be interpreted as providing the only time for its becoming effective unless such a meaning is
clearly expressed or necessarily inferrable from the words used."398 The reasoning of the Attorney General in his opinion supporting the November, 1968
election is open to question, but he achieves this result. OAG 68-110 (1968).
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Court concurred, along with one Court of Appeals judge who was sitting
by assignment for Chief Justice Taft.
One consequence of the Graves decision will be the disqualification
from re-election in 1970 of approximately 65 judges of Ohio Courts of
Common Pleas and Courts of Appeals. There are innumerable municipal
judges affected in 1969 and 1970. An interesting factor is that the Court
assumed without discussion that section 6(C) of Article IV applied to
municipal judges. The language of that subsection commences: "No per-
son shall be elected or appointed to any judicial office .... ." This is broad
and on its face all-inclusive, except when read in pan materia with sub-
sections (A) and (B) where judges of the Courts of Common Pleas,
Courts of Appeals and Supreme Court are referred to with no mention
of municipal judges. The latter three courts have traditionally been
known as "constitutional courts," while Municipal and County Courts are
referred to as legislative courts, provided for by statute pursuant to sec-
tions 1 and 18 of Article IV. It was argued to the Court that the amend-
ment of section 6 affected only the constitutional judges and was not in-
tended to restrict the General Assembly's constitutional power to create
inferior courts.
One ironic problem which faced the Court this term was the effect
of the Graves decision on the validity of one of the Court's own mandates.
In Stillmaker v. Dept. of Liquor Control399 Judge Troop of the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Appellate District sat for Justice Herbert who had
formerly been a member of the panel of the Court of Appeals which had de-
cided the Stillmaker case below. Judge Troop was one of the four essential
votes for reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.400 As pointed out
in a motion for rehearing, which was denied by the Court, Judge Troop
was nominated for his current term on the Court of Appeals at the same
primary election at which the Modern Courts Amendment passed while he
was over 70 years of age, and he was subsequently elected at the next gen-
eral election. Thus, the Court was forced to rely upon his vote as presum-
ably only a de facto judge in order to achieve a constitutional majority
for one of its own decisions.
The decisions in Heaton and Graves have raised another important
inconsistency. Justice Schneider's discussion in Heaton referred favorably
to sections (A) and (C) of the schedule as preserving procedural details
for pending cases.401 Yet following Graves, it is difficult to perceive how
these savings clauses are any less attempts "to postpone the effective date
of a part of the constitutional amendment," and as such they should be
399 18 Ohio St. 2d 200, 249 N.E.2d 61 (1969).
4 00 OHIo CoNsT. art IV, § 2 (A).
40 15 Ohio St. 2d at 75-76, 238 N.E.2d at 796-797.
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ineffective since they were eliminated in the ballot submission in exactly
the same way as was section (E).
III. THE STATISTICAL REVIEW
Tables I and II represent a compilation of the number of opinions pub-
lished by the Court from January 1, 1965 to August 31, 1968 and Septem-
ber 1, 1968 to August 31, 1969, respectively. Table Il is based upon the
redefinition of the 1969 term which is used in this article.0 2 This is the
date sequence which applies to the subsequent tables. Table I has been
produced to facilitate comparative analysis; while it might be theoreti-
cally desirable to compile statistics for this purpose over a longer period of
time, the changes in the membership of the Court as a result of the Novem-
ber elections in 1964 make earlier data less valuable.
The technique used for compiling the information in Tables I and II
is essentially that of counting. None of the information appearing in
these, or any of the other tables could properly be considered confidential.
The number and types of published opinions is readily available from the
Ohio State Reports, and the other tables are similarly derived from the
Ohio Bar, Ohio Courts, and the announcement sheets distributed to the
public weekly by the Supreme Court Reporter.
Tables I and II present a rough approximation of the work load as-
signed to, or assumed by, each of the justices. 03 Although it is true that
Chief Justice Taft and Justice Paul Herbert significantly out-distanced any
of the other members of the Court, and each of them has written substan-
tially more minority opinions than any other justice, it may be noted that
they have both written more majority opinions than any other justice.
Justice Schneider replaced the retiring Justice Herbert during the 1969
term as the second most prolific writer. It is also interesting to note that
Chief Justice Taft has, in each of the years covered by Table I, written con-
siderably more opinions than Chief Justice Warren of the United States
Supreme Court.404 Justices Zimmerman and Paul Herbert and Chief Jus-
tice Taft were absent from the Court due to illness for periods of 12, 3
and 3 weeks, respectively, during the 1969 term.
The row in Tables I, II and III labeled "assigned" refers to those
4 0 2 Notej supra.
403 Cases are assigned on the lot system to one of the justices tentatively voting in the ma-
jority, although a justice may volunteer for a particular opinion. Per Curiam opinions are
similarly assigned, but a particular justice may choose, for various reasons, to convert a full
opinion assigned to him into a per curiam. Of course, a particularly persuasive concurring or
dissenting opinion might eventually be reported as a majority decision.
It might well prove to be a valuable tool for supervising the orderly disposition of opinions
which have been assigned for the Chief Justice to assume the function of his counterpart on the
Supreme Court of the United States; there the senior justice who is voting with the majority as-
signs the opinion.
404 See Five Year Table II, 82 HAmV. L REV. 312 (1968). Concededly the opinions of
the U. S. Supreme Court are considerably longer, a perhaps dubious honor.
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Court of Appeals judges appointed to sit temporarily on the Supreme
Court due to the illness, absence or disqualification of any justice. These
judges are appointed as necessary by the Chief Justice.405 It is apparent
that these judges customarily vote with the majority and seldom write a
dissenting opinion.
The information contained in Table III(A) is available only from the
announcement sheets of the Court or the Ohio Bar. Dissenting votes re-
corded in the "announcement" column include those votes which are an-
nounced on merit dispositions that do not warrant a published opinion, as
well as dismissals of claimed constitutional questions supporting appeals as
of right on motion cases. These dismissals of claimed constitutional ques-
tions represent by far the majority of the dissenting votes recorded in that
column. In effect, such a dissent is evidence of disagreement as to the com-
position of the case load which a majority of the Court has allowed.
Table III(B) is a conglomeration of the respective dissenting votes of
the individual justices. This table shows the net result as to unanimity of
the Court on announced decisions. Inevitably, the number of cases an-
nounced "with dissent" in Table III(B) will be less than the aggregate of
total dissenting votes recorded in Table III(A), due to multiple dissents by
several justices on a single case.
Table III(C) is well defined in the notes which accompany it. By
dividing the figure in row "T" by those in row "N" it is possible to ar-
rive at a percentage of voting agreement on merit cases with published
opinions for each justice as compared to any other justice. The ratio thus
derived provides what might be called an index of judicial philosophy.
Table IV attempts to construct a more meaningful record of docket
progress than that which is currently compiled by the Supreme Court and
published in an annual January summary of Ohio Courts. Failure of the
Court to distinguish in its statistics between appeals, according to the
method of origination in the Court, prevents a breakdown of the total
figure for appeals pending on September 1, 1968. Similarly, the remote
possibility that some of those cases which had been pending on September
1 remained on the docket on August 31, 1969 prevents a confident break-
down in the last column.
Those motions allowed, as indicated in Table IV(B), are recorded as
"filed" in the appropriate categories of Table IV (A). This is a reflection
of the fact that such cases are actually heard twice by the Court, although,
since the amendment of the Court rules of practice announced in October,
1969, the first "hearing" on the motion itself will customarily be on briefs
alone without oral argument. Applications for rehearing, reviewed in
Table IV(C), appear nowhere else in these statistics. The statistics relating
to disciplinary cases, recorded in Table IV (D), although they are considered
4 0 5 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2 (A).
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dispositions on the merits by the Court, are not included in Table IV(A),
nor in the subject matter categories of Table V. They are incorporated,
where appropriate, in Tables I, II and III. The only other reference to
disciplinary dispositions is found in Table VI which presents the types of
discipline recommended and imposed, and the frequency of each during the
past term.
Table V serves a double function, that of presenting a general subject
matter distribution of the cases filed in the Court and of those which are ulti-
mately decided on the merits, and that of a comparison of the number of
instances of affirmance and reversal of those merit cases decided during the
term. As to any subject matter classification, it is possible to obtain some per-
spective on the importance attributed to it by the Court. Motions which
are allowed depend upon the presentation of a substantial constitutional
question400 or an issue of public or great general interest.40 7 Although all
motions allowed during the term are not disposed of on the merits during
that same term, and some merit dispositions are of cases allowed on
motion during the previous term, it should be reasonable to compare in a
gross sense the number of cases in Table V within a subject category
which are decided on the merits after a motion is allowed to the number
of cases in that same category which are overruled during the term. This
will suggest which categories the Court recognizes to present relatively
more interesting or constitutional issues.
One of the more striking statistics to be found in this table is the com-
parison of the affirmed and reversed merit cases which are heard after a
motion has been allowed as opposed to the proportion of affirmance and
reversal on other merit appeals. It is obvious that, when the Court accepts
a motion to be heard on the merits, it anticipates both a question of legal
significance and a probability of error in one of the lower courts. Thus,
the reversals outnumber the instances of affirmance, in total as well as
within most subject categories. However, the reverse situation prevails for
other appeals, for here the Court is directed to hear these cases on the
merits in all instances. Cases from the Board of Tax Appeals are among
the most frequent categories of constitutionally permissible 0 and statu-
torily provided 09 appeals. There is dual appellate jurisdiction from the
Board of Tax Appeals in the Supreme Court and in the Courts of Appeals;
unfortunately, the choice of forum is left to the appellant, and many cases
are brought to the Court involving little more than reconsiderations of
factual disputes. This the Court has declined to do, as a general matter,410
4 0 0 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2 (B) (2) (a) (iii).
4 07 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2 (B) (2) (d).
408 OHIo CoNST. art. IV, § 2 (B) (2) (c).
409 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5717.04 (Page 1953).
410 Compare Bd. of Revision v. Federal Reserve Bank, 16 Ohio St. 2d 42, 242 N.E.2d 571
(1968), with Pennsylvania Rd. Co. v. Porterfield, 16 Ohio St. 2d 136, 243 N.E.2d 87 (1968).
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and in such a case it will ordinarily affirm. A far more reasonable statu-
tory scheme would be to require the first appeal as of right from the board
to the Court of Appeals, and to have those decisions reviewed only upon
the allowance of a motion to certify.
Another noteworthy statistic is the large number of criminal cases over-
ruled on motion. At least in part this is attributable to the negligence of
this author in failing to construct subcategories that would distinguish
procedure, evidence, various constitutional complaints and the other nice-
ties of criminal law. In defense it may be said that almost every case
raised several issues, and since most cases were not discussed on the merits
by the Court it was impossible to choose the most significant error alleged.
In sum, such an attempt would have been unduly misleading. But it may
also be pointed out that this category as a whole probably reveals the
Court's current attitude on criminal appeals. There are, I believe, at least
four factors influencing the apparent reluctance to allow motions for
leave to appeal: (1) the feeling that the Supreme Court of the United
States has usurped the authority to supervise criminal practice and with it
the responsibility,411 (2) an increasing awareness by the lower courts of
the requirements of criminal due process and a consequently more con-
scientious effort to conform to those requirements, (3) a continuing fail-
ure on the part of counsel to create a reviewable record including an ade-
quate bill of exceptions, 412 and (4) the transfer of post-conviction review
to the lower court 413 together with holdings that some complaints of
error may be lost.414
The column on "original actions" does not include rulings on demur-
rers which are not agreed by the parties to be dispositive of the case.
Since the establishment of Ohio's post-conviction review procedure, 415
many original actions brought by criminal defendants are inappropriate.
In such cases it is normal for the State to demur, and it is also normal for
the prisoner-appellant to decline to agree that the ruling on the demurrer
will be dispositive; in actuality, the waste of his time is no loss to him,
and if a demurrer is sustained he does not desire that this shall terminate
his legal proceedings.
Table V is concerned only with final dispositions. Thus, it does not
The former case was a waste of the Court's time, and the latter would have undoubtedly been
allowed as a motion because of the serious statutory and constitutional questions presented. See
discussion at section 11(N), supra.
411 See two articles by Chief Justice Taft, Protecting the Public from Mapp v. Ohio Without
Amending the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815 (1964), and Book Review, Search and Seizure
and the Supreme Court, 42 NoTm DAMi LAw. 589 (1967).
412 See, e.g., cases 68-58 through 68-63, dismissed as improvidently allowed on October 30,
1968.
413 OHIO RBV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21 (Page 1953). See Freeman v. Maxwell, Warden, 4
Ohio St. 2d 4, 210 N.E.2d 885 (1965).
414 State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967).
4 1 5 See note 411 supra.
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include cases which are dismissed for want of prosecution, upon the appli-
cation of appellant or upon agreement of the parties, motions to file de-
layed appeals which are overruled, or cases dismissed as moot. All of
these types of dispositions represent cases which, for practical purposes,
are not before the Court and are not considered by it. But to accurately
present the progress of the docket, even these cases are accounted for in
Table 1V(A) as "disposed of" or in Table IV(B) as "overruled."
Table VII shows the original county and appellate district of each
appeal filed in the Court. Each case filed as a motion is recorded again if
the motion is allowed. Therefore, the merit column will include allowed
motions and other appeals in cases which originate in a lower court.
TABLE I
PUBLISHED OPINIONS
January 1, 1965a - August 31, 1968
1/1- Sub Total
1965 1966 1967 8/31/681 Total Opinions
Taft Majority 13 13 21 18 65
Minorityc 9 15 7 14 45 110
Zimmerman Majority 11 10 12 11 44
Minority 3 4 0 4 11 55
Matthias Majority 11 12 13 17 53
Minority 1 1 1 2 5 58
O'Neill Majority 13 13 13 13 52
Minority 9 3 3 2 17 69
Herbert Majority 16 13 11 16 56
Minority 11 9 7 9 36 92
Schneider Majority 12 12 11 14 49
Minority 5 9 2 7 23 72
Brown Majority 12 9 8 9 38
Minority 1 5 3 2 11 49
Assigned Majority 4 3 3 0 10
Minority 1 0 1 1 3 13
Total Signed Majority 92 85 92 98 367
Total Signed Minority 40 46 24 41 151
Total Signed Opinions 132 131 116 139 518
Per Curiam 63 d 58 62 55 238
Total Opinions 195 189 178 194 756
a This is the date of the commencement of the terms of Schneider, J., and Brown, J.
b Including Casualty Co. v. Gall, 15 Ohio St. 2d 261 (1968), heard during previous term.
c Includes both concurring and dissenting opinions.
d Not including 64 original habeas corpus actions.
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TABLE II
PUBLISHED OPINIONSa











































a Not including brief elaborations of dissent or concurrence.
b Includes one election contest heard by Chief Justice only.
c Includes opinions in which dissenting in part and concurring in part.
d Term ending January 1, 1969.
e Resigned effective January 1, 1969.
f Term commencing January 2, 1969.
g Appointed effective January 7, 1969.
TABLE III
ACTION OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
(A) DISSENTING VOTESa, b
In Dispositions by
Published Opinion Announcement Total
Taft 7 10 17
Zimmerman 4 7 11
Matthias 7 7 14
O'Neill 4 12 16
Herbert (Paul) 11 6 17
Schneider 10 35 45
Brown 6 7 13
Herbert (Thomas) 5 5
Duncan 10 16 26
Assigned 2 3 5
Total 61 108 169
a. Includes express dissent and silent vote when not otherwise indicating Justice not participat-
ing on a motion or merit announcement, but only an express dissent on a published opinion.
b. Multiple case numbers with single opinion or announced vote counted once for each case
number.
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(B)a
Uwanimous With Dissent Total
Published Opinionsb 95 40 135
70% 30%
Merit Cases and Motions 197 71 268
with Announced Vote 73.5% 26.5%
Total 292 111 403
72.5% 27.5%
a. Footnote a to Section (A) applies.
b. Multiple case numbers with one opinion counted once.
c. Multiple case numbers with single announced vote counted once for each case number.
(C) Votes of Each Justice with Another
Mb 61 54 27 90 12 102 105 68
Taft Sc 2 1 2 1
Td 61 54 27 92 12 103 107 69
Ne 76 63 37 111 23 120 122 79
M 32 26 30 61 15 73 74
Zimmerman S
T 32 26 30 61 15 73 74
N 37 31 36 75 23 82 82
M 69 63 32 99 13 111
Matthias S 1
T 70 63 32 99 13 111
N 86 71 37 122 24 128
M 67 60 31 98 15
O'Neill S 1 1 2 1
T 68 60 32 100 16
N 83 69 38 119 24
M 9 9
Herbert S 1 1
(Paul) T 10 10
N 21 21
M 60 55 24
Schneider S 1 2
T 60 56 26
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a. The cases are limited to those on the merits with published opinions, either signed or per
curiam.
b. Represents majority opinions of the court, either signed or per curiam, in which a justice
concurs generally.
c. Represents separate opinions, of any length, either concurring or dissenting. Also includes
similar votes dissenting or concurring with reservations.
d. Total agreements in "M" and "S".
e. Represents number of cases in which both Justices participated, and therefore the total op-
portunities on the merits for expressed agreement.
TABLE IV
DISPOSITION OF CASES




















Motions to Certify and
Claimed Appeals as of
Right on Constitutional
Questions in Civil Cases.
Jurisdiction Determined on
Motions for Leave to
Appeal and Claimed Appeals
as of Right on Constitutional






a. Includes motions on which jurisdiction determined during term.
b. Includes 23 consolidated cases involving the distribution of the Cuyahoga County local gov-
ernment fund, Brook Park v. Budget Comm., 16 Ohio St. 2d 119 (1968).
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(B) Disposition of Cases Where Memoranda
In Support of Jurisdiction Required
Pending Pending
9/1/68 Filed Allowed Overruled* 8/31/69
Motions to Certify and
Claimed Appeals as of
Right on Constitutional
Questions in Civil Cases 414 74 316
Motions for Leave to Appeal
and Claimed Appeals as of
Right on Constitutional
Questions in Criminal Cases 218 9 174
Total 248 632 83 490 307
Also includes a dismissal of a case upon motion to dismiss, for want of prosecution, upon
application of appellant, or upon agreement of the parties.
(C) Applications for Rehearing
Pending Pending
9/1/68 Filed Allowed Overruled 8/31/69
1 55 0 56 0
(D) Disciplinary Cases
Pending Pending
9/1/68 Filed* Disposed of 8/31/69
6 8 8 6
" Includes 4 petitions for reinstatement recorded under case number of previously disposed
cases.
TABLE V
SUBJECT MATTER OF FINAL DISPOSITIONSa
MOTIONS
OVERRjLEDb ON MERITS TOTAL
After Motion Allowed' Other Appeal Original
Affirm Reverse°  Affirm' Reversee Actionst
Adoption 2 2
Annexation 2 1 1 4
Appeals 23 23
Appropriation 6 4 2 2 14
Assessments 1 1 2
Bastardy 2 2




Contracts 8 2 1 11
Corporations 3 3













































































27 24 34 610
a. Many category assignments are arbitrary; for example, in a given case the distinction be-
tween "annexation" and "elections" may be difficult Choices are made on the basis of the
principal issue in each case. The "Motions" tabulated above do not include: those cases dis-
missed for want of prosecution, upon application of appellant, or upon agreement of the
parties; those cases on the disciplinary docket; motions to file delayed appeal which are over-
ruled; cases dismissed as moot;, or motions for rehearing.
b. Includes motions allowed and subsequently dismissed as improvidently allowed. Motions
allowed will appear as final dispositions when decided on the merits. Also includes mo-
tions to dismiss an appeal which are sustained.
c. Does not include those cases dismissed as improvidently allowed.
d. Includes modified judgments, and includes dismissals upon motion to dismiss.
e. Includes affirmed in part and reversed in part.
t. Does not include rulings on demurrer which are not agreed to be dispositive.
g. 23 consolidated cases counted only once. See Table IV(A), note b, supra. Also, consoli-
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1 1
1 0 5 1 0 1 8
a. Does not include motions for reconsideration or to remand to Board of Commissioners.






















































































































































































































a This column does not include habeas corpus and other original actions, appeals from the
Board of Tax Appeals, or appeals from the Public Utilities Commission.
